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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 1999, tens of thousands of protestors disrupted the Third
Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in Seat-
tle. Although the demonstrators represented diverse interests, they
shared a common concern about the growing power of transnational cor-
porations ("TNCs") and the consequences of corporate practices and
globalization for the environment, labor, and human rights. The protests
captured the interest of the mainstream media, and catapulted the debate
about free trade into the public consciousness. A central element of the
trade debate is disagreement about the relationship between free trade
and globalization, on the one hand, and environmental and social stan-
dards and impacts, on the other.
Both critics and proponents of globalization agree that there has been a
significant expansion, over the last decade, of international mechanisms
to define and enforce economic rules that promote and protect global
markets, and secure and advance the rights and economic interests of
TNCs. But efforts by governments to articulate and enforce global
norms to protect the environment, labor and human rights have lagged.
A considerable gap remains between the noble promises in official
speeches and documents, and the willingness or ability of governments
to implement them. This imbalance in international governance is illus-
trated by the fact that under the rules governing trade today, there is a
meaningful legal mechanism to hold a company accountable for pirating
a Madonna video, but not for contaminating the environment or using
forced or child labor.
Critics of globalization see free trade as an environmentally and so-
cially destructive force that harms more people than it benefits, and say it
is naive to believe that corporations will voluntarily use their power for
humanitarian purposes when it could affect "the bottom line." Propo-
nents of free trade and globalization argue that trade and investment in
developing countries bring not only economic development but also
higher standards of environmental protection and human and labor rights.
Especially since the Seattle protests, they increasingly recognize the need
to pay greater attention to environmental and social concerns in order to,
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in the words of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, "give a
human face to the global markets."' Nonetheless, they maintain that
globalization is the best way to address environmental and social needs
and concerns in the developing world, arguing that trade and investment
offer opportunities to export international standards, promote the rule of
law and good governance, and close the gap between the rich and poor.
Although a few officials, including former U.S. President Bill Clinton,
have called for public rule-making at the global level to address at least
some of the concerns raised by critics of globalization, most of the public
discourse has emphasized private, voluntary initiatives by TNCs, rooted
in corporate responsibility.2  TNCs, they argue, increasingly recognize
that good corporate citizenship not only is an ethical responsibility that
comes with the growing reach of corporate power and rights, but also is
good for business. In the environmental arena, this is consistent with
emerging principles of the international law of sustainable development,
which embrace international trade and direct national governments to fill
the environmental law vacuum by developing effective national regula-
tion to implement international commitments and protect the environ-
ment.3 The popular view, then, is that corporate responsibility will com-
plement nascent government regulation as developing nations gain
environmental experience and capacity, and strengthen national democ-
ratic institutions and the rule of law, including environmental law.
These assumptions, however, are seldom checked against close obser-
vation of corporate behavior in the developing world. This Article seeks
to help inform the trade debate by examining one initiative to implement
international environmental standards in the Amazon Rainforest in Ecua-
dor, by a U.S.-based oil company, Occidental Petroleum ("Occidental").
In this case, Occidental has used "international standards" to wrap its ac-
tivities in a veneer of environmental excellence; reassure government of-
I. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Address to the World Economic Forum, Davos,
Switzerland (Jan. 31, 1999). Annan raised these concerns before the Seattle protests.
2. In Seattle, President Clinton called for labor standards to be included in trade agreements. This
position was vehemently opposed by developing countries at the WTO meeting. As a general mat-
ter, governments and TNCs have opposed the development of an international environmental and
social regulatory regime.
3. Another key principle recognizes the importance of broad public participation in environmental
decision-making and implementation. See. e.g., U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, princs. 10, I1, 12, 13,
16, 17, 20, 22, 27, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 15l/5Rev.I (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [here-
inafter Rio DECLARATION]. The Rio DECLARATION was adopted by resolution of 178 governments
but is not legally binding. Rather, it represents international consensus and provides evidence of
customary international law. See also U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
AGENDA 2 1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26/Rev. I Ch. 23 (1992) [hereinafter AGENDA 21 ].
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ficials and local residents; cultivate confusion about standards and prac-
tices that apply to the operations; deflect meaningful oversight and trans-
parency; and arbitrarily legitimize norms that have been defined by spe-
cial interests. At the same time, the company has quietly negotiated an
environmental law regime in its contract with Ecuador that seems de-
signed to perpetuate and even legalize environmental self-regulation.
These findings contradict the popular view that governments like Ecua-
dor are on a "learning curve," and that foreign investment by TNCs
strengthens the capacity of national officials to implement environmental
law.4 They suggest that, in order for international standards and corpo-
rate responsibility to promote the rule of law in environmental affairs,
and reliably raise standards for environmental protection, the interna-
tional community needs to move beyond statements of principle, and de-
velop transparent and participatory mechanisms to independently moni-
tor and evaluate claims of environmental excellence by TNCs. In
addition, the practice of negotiating environmental rules in contracts with
TNCs raises serious questions of law and legitimacy, and should be pub-
licly disclosed and debated before adherence to those contractual provi-
sions becomes a litmus test for democratic development and the rule of
law in Ecuador.
The Article begins with a general discussion of international standards,
sustainable development and corporate responsibility, followed by an
overview of Occidental's corporate policy and operations. It continues
with a brief discussion of environmental law in Ecuador, and an intro-
duction to the company's contract with the State. It then examines pro-
visions in the contract that relate to international standards, and the im-
4. A related idea is that responsible TNCs can create new models to demonstrate that economic
development and environmental protection can co-exist. Representatives of "responsible" compa-
nies are understandably reluctant to belittle national environmental standards and capacity on the
record; however, they readily confirm that they go beyond what is required. In describing Royal
Dutch/Shell's exploratory and planned production operations for the Camisea gas fields in Peru, cor-
porate officials were unusually candid. When asked what the government requires of Shell in the
environmental arena, one top environmental official said: "We tell them what they want.... The
government requires that we keep our promises." Interview with Bruce Skinner, Health, Safety &
Environment Manager, The Camisea Project, Bechtel-Cosapi-Odebrecht Consortuim, in Lima, Peru
(July 7, 1998).
Another official was more visionary. He said that Peru's environmental guidelines are "young,"
but expressed hope that government officials are "on a learning curve." At th time, oversight was
not significant; environmental officials primarily asked the company for docullentation. However,
Shell expected Peru's "environmental division-always the weakest group in any institution" -to
change and become more active and competent over time. The company, he said, looked forward to
working with the government to demonstrate a model operation that environmental officials could
use to raise standards throughout the oil patch. Interview with Murray Jones, Chief of Health, Safety
& Environment, Shell Prospecting and Development (Peru) B.V., in Lima, Peru (July 9 & 15, 1998).
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plementation by Occidental of the ISO 14001 standard for environmental
management, which is commonly cited by corporate and government of-
ficials as the most important international standard for the operations.
The Article continues with a discussion of additional provisions in the
contract that define rules for environmental protection, including a provi-
sion that adopts Occidental's corporate environmental management plan
("EMP") as a legal standard. A detailed review of the EMP follows.
The Article concludes that the EMP and contract operate together to cede
environmental rule-making authority to Occidental, without public dis-
closure or meaingful review and approval by the government, and that
this amounts to the privatization of environmental law. To shed light on
the consequences of this legal framework, and levels of environmental
protection, the Article then examines Occidental's operations in the oil
fields, while acknowledging that the public record is murky in some im-
portant respects. It concludes with some general observations and rec-
ommendationss
5. In addition to the sources cited infra. the Article draws on the author's observations during
regular visits since 1989 to oil field facilities and affected communities in Ecuador's Amazon region;
participation in local, national and international fora; and interviews and ongoing dialogue with local
residents, oil company workers and executives, religious and medical workers, and government ofli-
cials, including environmental officials in successive Ecuadorian governments, and some U.S. and
European officials. From 1989-1996, the author resided primarily in Ecuador's capital, Quito.
Documentation by the author--based on field work with the indigenous organization, FCUNAE
(Federation of Comunas Union of Natives of the Ecuadorian Amazon)--of the environmental and
social impact of oil development in Ecuador's Amazon region first alerted Ecuadorians outside of
the region to the environmental costs of oil development in tropical forests and placed the issue on
the national and international environmental and human rights policy agendas. See generally JUDITH
KIMERLING, AMAZON CRUDE (NRDC 1991) (Spanish-language adaptation in CRUDO AMAZONICO,
Ediciones Abya Yala, 1993) (hereinafter IMERLING 1991]. Portions of AMAZON CRUDE are re-
printed in Judith Kimerling, Disregarding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected
Natural Areas and Indigenous Homelands in Ecuadorian Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 849 (1991). See also James Brooke, Oil and Tourism Don 't Mix. Inciting Amazon Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1993, at A3 (referring to AMAZON CRUDE as the SILENT SPRING of Ecuador's envi-
ronmental movement). A follow-up study, supported by a research and writing grant from the John
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, examined environmental law in the oil fields and the
rule of law in Ecuador. See generally Judith Kimerling, Rights. Responsibilities and Realities: Envi-
ronmental Protection Law in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields, 2 Sw. J. OF L. & TRADE AM. 293 (1995)
(hereinafter Kimerling 1995] (Spanish- language adaptation in EL DERECHO DEL TAMBOR, Ediciones
Abya Yala, 1996).
FCUNAE is currently comprised of sixty-seven indigenous Quichua communities located in and
near the lower Napo River basin, including communities affected by Occidental. Field work and
interviews for this study were conducted in the summers of 1998, 1999 and 2000. Many residents
and some oil workers and government officials spoke with the author in confidence, and asked that
their names not be published because of concern about possible retribution from Occidental or Ecua-
dor's government.
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II. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
The call for TNCs to serve as stewards of environmental and social re-
sponsibility in the developing world can be seen as a continuation and
expansion of discussions about the role of business in promoting sustain-
able development, that gathered force over the last decade in the wake of
the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
("UNCED"). As governmental and nongovernmental actors prepared for
UNCED, also known as the Earth Summit, representatives from industry
promoted the idea that corporations can and will play a key role in im-
plementing sustainable development. The Earth Summit became the first
major United Nations-sponsored global conference with strong business
participation, led by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and
6the newly-formed Business Council for Sustainable Development. At
the Earth Summit, governments agreed that the current course of devel-
opment is unsustainable, and pledged to change course.
Since then, the term "sustainable development" has become popular
with governments, industry and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Its meaning, however, remains poorly defined. In essence, the concept
of sustainable development recognizes the need to integrate environ-
mental and development concerns and decision-making, in order to en-
sure that development not only meets the needs of present generations,
6. See generally International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Business Charter for Sustainable
Development (1991), at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment/charter.asp (last visited Apr. 3,
2001); STEPHEN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
By 1997, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) included 120 in-
ternational companies from thirty-five countries and more than twenty industrial sectors "united by a
shared commitment to the environment and to the principles of economic growth and sustainable
development." WORLD BUSINESS COUNSEL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SIGNALS OF
CHANGE, at 4 (1997) [hereinafter SIGNALS OF CHANGE]. In a report prepared for the United Nations
General Assembly Special Session, "Earth Sunmiit + 5:' to review progress five years after
UNCED, WBCSD claims that business has "changed a great deal since the decades preceding the
1992 Earth Summie" and made "substantial progress" toward implementing sustainable develop-
ment. At the same time, it aclowledges that "society is still a long way from achieving sustainable
development, and that further progress will require contributions from all sectors of society." Id. at
6. The report argues that free trade promotes sustainable development and higher environmental
standards, but also recognizes that "there will always be a need for clear, effective, enforced regula-
tions, especially in cases of threat to human health" and for "effective citizen participation in deci-
sion making." Id. at 6-7, 44-45, 48, 50-55.
These statements echo some of the principles that were agreed to at the Earth Summit, favoring
free trade, the development of national environmental regulation, and broad public participation.
See, e.g., Rio DECLARATION, supra note 3, at princs. 10-13, 16-17, 20, 22, 27.
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but also is fair to future generations.7 In a prelude to the greater contro-
versy to come, many environmentalists were disappointed by the failure
of governments at the Earth Summit to define global rules to regulate
corporate conduct to achieve sustainable development, and were skepti-
cal of expressions of corporate goodwill.8 The under-stated reality, how-
ever, seemed to be that governments were counting on private corpora-
tions to carry out and pay for sustainable development.9
One arena where the trade debate is played out with real world conse-
quences is the development of oil and gas fields in indigenous territories
in Amazonia. The Amazon Rainforest is the world's largest remaining
humid tropical forest. It contains the greatest biological diversity of any
known ecosystem, is a natural carbon reservoir, and is believed to con-
tain twenty to twenty-five percent of the world's flowing fresh water. It
is generally regarded as an environmentally sensitive region, and is home
to hundreds of ethnolinguistic groups of indigenous peoples whose
health, well-being and cultural survival are closely linked with environ-
mental quality. Oil and gas exploration and production are industrial ac-
tivities. Among other environmental impacts, they typically generate
large quantities of wastes with toxic constituents, in addition to present-
ing risks of oil and chemical spills.'0
"Saving the Rainforest" became a popular cause with environmental-
ists and the public in the late 1980s. Around 1990, documentation of ir-
responsible oil field practices in Ecuador's Amazon region by the U.S.-
based TNC, Texaco, and other companies, added a new issue to the rain-
7. The concept of sustainable development was first developed in the 1987 report of the World
Commission on Environment and Development. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) (also referred to as the "Brundtland Commission
Report"). With the Earth Summit in 1992, the term became firmly embedded in policy and public
discourse.
8. Instead, developing nations committed to develop effective regulation at the national level. See
supra note 3. This is consistent with the position advocated by TNCs. As a general matter, TNCs
have opposed international environmental regulation of their operations. At the same time, they
have expressed support for the international harmonization of national laws and corporate standards.
For a discussion of TNCs and international environmental standards, see Robert J. Fowler, Interna-
tional Environmental Standards for Transnational Corporations, 25 ENVTL. L. I (1995).
9. Indeed, the 1990s saw a dramatic change in the patterns of international capital flows to devel-
oping countries. Development aid from industrial countries dropped, and private capital flows in the
form of foreign direct investment ("FDI") increased. As a proportion of capital flowing into devel-
oping countries, FDI rose from thirty-three percent in 1991 to seventy-five percent in 1996.
SIGNALS OF CHANGE, supra note 6 at 44 (1997); see also WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT
INDICATORS (1997).
10. In addition to pollution, oil and gas exploration and production can cause dislocation of in-
digenous peoples, disease, forced or accelerated acculturation, dependency, deforestation, depletion
of natural resources, habitat loss and fragmentation, disruption of natural drainage patterns, threat-
ened or lost biodiversity, and impetus for further development.
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forest agenda. The revelations spawned a surge in national and interna-
tional concern about the impact of oil development on the environment
and human rights in tropical forests, and buttressed longstanding local
grievances. In response to growing international and local conflict and
confrontation, some TNCs acknowledged that national governments have
not implemented meaningful environmental regulation, and that local
communities bear the costs of irresponsible development without sharing
in the benefits. They publicly pledged to change their practices, and im-
plement environmental protection and community relations measures
that go beyond what is required of them by national governments in host
countries. While recognizing that there have been problems in the past, a
growing number of international companies-including Occidental in
Ecuador-now claim to voluntarily abide by "international standards" or
"best practice."' 12 Although corporate officials generally cite ethical
rather than legal obligations and responsibilities, national laws in a num-
ber of countries, including Ecuador, include general provisions that, in
theory, require oil companies to abide by unspecified "international stan-
dards."' 3
II. See generally KIMERLING 1991, supra note 5. Among other disclosures, oil production facili-
ties at the time deliberately discharged 4.3 million gallons of wastes with toxic constituents into the
environment every day; waste oil was applied to roads for dust control purposes; hundreds of open,
unlined waste pits dotted the region, contaminating countless streams and rivers that served as local
water supplies and fisheries; flares burned tens of millions of cubic feet of natural gas as a waste
every day, without environmental controls; and oil company roads had opened an estimated one mil-
lion hectares of tropical rain forest to colonization and deforestation by incoming settlers. In addi-
tion to impacts from routine operations, accidental spills from the main pipeline alone dumped some
16.8 million gallons of crude oil into the environment; by comparison, the Exxon Valdez spilled
some 10.8 million gallons, in the largest oil spill in U.S. history.
For a recent study of the impact of oil field operations in the region on health in local communi-
ties, see generally, Manuel Amunirriz Institutue for Epidemiology and Community Health, Informe
Yana Curl: Impacto de la actividad petrolera en la salud de poblaciones rurales de la Amazonia
Ecuatoriana [Yana Curi Report: Impact of Petroleum Activity on the Health of Rural Populations in
the Ecuadorian Amazon] (Ediciones Abya Yala, CICAME and Medicus Mundi Gipuzkoa) (investi-
gation by Dr. Miguel San Sebastiin and Sandi Yura Health Promoters Association, finding elevated
levels of miscarriage and other health problems among women in the study area, and a cancer cluster
among men in one contaminated community).
12. At the time, Occidental did not make similar promises for existing operations in Peru or Co-
lombia. Other companies in Ecuador included Conoco, Maxus (now Repsol-YPF), and ARCO.
Both Conoco and ARCO have since sold their interests in Ecuador. In the Peruvian Amazon, opera-
tors that promised to voluntarily implement some variation of international standards or best practice
during the 1990s included Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Mobil Corp. and Chevron. Occidental is cur-
rently under fire for its efforts to expand operations in Colombia, because of steadfast opposition by
indigenous U'wa. The U'wa believe they have a duty to protect Mother Earth, and that oil extrac-
tion in their traditional territory would bleed her to death, in addition to attracting increased guerilla,
paramilitary and military violence and conflict to the area.
13. Companies arguably also have a legal duty to use a reasonable level of care in their operations,
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The emerging recognition by some governments and TNCs that a dou-
ble standard of environmental protection is no longer appropriate could
be a significant development in government and corporate policy in
Amazonia. 4 Nonetheless, the claim or requirement to abide by "interna-
tional standards," "best practice" or some other variation of "world
class," "responsible" standards and practices risks becoming a hollow
platitude in many areas-and undermining rather than promoting na-
tional environmental law-because affected communities, environmental
and human rights advocates, and even government officials and policy-
makers do not really know what it means. To date, neither governments,
industry, nor the academic community have clearly defined "interna-
tional standards" and "best practice," nor determined how to measure
irrespective of government regulation. In Ecuador, for example, the Civil Code establishes a general
duty of care, similar to a common law duty in the United States. It is defined as the duty to use the
same level of care as "a good father of a family." It applies generally to all conduct by all compa-
nies, and there is no principled reason why it should not apply to environmental practices by oil
companies when others could be harmed thereby. CIVIL CODE [CIv. C.], arts. 29, 2214-15, R.O. No.
399 (Dec. 29, 1982) (Ecuador). For a fuller discussion of Ecuador's Civil Code, see Kimerling
1995, supra note 5. In addition, for corporate decisions made in the United States, common law du-
ties arguably apply even when actions to implement the decisions, and actionable impacts, occur
abroad.
14. Consensus on this point does not necessarily extend to other regions or industrial sectors. As a
general matter, TNCs have expressed growing support for the concept of going beyond legal re-
quirements, to apply equivalent standards for corporate environmental management on a global ba-
sis. See, e.g., ICC, BUSINESS CHARTER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 6, princ. 3
("To continue to improve corporate policies, programs and environmental performance ... with le-
gal requirements as a starting point; and to apply the same environmental criteria internationally.")
The BUSINESS CHARTER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT was one of the earliest expressions of
-international standards" for environmental protection in developing countries. It was launched by
ICC in 1991. By 1997, it had been translated into twenty-three languages and supported by more
than 2,500 companies. See SIGNALS OF CHANGE, supra note 6, at 7.
At the same time, industry has vigorously opposed public international rle-making and regula-
tion. These apparently mixed signals can be reconciled by the view that TNCs favor voluntary in-
ternational corporate standards, but oppose legally binding ones. Some observers argue that the
groundswell of pledges by TNCs to embrace corporate responsibility is primarily an effort to pre-
clude government regulation.
Nation states, especially developing countries, have consistently defended their sovereign right to
determine their own environmental and development laws and policies, and agreed to a contradictory
principle at the Earth Summit:
States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental standards, management
objectives and priorities should reflect the environmental and developmental context to which
they apply. Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted
economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.
Rio DECLARATION, supra note 3, at princ. II. The principle of differentiated environmental stan-
dards is based on the belief that costly environmental requirements could undermine economic de-
velopment, and that developing countries may choose to prioritize the generation of jobs and reve-
nues over environmental concerns. Industrial nations, they say, became wealthy at great
environmental expense, and should not expect poor countries to forego those trade-offs.
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compliance. Like "sustainable development," the terms have become
fashionable in corporate, governmental and some NGO circles; however,
most of the public discourse has been very general, focusing on princi-
ples rather than the specifics of how to achieve them.'5 Especially in the
corporate world, the terms are not used to refer to binding regulatory re-
quirements, but rather, refer to non-binding goals.
Most written commitments by international oil companies are general
and inexplicit, and allow for considerable leeway in how to interpret
them. Even the most innovative companies have not yet matched their
claims-that they can extract oil and gas from fragile tropical forest eco-
systems without harming the environment or local populations-with the
information that is needed to verify their accuracy.' 6 Government agen-
cies continue to depend on training by the industry they are charged with
regulating, and rely on industry analyses of environmental and public
health issues. Environmental decision-making and monitoring are typi-
cally carried out behind closed doors, without transparency or meaning-
ful participation by affected communities and other stakeholders. On an
international level, oil field standards and practices vary considerably in
different locations. As a result, TNCs in the tropics essentially pick and
choose which standards to apply, and how to measure compliance.
Ill. OCCIDENTAL IN ECUADOR--CORPORATE POLICY AND OPERATIONS
According to corporate officials, Occidental is the largest U.S.-based
producer of crude oil in Latin America. In Amazonia, the company has
conducted exploration and production activities in Ecuador, Colombia
and Peru. In the words of Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation's World-
wide Environmental Manager, Clark Hull, "down there, we're the big
15. In U.S. domestic environmental law, the use of technology-based standards for pollution con-
trol is well developed for some sources. The specifics of this experience, however, are generally not
brought to bear on the trade debate or public discussions of "best practice" for international oil field
operations.
16. One company, Royal Dutch/Shell, launched an effort to change that trend. As part of the com-
pany's initiative to develop a new model for hydrocarbon operations in the Caniisea gas fields in
Peru, Shell reached out to a wide range of stakeholders and facilitated the distribution of information
about environmental and social standards and practices. However, Shell abandoned full field devel-
opment plans for Camisea a few months before construction was expected to begin, after failing to
reach agreement with Peru over the distribution, pricing and export of gas. Occidental objects to any
comparison with Shell, and argues--correctly--that it is easier to nurture good stakeholder relations
about future plans, but considerably more difficult to maintain them after the operations are up and
running. Telephone interview with Lawrence Meriage, Vice President, Executive Services and Pub-
lic Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation, and Clark Hull, Worldwide Environmental Man-
ager, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (Oct. 22, 1999).
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guys."' 7 Production facilities in Ecuador are the newest major project by
the company. As a result, they incorporate Occidental's highest envi-
ronmental standards. According to Hull, "for Oxy (Occidental), Ecuador
is the top."'" Activities there began in 1985, after the company's Ecua-
dorian subsidiary, Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Su-
cursal Ecuador ("Occidental Ecuador"), signed a contract with Ecuador's
national oil company (CEPE, now Petroecuador) for the exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbons in a 200,000-hectare 9 area designated as
"Block 15." Efforts to improve environmental practices and community
relations began around 1990-91, after revelations about irresponsible oil
field practices in Ecuador's Amazon region put a spotlight on the indus-
try there. At the time, Occidental had conducted some oil exploration,
but had not yet begun production activities.
Although Occidental prefers to maintain a low public profile, the com-
pany's Ecuador operations have nonetheless been promoted within se-
lected circles in industry, government, NGOs that are considered "repu-
table" by the company, and local communities, as a successful new
model of responsible "world class" environmental protection and com-
munity relations."20 For example, in 1996, The Houston Chronicle re-
ported that Occidental's production "seems a model of how oil can be
extracted in environmentally sensitive areas of the tropics."'" The fol-
lowing year, Oil and Gas Journal reported that Occidental "has imple-
mented a comprehensive strategy of strict environmental protection
measures and aggressive community relations initiatives" in Ecuador,
and characterized the undertaking an "unqualified success" and a "world
class" environmental operation.22  On a local level, Occidental has re-
peatedly assured residents-who are aware of environmental devastation
caused by the continued use of antiquated technology by other oil com-
17. Interview with Clark Hull, Worldwide Environmental Manager, Occidental Oil and Gas Cor-
poration, in Palo Alto, Cal. (Nov. 10, 1999) [hereinafter Hull Interview).
18. Id.
19. One hectare is 100 meters x 100 meters or 2.47 acres; 200,000 hectares is 2,000 square kilo-
meters.
20. Telephone interview with Lawrence Meriage, Vice President, Executive Services and Public
Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (Dec. 7,1998) [hereinafter Meriage Interview I.
21. Dudley Althaus, Amazon s Empty Legacy; Big Oil Responds to Environment: Toll on Rain
Forest, Culture Still Unacceptable to Critics, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 15, 1996, at Al.
22. Bob Williams, Oxy's Strategy on Environment. Community Issues Key to Success of Project in
Ecuador's Rain Forest, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 21, 1997, at 44 [hereinafter Williams 19971. OIL AND
GAS JOURNAL describes itself as "the Bible of the oil and gas industry for almost a century." Bob
Williams, Petroleum's Brave New World, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 13, 1999, at 3. The weekly magazine
is widely circulated and read in the industry; the author observed a stack of back issues on a desk in
Occidental's Central Processing Facility (CPF) office.
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panies in the region-that its operations use "tecnologia de punta," cut-
ting edge technology.
Occidental has also produced a glossy Spanish-language brochure, en-
titled "Oxy, Certificada ISO 14001" ("Oxy, ISO 14001 Certified"), and a
short English-language video called "The Human Face of Petroleum. 23
These materials paint a portrait of corporate responsibility. They say the
'right things,' and avow a commitment to protect the environment, re-
spect indigenous cultures, be a good neighbor, and promote self-reliant
sustainable development. Color photographs show proud and smiling
indigenous residents and greenery in and around oil field installations.
Even roofs, tanks and pipelines have been painted green.
The Ecuador materials are consistent with Occidental Oil and Gas
Corporation's published corporate policy. Applicable worldwide, the
company's "Health, Environment and Safety Management System
("HESMS") Guidance Manual" begins by affirming a commitment to
"the highest standards of ethical conduct and social responsibility," and
continues:
A key element in the area of social responsibility is our commitment to
conduct our business in a manner which protects the environment, main-
tains a strong safety program for the workplace and promotes sound occu-
pational health standards among our employees. 4
The manual includes a "Good Neighbor Policy" and ten "Health, Envi-
ronment and Safety Principles. ''21 Practices in Block 15, however, do not
match the company's promises. Notwithstanding a worldwide policy to"support the concept of public accountability for HES [Health, Environ-
ment and Safety] performance and ... report on our progress in measur-
able terms,, 26 Occidental has refused to fully disclose the environmental
standards it applies to operations in Ecuador, or information that is
23. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, OXT CERTIFICADA ISO 14001
[OXY, ISO 14001 CERTIFIED], July 1998 (Ecuador). The brochure has been distributed in Ecuador.
The video has been mailed to groups and individuals in the United States who inquire about opera-
tions in Ecuador.
24. OCCIDENTAL OIL & GAS CORPORATION, HEALTH, ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: GUIDANCE MANUAL (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter HESMS GUIDANCE
MANUAL). Occidental Oil & Gas is a subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum.
25. Id. at i, 6-7.
26. Id. at note 24, princ. 10. Principle 8 also recognizes the importance of disclosure, and states:
Appropriate officials, employees, contractors, customers and the public, who may be affected
will be informed about relevant health, safety or environmental issues related to our facilities in
a timely manner. Our facilities will regularly participate in an open dialogue with neighboring
communities to share information and respond to the public's input or concerns about safety,
health and environment....
Id. at princ. 8.
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needed to verify corporate claims of environmental excellence. In addi-
tion, the company's community relations are, from the perspective of lo-
cal residents, characterized by serious problems. Among other issues,
representatives of indigenous Quichua who live near wells and produc-
tion facilities say that recent efforts by affected communities to partici-
pate in environmental monitoring and gain access to information about
environmental standards and practices have been rebuffed by Occidental,
and a number of grievances and concerns have not been resolved."
Located in the upper Amazon basin, Block 15 crosses two major riv-
ers, the Napo and the Aguarico, to the east (and downstream) of the oil
boom towns, Puerto Francisco de Orellana (Coca) and Nueva Loja (Lago
Agrio), respectively. It includes lands that have been titled to indigenous
Quichua who live on and around the Napo River, and indigenous Secoya
and Siona who live on and around the Aguarico River. 28 Block 15 also
includes lands that have been designated as protected natural areas under
Ecuadorian law: the entire Limoncocha Biological Reserve and Pafiaco-
cha Protected Forest, as well as parts of Yasuni National Park and Cuya-
beno Wildlife Reserve.
Occidental initiated its search for oil in the western part of Block 15,
conducting seismic studies and drilling exploratory wells. In July 1992,
the company declared the comercialidad, or commercial marketability of
early discoveries, and three weeks later Petroecuador authorized Occi-
dental to begin extraction operations. 29 Production began in mid-1993.
27. This finding is based on visits to affected indigenous Quichua communities in 1998-2000.
Another major problem is Occidental's use of expropriation by Ecuador to secure access to lands for
production facilities. See infra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. A full discussion of commu-
nity relations is beyond the scope of this article. See generally Judith Kimerling, Uncommon
Ground: Occidental's Land Access and Community Relations Standards and Practices in Quichua
Communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, I I L. & ANTHROPOLOGY, 179-247 (2001) [hereinafter
Kimerling 2001 ].
28. Residents of Block 15 include a relatively small number of settlers, or colonists, from Ecua-
dor's highland and coastal regions ("colonos") and Shuar. The Shuar are indigenous to Ecuador's
southern Amazon region and, like most colonos, migrated to the Napo and Aguarico basins in search
of land, in the wake of the oil boom that followed the discovery of commercial quantities of Amazon
crude in Ecuador by Texaco in 1967. See generally KiMERLING 199 1, supra note 5.
29. Contrato Maodificatorio de Prestacidn de Servicios para la Exploracidn y Exploitacidn de
Hidrocarburos (Petroleo Crudo) en el Bloque 15 de la Regidn Amaz6nica Ecuatoriana, Celebrado
Entre el Estado Ecuatoriano por Intermedio de la Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroec-
uador) y ia Compafia Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Sucursal Ecuador [Modi-
fied Service Contract for the Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons (Crude Oil) in Block 15
in the Ecuadorian Amazon Region, Celebrated between the Ecuadorian State, through The State Oil
Company of Ecuador (Petroecuador) and the Company Occidental Exploration and Production
Company, Sucursal Ecuador], Quito (May 21, 1999), paras. 2.1-2.4 [hereinafter Contract].
The Contract as well as the environmental impact assessments and management plans, Ecuadorian
legal provisions, and some other documents were reviewed in Spanish, but are cited primarily in
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In 1995, Occidental and Ecuador's government reached an agreement to
expand exploratory activities throughout the remaining ninety-seven per-
cent of Block 15. The first exploratory well under that program was
drilled in 1996 in the southeastern comer of the Block, in the remote
Quichua community of El Eden. Named Eden-i, the well located com-
mercially valuable oil (Eden-Yuturi reserves). According to Oil and Gas
Journal, Occidental estimates Block 15's total potential reserves at 300-
400 million barrels, 30 an amount equivalent to roughly fifteen to twenty-
one days of petroleum product consumption in the United States.
In 1997, Occidental proposed to re-negotiate its contract with Petroec-
uador, based on reforms to Ecuador's Law of Hydrocarbons that were
intended to enhance the country's attractiveness to foreign investment in
the oil and gas sector. In May 1999, Occidental and Ecuador, through
Petroecuador, signed a modified contract. This contract ("the Contract"),
which is currently in effect, contemplates the continued expansion of ex-
ploration and production in Block 15 and two adjacent areas.3 Under
the Contract, Occidental has the obligation and exclusive right to operate
existing facilities in Block 15 until 2012, and to find, develop and oper-
ate subsequent discoveries until 2019.
According to corporate officials, Occidental produces some 18,000
barrels of oil per day, from twenty-two production wells located on six
drilling platforms. A seventh platform is the site of a waste injection
well.3 2 The platforms and a central production facility ("CPF") are con-
English for the reader's convenience. Translations are by the author.
30. Williams 1997, supra note 22, at 45.
31. In addition to reserves that are located exclusively in Block IS, Occidental has also been des-
ignated as the operator of two oil fields that span both Block 15 and adjacent areas that have been
controlled by Petroecuador. As the operator of the campos unificados, unified oil fields, Occidental
will assume operation of some of Petroecuador's existing production facilities, in addition to build-
ing new ones. The modifications also changed Occidental's contract from a service contract to a
participation contract. See Contract, supra note 29. The contract approval process is discussed infra
note 76.
32. Another injection well shares a platform with two producing wells, and a third injection well is
located at the Central Processing Facility ("CPF"). Presentation by and interview with Marcos Ra-
mirez, Acting Chief of Field Operations, Occidental Ecuador, and Jose Verdesoto, Acting Field
Chief of Health, Safety and Environment, Occidental Ecuador, in Block 15, CPF, Ecuador (Aug. 9,
1999) [hereinafter CPF Visit].
A considerably higher production level---"around 30,000 barrels/day"-was subsequently re-
ported by the Ecuadorian press, based on interviews with corporate officials. OxySignifica 2.8% del
PIB al Sector Petrolero [Oxy Signifies 2.8% of GNP in the Petroleum Sectorl, HY, June 29, 2000.
The higher number may reflect Occidental's assumption of operations in unified oil fields that were
previously managed by Petroecuador. The infrastructure, waste streams, standards and practices at
those facilities are not included in this article; however, Petroecuador has an abysmal environmental
record and reputation and, as a general matter, continues to follow standards and practices that were
established in the region by Texaco when the oil boom began.
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nected by a network of unpaved roads, most of which were built by Oc-
cidental for the operations. Alongside the roads, buried pipelines (flow
lines) carry a mixture of oil, natural gas and formation water-extracted
from the wells-to CPF. Two flow lines cross under the Napo, but a
bridge has not been built across the river. Instead, barges have been used
to carry personnel, vehicles and equipment across the river at two loca-
tions.
At CPF, crude oil is separated from the natural gas and formation wa-
ter. Oil field formation water is also commonly known as brine because
it typically contains toxic levels of salts, in addition to hydrocarbons,
heavy metals, and other chemicals. In Block 15, the ratio of brine to oil
(water cut) is high, and, according to the company, roughly 65,000 bar-
rels (2.73 million gallons) of brine wastes, better known as produced wa-
ter, are generated every day. The separation process also generates some
4.5 million cubic feet of gas every day. According to Occidental, thirty
percent of the gas is used by the company as an energy source for oil
field operations; the rest is burned as a waste at CPF.34 The forty-hectare
site also includes storage and pumping facilities, living quarters for
workers, offices, a sewage treatment system, and equipment maintenance
facilities.35Additional flow lines carry produced water from separation
facilities to injection wells.
CPF and the production and injection wells are located in four Quichua
communities-Rio Jivino, Limoncocha, Itaya and Pompeya. Many other
communities are potentially affected by those operations. For example,
the Quichua community of Santa Elena is located across from the com-
munity of Limoncocha on Limoncocha Lake, and there are dozens of
communities along the Napo River, downstream from the facilities. In
addition, Occidental operates a landfill in the Shuar community of Ya-
manunka. From CPF, a 16.5 mile (27.5 kIn) secondary pipeline trans-
ports Amazon crude to Shushufindi Central Station,36 currently owned
and operated by Petroecuador. From there, it is transported via pipelines
owned and operated by Petroecuador to Lago Agrio, and thence, over the
Andes Mountains to the Pacific coast via the trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline
33. According to Occidental's pre-production environmental impact assessment, the flow lines
total twenty-four miles (forty kcm), including two lines that pass under the Napo River, for a distance
of 0.78 miles each (1.3 km). OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, ESTUDiO DE
LIwPACTO Y PLAN DE MANEO AMBIENTAL, BLOQLUE 15, VOL 1, EsTLDiO DE IMPACTO AMBIENTAL
[ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STUDY AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, BLOCK 15, VOL. 1, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STUDY], at 3 (1992) (prepared by Ambientec Ltda.) [hereinafter 1992 EIA].
34. CPF Visit, supra note 32.
35. 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 55.
36. Id. at 3.
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System ("SOTE"). A refinery and an export terminal are located on the
coast.
By law, Occidental must maintain a five-year development plan ("De-
velopment Plan"), and update it on an annual basis for approval by Ec-
uador's Ministry of Energy and Mines ("MEM"). In an interview, cor-
porate officials in Quito confirmed that Occidental seeks to
incrementally expand operations throughout all of Block 15. However,
they refused to disclose details, other than to say that the company
planned to drill six wells over the next year. Three exploratory wells
were slated for Secoya-Siona territory; officials refused to disclose the
locations of the other wells.3" Subsequently, residents reported drilling
activities for additional production wells at existing platforms in Itaya
and Pompeya, and the construction of a new platform for an exploratory
well in the Quichua community of Sani Isla, in the eastern portion of
Block 15. Additional seismic studies are also underway.
Although Occidental refuses to disclose its Development Plan, the
company did provide a copy of the Contract, without the annexes, for
this study. The Contract contemplates the development of new produc-
tion operations in the Eden-Yuturi oil fields; however, construction of
those facilities has reportedly been delayed because SOTE is already op-
erating at full capacity. As a result, any additional production from new
facilities in Block 15 could not be transported out of the Amazon region
economically. Plans to build a second trans-Ecuadorian pipeline have
been stalled for years because of political opposition in Ecuador.38
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE ROOTS OF INEQUALITY UNDER THE
LAW IN ECUADOR
In form, Ecuador is a constitutional democracy. In practice, democ-
ratic institutions are fragile, and a strong executive generally dominates
the government. Longstanding weaknesses include pervasive corruption
37. Interview with Vicki Hollub, Chief of Field Operations and Acting General Manager, Occi-
dental Ecuador, and Patricio Rivera, Saftiy & Environment Manager, Occidental Ecuador, in Quito,
Ecuador (Aug. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Holiub and Rivera Interview].
38. The limited pipeline capacity to transport crude oil out of the Amazon currently limits produc-
tion not only in Block 15 but also throughout the region. Opposition to a new pipeline has been led
by oil workers' unions in Ecuador, including FETRAPEC and ASPEC, and allies with nationalist
sentiments, who oppose privatization and private foreign control of the transportation of crude oil in
the country. See generally IVAN NARVAEZ ET AL., ENCADENADOS DEL OLEODUCTO [Chained to the
Pipeline] (Quito: FETRAPEC 1996). Recent reports, however, suggest that construction of a new
pipeline could begin in 2001. See, e.g., OCP: Tres Mesas para los Trabajos Previos [Heavy Crude
Pipeline: Three Months for Preliminary Work], ELCOMERCIO, Feb. 20, 2001.
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and a discredited judiciary and political class.3 9 A popular saying, "the
law is only for those with the ponchos," reflects the general belief that
39. Ecuador reestablished democracy in 1979 after nine years of dictatorship, seven under military
rule. The failure of the rule of law reflects the gap between legal ideals and social and political real-
ties. The judiciary has failed to promote the rule of law through the impartial administration ofjus-
tice. Despite repeated efforts at reform, the courts have become increasingly politicized, inefficient
and corrupt. For a fuller discussion of environmental law and the administration of justice in Ecua-
dor, see generally Kimerling 1995, supra note 5. For discussions of the administration ofjustice, see
Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the
Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/I1.96, doc. 10 rev.l (Apr.
24, 1997); Laura Chinchilla & David Schodt, The Administration of Justice in Ecuador (1993); Cen-
ter for the Administration of Justice, Ecuador Justice Sector Assessment: Social Soundness Analysis
(1991); U.S. Dept. of State, Ecuador Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1999 (2000);
U.S. Dept. of State, Ecuador Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 (Feb. 26, 1999).
Since the return to democracy, the great majority of legislative initiatives have originated in the
executive branch. Because of power conflicts between political parties in the National Congress and
the Executive, the latter has made frequent use of a procedure under which it characterizes proposed
legislation as a law of"economic urgency." Fabian Corral, La Reestructuracitn Constitucional (The
Constitutional Restructuring]. 37 (Tomo il) RUPTURA 25, 28. Under the Constitution in effect from
1979-1998, the Congress-or plenary of legislative committees, if the Congress was not in session-
had fifteen days to approve, reform or modify the proposal. If the Congress failed to act within fif-
teen days, the Executive could promulgate the legislation as a "Law-Decree," effective upon publi-
cation in the Official Registry. CoNSrrruCi6N Po1JTicA DE LA REP UBLiCA DEL ECUADOR [POLITICAL
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], tit. I, art. 66 (1979) (hereinafter 1979
CONSTITUTION]. The 1998 Constitution, currently in effect, retained the procedure but extended the
period in which the Congress may act on the proposed legislation to thirty days. COVSTiTUCI6N
POLJTICA DE LA REPOB..CA DEL ECUADOR (POLITICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
ECUADOR], tit. V, ch. V, art. 155-56 (entered into effect Aug. 10, 1998) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION].
The new Constitution also strengthened the executive branch. Cf CONSTITUTION, art. 130 (8) & (9);
1979 CONSTITUTION, art. 59(e), granting the Congress important powers to impeach high level offi-
cials in the executive and judicial branches for violating the law in the performance of their official
duties; the current Constitution limits the grounds for impeachment of the President and Vice Presi-
dent to violations against national security, extortion, bribery, peculation and illicit enrichment.
For detailed accounts of politics and government in Ecuador that document historic patterns of
volatility, contentiousness, personal rivalries, shifting alliances, regional competition, rapid govern-
ment turnover, periodic uncertainty about the power and authority of key institutions and officials,
minimal systemic legitimacy, and the power of a small elite, see generally JOHN D. MARTZ,
POLITICS AND PETROLEUM IN ECUADOR (1987); DAVID CORKILL & DAVID CUBITT, ECUADOR:
FRAGILE DEMOCRACY (1988); AMERICAS WATCH AND THE ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR (1988). Between 1830 and 1895, twenty-one individuals and juntas
occupied Ecuador's presidency for a total of thirty-four times; only six completed their constitutional
term of office. CORIULL & CUBITT at 10. From 1925-47, at least twenty-three governments passed
through office. MARTZ at 66. Ecuador's current President, Gustavo Noboa, assumed office in 2000,
after the elected president, Jamil Mahuad, was overthrown by a coalition of indigenous organizations
and military officials. They formed a military-civilian junta, comprised of an army colonel, the
president of the national indigenous organization, CONAIE, and a former Supreme Court judge.
However, within hours, in the early dawn, the military withdrew support from the triumvirate and
ceded power to Noboa, then Vice President. Noboa became Ecuador's fifth president in four years.
He is not currently affiliated with any political party; each of the four preceding presidents was from
a different political party. Interview with Sister Elsie Monge, Executive Director, CEDHU (Ecu-
menical Commission on Human Rights), in New York, NY (Mar. 25, 2001).
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only the most marginal citizens-the indigenous peoples-are not above
the law. Indigenous peoples comprise an estimated forty percent of Ec-
uador's population. Ecuadorian society, however, is characterized by
deep racism, widespread poverty, extreme inequality, and discrimination
against indigenous peoples and the poor.40 Illiterate Ecuadorians were
not allowed to vote until 1979. Amazonian peoples live far from the cen-
ters of power and seat of government; poor transportation and communi-
cation services augment the geographical distance. Cultural, historical
and linguistic distances further separate Amazonian peoples from their
government. To the government, Amazonia is a vast land with few peo-
ple, a frontier to be conquered, a source of revenue for the debt-burdened
state, and a safety valve for land distribution and population pressures.
The oil boom in Ecuador's Amazon region began in the late 1960s,
and has been the primary engine of change and environmental degrada-
tion in the region. It reflected and reinforced two tiers of inequality. As
a so-called "Third World" country, Ecuador depended on TNCs to trans-
fer petroleum technology, and finance, build and operate development
facilities.4 1 Within Ecuador, Amazonia is effectively a "Fourth World,"
where indigenous peoples also face disparities and inequities with re-
spect to the dominant national culture.
According to the letter of the law, the Constitution is the supreme law
of the land. In practice, however, constitutional law has been unstable
and relatively easy to disregard and manipulate. 42 Ecuador has had nine-
40. Since the oil boom began, some national social indicators such as life expectancy and literacy
rates have improved, but the percentage of Ecuadorians living in poverty has grown. Chinchilla &
Schodt, supra note 39, at 23. Figures reported in the press put the level at sixty-seven percent of the
population in 1993, up from forty-seven percent in 1975. Nongovernmental figures put the poverty
level as high as seventy-five percent. En el Ecuador el 67% es Pobre [In Ecuador Sixty-Seven Per-
cent are Poor], EL COMERCIO, Sept. 21, 1993.
41. Texaco's production contract with Ecuador ended in 1992. Currently, Petroecuador operates
the former Texaco facilities and some additional ones it developed using technology acquired from
Texaco. Ecuador still depends on TNCs to transfer new technology and finance most oil develop-
ment activities.
42. See Hugo Ordofiez Espinoza, Diecisiete Apuntes para la Reforma Constitucional [Seventeen
Notes for Constitutional Reform] 37 (Tomo 11) RUPTURA 57, 59-60 (1994). Many constitutional
provisions have been copied from other countries. Id. Ordoflez Espinoza is a former President of
the constitutional chamber of Ecuador's Supreme Court. He characterizes Ecuador's treatment of
constitutional matters as "flippant, superficial and sometimes truly frivolous." Id.
One Ecuadorian jurist described the 1979 Constitution as "perhaps the most extreme example of
the abstract application of political theory to a society." Corral, supra note 39, at 26. The rule of
law itself is essentially a theoretical formality in a country that often lives informally. Id. A sign at
a toll booth on the outskirts of Quito is illustrative. It reads: "Do not insist. Everyone must pay the
toll." Another Ecuadorian jurist and former President of Ecuador's Tribunal of Constitutional Guar-
antees, Emesto Lopez, describes current constitutional law in Ecuador as "science fiction." Inter-
view with Dr. Emesto Lopez Friere, in Quito, Ecuador (July 5, 2000).
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teen constitutions since becoming a republic in 1830. Both constitutional
and statutory law recognize the public interest in a clean and healthy en-
vironment and charge the State with environmental protection responsi-
bilities. Since 1984, Ecuador's constitutions have formally recognized
the right of individuals to live in an environment "free from contamina-
tion."A3 The State bears a corresponding obligation:
It is the duty of the State to ensure that this right is not infringed upon and
to promote the preservation of the natural world. The law will establish re-
strictions on the exercise of selected rights and liberties, in order to protect
the environment.44
The current Constitution, adopted in 1998, expands environmental
rights and obligations in a new chapter on group rights. The section be-
gins with a provision that imposes environmental duties on the State:
The State shall protect the right of the population to live in a healthy and
ecologically balanced environment, that guarantees sustainable develop-
ment. [The State] shall ensure that this right is not affected and shall guar-
antee the preservation of nature.45
The provision continues by declaring that environmental protection,
conservation of ecosystems and biodiversity, pollution prevention, recu-
peration of degraded areas, sustainable management of natural resources,
and the maintenance of a system of protected natural areas that protect
biodiversity and ecological services are "of public interest and shall be
regulated in accordance with the law."'46 A subsequent provision recog-
nizes and guarantees the right of affected communities to participate--on
an informed basis-in decision-making by the State that could affect the
environment.47 These expanded rights and duties-including rights to
environmental information and participation-echo emerging principles
in international environmental law, particularly agreements to promote
sustainable development.48
43. CoNsTr'rTION, supra note 39, tit. 111, ch. 2, art. 23, para. 6; in the former Constitution, the
provision is found in Tit. I1, sec. 1, art. 19, para. 2. The right is included in a list of "rights of the
individual" guaranteed by the State.
44. Id.
45. Id. at art. 86.
46. Id.
47. Id. at ch. 5, sec. 2, art. 88 provides:
Every state decision that could affect the environment must consider the criteria of the commu-
nity, prior [to making the decision], for which [the community] will be properly informed. The
law shall guarantee their participation.
48. For example, the Rio Declaration states:
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concered citizens, at the
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to informa-
tion concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including information on
hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
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The 1998 Constitution also includes a new section on the collective
rights of indigenous peoples.49 It recognizes and protects a number of
cultural, political and land rights that are relevant to development and the
environment in Amazonia. As with the environmental provisions, the
new collective rights of indigenous peoples echo emerging principles in
international law, particularly some of the rights and duties in the Inter-
national Labor Organization Convention concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries ("ILO Convention 169"), which
was ratified by Ecuador in 1998. For example, Article 84 (5) of the Con-
stitution directs the state to "recognize and guarantee" the rights of in-
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and partici-
pation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and administrative
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.
Rio DECLARATION, supra note 3, at princ. 10. See also supra note 14 for a discussion of princ. I1
(states shall enact effective environmental regulation). The Rio Declaration is non-binding but pro-
vides evidence of customary international law. One U.S. District Court has stated in dicta that "[t]he
Rio Declaration may be declaratory of what it treated as pre-existing principles just as was the Dec-
laration of Independence." Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006 (SD.N.Y.
Apr. II, 1994).
See also United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc DPI/I 307,
31 I.L.M. 818 (1992). Art. 10(d) recognizes that popular participation is critical to the success of
environmental protection strategies (State parties "shall, as far as possible and as appropriate ...
support local populations to develop and implement remedial action in degraded areas where bio-
logical diversity has been reduced"). Ecuador ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity on
Feb. 23, 1993. It entered into force on Dec. 29, 1993 and is a legally binding treaty. See also
AGENDA 21, supra note 3, at chs. 23-32 (identifying major social groups ("Major Groups") whose
"commitment and genuine involvement" are "critical to the effective implementation" of sustainable
development). AGENDA 21 is a 472-page blueprint for sustainable development. Like the Rio Dec-
laration, it is not legally binding, but was adopted at the Earth Summit and purportedly represents a
high-level political commitment for implementation at the national level.
Notwithstanding advances in recognizing participatory rights for indigenous (and other) peoples,
and the inclusion of "indigenous people and their communities" as a Major Group in AGENDA 21,
indigenous peoples were, for the most part, disappointed with the Earth Summit. Their participation
in the conference and preparatory meetings was limited, and many felt like bystanders in a global
negotiation over the future of their resources. In documents adopted at the Earth Summit, govern-
ments refused to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and ancestral terni-
tories; instead, they emphasized state sovereignty over natural resources and affirmed the right of
States "to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and development poli-
cies." Rio DECLARATION, supra note 3, princ. 2. From the perspective of indigenous peoples, the
imposition of development activities in their lands, without consent, represents colonization of their
territory by outsiders. The Earth Summit documents also failed to recognize the collective dimen-
sion of indigenous identity and rights. Governments refused to use the term "indigenous peoples";
instead they refer to "indigenous people and their communities." For a fuller discussion, see gener-
ally International Alliance of Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest, and European Alli-
ance with Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples Participation in Global Environmental Negotia-
tions (1997); Judith Kimerling, "The Human Face of Petroleum ": Sustainable Development in
Amazonia?, REV. OF EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. (RECIEL) 10(1) (2001).
49. CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at ch. 5, sec. I.
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digenous peoples,
to be consulted about plans and programs for exploration and exploitation
of nonrenewable natural resources that are located in their lands and which
could affect them environmentally or culturally; to participate in the bene-
fits that. those projects obtain, inasmuch as is possible and to receive com-
pensation for socio-environmental damages that are caused to them.so
Another provision recognizes and guarantees the right of indigenous
peoples to participate in the "use, administration and conservation bf the
renewable natural resources that are located in their lands."',
Ecuador's legislation and regulations have included general exhorta-
tions to protect the environment and prevent pollution since at least the
early 1970s. The 1972 Law of Waters prohibits "all water contamination
that could affect human health or the development of flora and fauna,"
and directs various government agencies to enforce the law.5 2 The Law
50. Id. at ch. 5, sec. I, art. 84, para. 5. Article 15, para. 2 of the ILO Convention 169 provides
that:
In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to
other resources pertaining to [indigenous] lands, governments shall establish or maintain proce-
dures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and
to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or permitting any pro-
grammes for the exploration or exploitation of such resources pertaining to their lands. The
peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities, and
shall receive fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of such ac-
tivities.
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, I.L.O. Conv. 169,
I.L.O., 76th Sess., reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1382 (1989) [hereinafter ILO Convention 169]. ILO Con-
vention 169 entered into force Sept. 5, 1991; it was ratified by Ecuador on May 15, 1998. See also
id. at art. 7 (participation rights).
Other provisions in Article 84 of the Constitution recognize and guarantee the rights of indigenous
peoples to "maintain, develop and fortify their identity and traditions, in the spiritual, cultural, lin-
guistic, social, political and economic [spheres]" (para 1); "to formulate priorities in plans and pro-
jects for the development and improvement of their economic and social conditions" (para. 13); to
occupy ancestral lands and obtain legal title to them, without charge (para. 3); to retain communal
lands as inalienable, indivisible and not subject to prescription or seizure, except under the authority
of the State to expropriate lands for "public utility" (para 2); "to not be displaced, as peoples, from
their lands" (para. 8); "to maintain, develop and administer their cultural and historical patrimony"
(para. 10); "to conserve and promote their practices to manage biodiversity and its natural environ-
ment" (para 6); "to collective intellectual property rights for their ancestral knowledge; and to its
valuation, use and development under the law" (para. 9); to have access to a quality bilingual educa-
tion (para. I I); to conserve and develop traditional social organizations, and ways of living together
and generating and exercising authority (para. 7); to use and protect "traditional medical systems,
knowledge and practices, including the right to protect ritual and sacred sites, (and] plants, animals,
minerals and ecosystems that are of vital interest from that point of view" (para. 12); "to use symbols
and emblems that identify them" (para. 15); and "to participate, through representatives, in the offi-
cial bodies that determine the law" (para. 14). CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at art. 84.
51. Id. at art. 84, para. 4.
52. Ley de Aguas [Law of Waters], art. 22, R-O. No. 69 (May 30, 1972) (Ecuador). Regulations
under that law, adopted in 1973, define contaminated water as:
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
of Fishing and Fishing Development, adopted in 1974, also prohibits
contamination of waters.53
The 1976 Law for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Con-
tamination is dedicated entirely to pollution control. It declares "the pro-
tection of air, water and soil resources, and the conservation, improve-
ment and reclamation of the environment ... to be in the public interest,"
and prohibits contamination of water, air and soil. The law confers en-
forcement responsibility on an inter-agency group headed by the Minis-
ter of Public Health. Other members include the Minister of Energy and
Mines, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Minister of Defense, Min-
ister of Industry, Commerce and Integration, and the President of the Na-
tional Planning and Coordination Board.54 In 1989, the Ministry of Pub-
lic Health issued detailed water pollution regulations under the law. The
regulations include some water quality standards, and require impact as-
sessments, permits, and regular monitoring for new and existing dis-
charges into surface and ground waters. 55 Regulations were issued for
air pollution in 1991, and for noise emissions in 1990.56 In theory, those
requirements offer mechanisms for command-and-control or perform-
ance based regulation of significant sources of oil field pollution. In
practice, the oil industry has ignored the regulations and successive gov-
ernments have failed to implement and enforce them.
In practice, government intervention in the hydrocarbon sector has
(AIII water, running or not, that presents degradation of its physical, chemical, or biological
characteristics, as the result of the influence of any element of solid, liquid, gaseous, or radioac-
tive material, or any other substance, which results in partial or total limitations on those waters
for domestic, industrial, agricultural, fishing, recreational, or other uses.
President of the Republic, Reglamento General para la Aplicacion de la Ley de Aguas [General
Regulations for the Application of the Law of Waters], art. 89, R.O. No. 233 (Jan. 26, 1973) (Ecua-
dor).
53. Ley de Pesca y Desarrollo Pesquero (Law of Fishing and Fishing Development), art. 47, R.O.
No. 497 (Feb. 19, 1974), renumbered in R.O. No. 252 (Aug. 19, 1985); see also arts. 80, 15 & 92.
54. Ley para la Prevencion y Control de la Contaminacidn Ambiental (Law for the Prevention and
Control of Environmental Contamination], ch. I, para I, R.O. No. 97 (May 31, 1976) (Ecuador)
(translated in FOOD AND AGRICULTURE LEGISLATION, Vol. 26-1 (1977)) [hereinafter Contamination
Prevention Law].
55. See generally Ministry of Public Health, Reglamento para la Prevenci6n y Control de la Con-
taminaci6n Ambiental en lo Relativo al Recurso Agua [Regulations for the Prevention and Control of
Environmental Contamination Related to Water Resources], R.O. No. 204 (June 5, 1989) (Ecuador)
[hereinafter Water Pollution Regulations].
56. Ministry of Public Health, Reglamento que Establece las Normas de Calidad del Aire y sus
Metodos de Medici6n (Regulations to Establish Air Quality Standards and Methods of Measure-
ment], R.O. No. 726 (July 15, 1991) (Ecuador); Ministry of Public Health, Reglamento parn la Pre-
venci6n y Control de la Contaminaci6n Ambiental Originado par la Emisi6n de Ruidos [Regulations
for the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination Originating from the Emission of
Noise], R.O. No. 560 (Nov. 12, 1990) (Ecuador).
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been dominated by two powerful agencies. The Ministry of Energy and
Mines ("MEM") (Ministerio de Energia y Minas, formerly the Ministry
of Natural Resources) is charged with promoting oil development, and
implementing and enforcing the Law of Hydrocarbons." 7 Petroecuador
(formerly CEPE) was established to enable the State to participate in hy-
drocarbon development, both directly and by contracting with foreign
and national operators and investors.58 Since at least 1971, the Law of
Hydrocarbons has included boilerplate environmental directives.59 How-
ever, it was not until 1984 that an environmental unit was created in
MEM. Currently under the direction of a Deputy Secretary for Environ-
mental Protection, and known as SPA (Subsecretaria de Protecci6n Am-
biental), the unit has been seriously hamstrung by a lack of legal author-
ity, resources, and political support from ministry officials. 60 Although
charged with responsibility for environmental oversight and control in
Block 15, SPA has neither authority to levy sanctions nor needed techni-
cal capacity, including environmental training or access to laboratories
that can perform analyses of chemical samples.6' The environmental unit
57. Ley defHidrocarburos [Law of Hydrocarbons], art. 6, R.O. No. 711 (Nov. i5, 1978), amended
by R.O. No. 306 (Aug. 13, 1982) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Law of Hydrocarbons]. The Minister of De-
fense is also designated to develop and execute petroleum laws and policies in matters related to
national defense.
58. Ley Especial de la Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Perroecuador) y sus Empresas
Filiales [Special Law of the State Company Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador) and its Subsidiar-
ies], art. 2, R.O. No. 283 (Sept. 26, 1989) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Law of Petroecuador].
59. Early provisions required oil field operators to "adopt necessary measures to protect flora,
fauna and other natural resources" (art. 31(t); and prevent contamination of water, air and soil (art.
31(s)). In 1982, art. 31(s) of the Law of Hydrocarbons was amended to require oil companies to
submit, for approval by MEM, "plans, programs and projects" to protect natural resources and pre-
vent adverse social and economic impacts on local communities. Art. 31(t) was amended to require
operators to conduct operations in accordance with Ecuador's environmental laws and regulations,
and international practice "in matters of preservation of the rich fisheries and farming industry."
Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57. Subsequent amendments to the law, published in R.O. No.
446 (May 29. 1986), P.O. 283 (Sept. 26, 1989), R-O. No. 121 (Feb. 3, 1993), P.O. No. 326 (Nov.
29, 1993), R.O. No. 346 (Dec. 28, 1993), R.O. No. 523 (Sept. 9, 1994), retained the provisions.
60. Notwithstanding this state of affairs, MEM's 1987 Regulations for Hydrocarbon Operations
continued the trend of including boilerplate environmental protection provisions in the law, by in-
cluding a general duty to prevent contamination. See Ministry of Energy and Mines, Reglamento de
Operaciones Hidrocarburiferas [Regulation for Hydrocarbon Operations], arts. 20(b) & 62, R.O.
No. 681 (May 8, 1987) (Ecuador).
SPA's limited influence with Occidental is illustrated by a statement by Clark Hull in response to
a SPA Oficio asking Occidental to provide the author with requested environmental information for
this study. He said that the Oficio is not controlling, because the company "does not answer contrac-
tually to SPA." Hull Interview, supra note 17. The Oficto is discussed infra at note 188.
61. SPA can recommend sanctions to the National Direction of Hydrocarbons ("DNH"), also in
MEM. DNH officials have even less environmental expertise than environmental officials. See
Ministry of Energy and Mines, Reglamento Ambientalpara las Operaciones Hidrocarburiferas en el
Ecuador (Environmental Regulations for Hydrocarbon Operations in Ecuador], art. 5, R.O. No. 766
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in Petroecuador, first created in 1990, is not involved or well-informed
about the operations of foreign oil companies. Officials in Ecuador's
new Ministry of the Environment ("MMA") (Ministerio de Medio Ambi-
ente) have expressed interest in regulating oil field operations; however,
the agency does not yet have authority to do so. 61
MEM first issued environmental regulations for hydrocarbon activities
in 1988, but they applied only to operations "in national parks or equiva-
lents."' ' In 1990, an effort by agency environmental staff to promulgate
comprehensive regulations was cut off by high level officials. In lieu of
the regulations, a weakened set of voluntary environmental guidelines
was negotiated with industry and adopted as a "gentlemen's agree-
(Aug. 24, 1995) (Ecuador) [hereinafter MEM Environmental Regulations]; Contract, supra note 29,
paras. 14.2 & 5.1.20.7.
62. Interview with Ivan Narvaez, Chief, Petroecuador Environmental Protection Unit ("UPA"), in
Quito, Ecuador (Aug. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Narvaez Interview]. This is a political choice and is not
mandated by the law establishing the unit. See Law of Petroecuador, supra note 58, art. 2.
63. In theory, MMA has some legal authority over activities in protected natural areas, which are
administered by a unit of the agency. In practice, it does not exercise control over oil development
operations in protected areas. The weakness of the agency in the oil fields is illustrated by Occiden-
tal's reported rejection of an oral request by the Area Chief for Limoncocha Biological Reserve to
review chemical sampling data from Lake Limoncocha. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying
text.
MMA did, however, play an important role in securing a pair of presidential decrees in 1998 that
declare 1,135,500 hectares in Amazonia off-limits to oil and mining development. The areas include
lands occupied by the Tagaeri clan of the Huaorani people, who were dislocated by Texaco and have
continued to resist all efforts by outsiders to contact them; and large areas in Yasuni National Park
and Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve. Constitutional President of the Republic, Decreta No. 551 [Decree
No. 551] (Jan. 29, 1999) (Ecuador) (Cuyabeno-Imuya region); Constitutional President of the Re-
public, Decreta No. 552 [Decree No. 5521 (Jan. 29, 1999) (Ecuador) (Tagaeri and Yasuni region).
Reportedly, a commitment from the European Community to provide economic aid to administer the
areas was an important factor in the decision. In addition, a history of violent encounters with the
Tagaeri and lobbying by representatives of the Catholic Church, and growing international pressure
to protect Tagaeri territory, likely played a role. For example, in 1998 an international jury con-
voked by the government of Spain for its prestigious Bartolome de las Casas Prize, awarded an hon-
orable mention to the Tagaeri. Aeta de ia Reunion del Jurado del Premio Bartolome de las Casas en
su Octavo Edicion [Record of the Meeting of the Jury of the Eighth Issue of the Bartolome de las
Casas Prize), Madrid, Oct. 7, 1998. For a fuller discussion of the Tagaeri, see Judith Kimerling, Dis-
location, Evangelization and Contamination: Amazon Crude and the Huaorani People, in ETHNIC
CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, WORKING PAPER SERIES, No. 215
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995). The areas have not yet been demar-
cated, as called for in the decrees, and it remains to be seen whether the State will abide by the de-
crees.
64. Ministry of Energy and Mines, Normas para ia Prevenci6n, Control. y Rehabilitaci6n del Me-
dio Ambiente en las Actividades Hidrocarburiferas de Exploracion y Explotacion en los Parques
Nacionales a Equivalentes (Rules for the Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of the Environment
in Hydrocarbon Activities of Exploration and Exploitation in National Parks or Equivalents], R.O.
No. 004 (Aug. 16, 1988) (Ecuador). The legality of permitting commercial oil development activi-
ties in protected natural areas is questionable. See Kimerling 1995, supra note 5, at 342.
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ment. ' ,65 As with prior laws and regulations, the measures failed to im-
prove oil field operations.
In 1992, MEM issued new environmental regulations after closed-door
negotiations with industry ("1992 MEM Regulations")." The regula-
tions included environmental impact assessment requirements and some
quantitative chemical standards for waste discharges into surface waters.
As discussed infra, in the United States, EPA regulations have generally
prohibited the discharge of onshore exploration and production wastes
into fresh waters since 1979. Moreover, the choice of discharge stan-
dards in Ecuador is not supported by an administrative record, and some
61standards raise serious questions. ' In addition, no monitoring, reporting
or record-keeping is required, so the standards are not enforced. By con-
trast, MEM requires detailed reporting of financial and production-
related data.68
Thus, despite a clear trend on paper toward increasingly detailed-
albeit incomplete--environmental requirements, implementation, over-
sight and compliance remain poor. Successive governments have repeat-
edly ratified the state's authority-and duty-to develop environmental
law, but have failed to implement meaningful regulation in the oil fields.
Exploration and production activities generate large quantities of wastes
with toxic constituents, yet in practice the government does not even re-
quire operators to characterize, record or report the nature, volume or
destiny of the wastes they discharge, dump or bury in the environment.
The development and implementation of environmental law has been
hindered by the absence of political will, a lack of resources and techni-
cal capacity, the failure of the rule of law and good governance gener-
65. KIMERLING 1991, supra note 5, at 48-50.
66. Ministry of Energy and Mines, Reglamento Ambientalpara las Actividades Hidrocarburiferas
en el Ecuador [Environmental Regulations for Hydrocarbon Operations in Ecuador), R.O. No. 888
(Mar. 6, 1992) (Ecuador) (hereinafter 1992 MEM Regulations), repealed and replaced in 1995 by
MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61. The reforms are discussed, infra Pt. VI; the pro-
visions discussed above remain in effect.
67. For example, there are no standards for specific hydrocarbons that are particularly toxic. In-
stead, a single parameter-oil and grease-is used, and the acceptable level of fifteen parts per mil-
lion (ppm) could be dangerously high at many sites because the flow rate and chemistry of receiving
waters are not taken into account, and certain hydrocarbons, such as benzene and polynuclear aro-
matics (PAHs), can threaten human health and the environment at very low levels. See generally
MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61.
68. See, e.g., Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, art. 3 1; Regulation for Hydrocarbon Opera-
tions, supra note 60, arts. 8 (request for drilling permit requires technical justification), 10 (detailed
sampling and reporting for drilling operations do not include waste management or other environ-
mental information), 17 (final drilling reports do not include environmental information), 23, 26-27,
30, 33-38, 41-44, 60 & 72. Cf id., arts. 20 and 62 (general duty to prevent contamination but no
reporting or oversight mechanisms).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ally, and industry resistance to regulation. Especially in MEM and
Petroecuador, environmental units have commonly been staffed with en-
gineers who became "environmentalists" overnight, in the wake of the
public outcry over oil field conditions, which began around 1990 and
quickly forced government and industry to acknowledge the need for im-
provement.69 In the environmental law vacuum, standards are set by
corporate policy rather than by law, and TNCs apply and interpret stan-
dards, and measure and evaluate performance and outcomes, without
meaningful oversight or transparency.70
V. CONTRACTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Occidental's contract with Petroecuador establishes the basic legal
terms for the company's operations in Ecuador and its relationship with
69. Ecuador's failure to act also reflects the legacy of the "school" of Texaco, where many offi-
cials in MEM and Petroecuador received their basic oil development education, but did not learn
about environmental protection; the enormous disparities in political influence and resources be-
tween TNCs and affected residents; and economic pressure from a crushing debt burden and deepen-
ing economic crisis. Ecuador's debt grew from U.S.$217 million in 1970 to U.S.$12.5 billion in
1990, more that the gross national product (GNP). According to press reports, interest payments on
the debt accounted for fifty-two percent of Ecuador's budget in 2000.
Another problem is that some environmental officials in MEM and Petroecuador still do not be-
lieve in environmental protection. In addition, officials have an inherent conflict of interest because
Ecuador has financial incentives to keep environmental expenditures down, in order to maximize
revenues for the state. Many officials also fear that if environmental protection becomes costly, for-
eign investment will go elsewhere.
70. The continued lack of environmental oversight of international oil companies was acknowl-
edged by top Ecuadorian environmental officials in a series of interviews conducted in 1999-2000
for this study. Officials included: the Deputy Secretary for Environmental Protection in MEM, who
heads SPA; Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of the Environment (MMA); Chief of Petroecuador's
Environmental Protection Unit; Area Chief for Limoncocha Biological Reserve; and the official in
MMA's Protected Areas Department who oversees management of Limoncocha Biological Reserve.
One official, the Director of the National Direction for Environmental Protection, who works under
the Deputy Secretary for Environmental Protection in MEM, responded by saying that Ecuadorian
law requires MEM to audit Occidental's compliance with its environmental management plan
(EMP). However, he did not appear to be familiar with the EMP, was vague and uninformed about
the implementation of the audit requirement in Block 15, and could not locate any audit or inspec-
tion reports, sampling results, or compliance information in a search of the agency's archives, con-
ducted by archive staff. MEM Environmental Regulations require SPA to prepare a written techni-
cal report within fifteen days of an environmental audit; for inspections, a technical report is also
required, for signature by participating government and corporate officials. MEM Environmental
Regulations, supra note 61, at arts. 58-59.
The principal reasons cited by officials for the failure of regulatory efforts are the lack of technical
capacity and equipment, and the lack of legal authority for environmental units. One official also
cited the "philosophy" of high level MEM officials. Officials in both MEM and MMA said their
agencies are working on regulatory reforms to address those deficiencies. For reports of interviews
and findings from prior studies, see Kimerling 1995, supra note 5 and KIMERLING 1991, supra note
5.
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the Ecuadorian State. Although the Contract requires Occidental to
comply with Ecuadorian law, and provides that Ecuador's laws and regu-
lations shall prevail in the event of a conflict between the law and a pro-
vision in the Contract, it is also intended to protect the company from
changing legal requirements and other shortcomings in Ecuador's legal
system. Longstanding deficiencies include: the failure of the rule of law
generally; confusion about what many applicable laws and regulations
require; high turnover and instability among government officials, espe-
cially at the highest levels of government; widespread corruption; and a
general atmosphere of uncertainty about how the law will be inter-
preted-and administered, ignored, or reformed-by successive govern-
ments. Ecuador's political class and government institutions, including
the judiciary, are increasingly discredited and distrusted. 71 A deepening
economic crisis and growing debt burden-not unrelated to problems in
governance-have made the country increasingly desperate for foreign
aid (including loans) and investment.
In return for aid and investment, successive governments have faced
growing pressure from the United States and other international credi-
tors, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to establish the
rule of law, and promote stability and a predictable legal environment for
foreign investors. Oil companies have long complained about changes in
policies and contractual terms. 72  As a result, the need to 'honor' con-
tracts with foreign investors has been emphasized by TNCs and interna-
tional creditors as a key indicator of both Ecuador's democratic pro-
gress-and respect for the rule of law-and its suitability for new foreign
aid and investment. 73 For practical purposes, then, despite its subordina-
7 1. See. e.g, Steve H. Hanke, Ecuador Needs More Than a Dollars-for-Sucres Exchange, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2000, at A19; Larry Rother with Clifford Krauss, The Andes in Tumult, Shaken by
Political Tremors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000, at A3; Gonzalo Solano, Ecuador Indians Seek Con-
gress End, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 2, 2000, Oswaldo Leon, Ecuador: Firmas para la Consulta
Popular [Ecuador: Signatures for a Popular Referendum], SERVICIO INFORMATIVO "alai-amlatina,"
Aug. 3, 2000; see also supra note 39.
72. See, e.g.. Oil in Ecuador: A Tale of Missed Opportunity; Development Lags as State Stalls
Foreign Producers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 1997, at A15.
73. See, eg., Letter from J. Curtis Struble, charge d'affaires, Embassy of the United States of
America, Quito, to Melina Selverston, Coalition for Amazonian Peoples and their Environment
(Dec. 27, 1996). The letter was sent in response to concerns raised by U.S. NGOs about alleged ef-
forts by the U.S. embassy in Quito to discourage Ecuador from (I) supporting Ecuadorian plaintiffs
seeking to sue Texaco in the United States, based on operations in Ecuador; and (2) challenging an
agreement between Texaco and Ecuador's previous government that purported to clean up affected
areas and release Texaco from all environmental liabilities to Petroecuador and the Ecuadorian State.
The letter states that the U.S. government has no position regarding the lawsuit, but admits that em-
bassy officials met with Ecuador's then-Attorney General to question his efforts to invalidate the
agreement, based on a policy favoring "the sanctity ofcontractual agreements." Id.
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tion to Ecuador's laws on paper,7 4 and a provision that the parties will
not use diplomatic channels to resolve their disputes,7 5 Occidental's Con-
tract serves as the basic legal blueprint for the company's operations in
Block 15, and for Ecuador, the political and economic stakes are high.76
This message appears to have had considerable influence on officials in subsequent governments.
Efforts to repudiate the agreement were abandoned, even by officials who publicly denounced the
negotiation process that led to the accord, the agreement itself, and the work performed under it.
Privately, they explained that, however unfortunate, Ecuador must honor the agreement, and all con-
tracts, in order to attract foreign investment. Environmental officials who expressed those views did
not appear to understand that the operation of the rule of law in the United States and international
commerce allows for some contracts to be invalidated, under certain circumstances, based on a num-
ber of legal grounds. The lawsuit against Texaco is discussed briefly infra notes 120 & 163.
74. See, e.g., Contract, supra note 29, at paras. 22.1, 22.1.1, 22.1.4, 22.2, 5.1.18, 5.1.19, 5.1.20.11,
5.5.2, 17.4 & 17.5.
75. Id. at para. 22.2.1.
76. Occidental's initial contract with Petroecuador (then CEPE) was signed on January 25, 1985.
Contract, supra note 29, at para. 2.1. For Petroecuador's General Manager at the time, Patricio Ri-
badeneira, the agreement marked a "new phase in the history of Ecuadorean hydrocarbons," in
which foreign participation in exploration and production would again be welcomed. MARTZ, supra
note 39, at 355. The economic bonanza and "easy money" from Texaco's discovery of Amazon
crude had been relatively short-lived in Ecuador. Production-and revenues--began in 1972, but by
1977, Ecuador's economic growth was sustained only by a "flood of foreign borrowing" by the gov-
ernment. Id. at 207-08, 304. Impelled by a "deteriorating economic climate and growing alarm over
the possible depletion of petroleum reserves," Ecuador reformed the Law of Hydrocarbons in 1982,
in an effort to re-stimulate foreign investment in oil and gas exploration and production. The con-
tract with Occidental was the first risk service agreement under the reformed legislation. Id. at 355;
see generally Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57. According to Martz, Petroecuador (then CEPE)
"labored energetically [in negotiations under the new law] to produce terms acceptable to (Occiden-
tal and other] bidding companies." Id. at 354.
Subsequently, Occidental and Petroecuador signed a number of complementary agreements; in
1995, after production operations were underway in western Block 15, the parties signed a Modified
Contract, which included commitments for additional exploration by Occidental. Contract, supra
note 29, para. 2.5. The exploratory well in El Eden was drilled under that agreement. See supra
note 30 and accompanying text. Occidental told residents of El Eden that the well in their commu-
nity was dry; however, it told OIL AND GAS JOURNAL that the find there was so significant that it
"could itselfjustify construction of a pipeline to the western end" of Block 15. Williams 1997, su-
pra note 22, at 45; see also Kimerling 2001, supra note 27, at 212-39.
Following the confirmation and discovery of commercial reserves in El Eden, Occidental sought
to renegotiate the terms of its contract with Petroecuador, in order to take advantage of reforms to
the Law of Hydrocarbons that had been adopted in 1993 in a renewed effort to attract foreign in-
vestment. The reforms introduced a new type of contract, known as a participation contract. Law of
Hydrocarbons, supra note 57 at art. 4. Occidental's initiative led to the current Contract. In a May
27, 1997 letter to Petroecuador, Occidental proposed changing its contract from a service contract to
a participation contract. On July 7, 1997, Petroecuador agreed to negotiate. By December 29, 1998,
negotiations between the two companies had concluded, and the negotiating committee from
Petroecuador submitted the terms of the new agreement to Petroecuador's President and Administra-
tive Council. The Administrative Council approved the terms on that same day; the President ap-
proved them on January 19, 1999. Contract, supra note 29, paras. 2.6-2.11. After formal approval
by Petroecuador, the terms of the Contract were submitted for approval to a sequence of government
agencies, including MEM, the Attorney General, the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, and the
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The Contract and negotiation that led to it have been denounced by a"group of citizens" to Ecuador's Commission for Civic Control of Cor-
ruption ("the Commission"), primarily on economic and procedural
grounds." It is currently under investigation by the Commission; how-
Special Committee on Bidding ("CEL"). CEL is a high-level inter-agency group established by the
Law of Hydrocarbons to oversee the adjudication of oil development contracts. The Minister of En-
ergy and Mines presides, the General Manager of Petroecuador serves as Secretary, and the other
members include the Minister of National Defense; the Minister of Finances and Public Credit; and
the Comptroller General of the State. Officials may not delegate their representation on CEL to
anyone other than their immediate inferior. Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, art. 18. All of the
needed approvals were secured in rapid succession-on March 12, March 24, April 5, and April 26,
respectively. Contract, supra note 29, paras. 2.12-2.16. Notwithstanding Ecuador's obligations un-
der the Constitution and ILO Convention 169 to consult with affected indigenous residents and share
the benefits of development with them, no government agency informed or consulted with Block 15
residents during the approval process, and the economic "participation" formula in the Contract to
distribute revenues from the operations does not include them. See supra notes 47-51.
The terms agreed to by the negotiators from Petroecuador and Occidental apparently were not
modified during the approval process, and on May 21, 1999, the new Contract was signed by the
parties. Ecuador's President, Jamil Mahuad, signed as an "honorary witness." See Contract, supra
note 29. The Contract was promptly announced to the national and international press, but not to
residents of affected Quichua communities in Block 15. Although the Contract clearly contemplates
the development of new production operations to exploit reserves in El Eden, in a July 1, 1999 meet-
ing with the community (which the author attended), representatives of Occidental refused to con-
firm or deny that a new Contract had been signed. They also denied that the company had plans to
work in the community. This reflects a general practice observed by the author in Quichua commu-
nities during this study, and reported by local residents, in which the State is absent, and the com-
pany rebuffs efforts by residents to gain access to information and participate in decision-making
about development activities in their communities. See generally Kimerling 2001, supra note 27.
77. As indicated supra note 31, in addition to oil fields in Block 15, the Contract designates Occi-
dental as the operator of two unified fields, located in both Block 15 and adjacent areas, that had
been controlled by Petroecuador. See Convenio Operacional de Explotaciin Unificada de los Ya-
cimientos Comunes "U" Inferior y "° T" y los acimientos No Comunes en el Campo Limoncocha
[Operational Agreement for Unified Exploitation of the Common Reserves Lower "U" and "r and
the Non-Common Reserves in Limoncocha Field] (May 21, 1999) (signed by Occidental Explora-
tion and Production Company and Petroproducci6n and attached to the Contract); Convenio Opera-
cional de Explotaci6n Unificada de los Yacimientos Comunes "Ml," "M2," "'U"y "T" en el Campo
Unificado Eden-Yuturi [Operational Agreement for Unified Exploitation of the Common Reserves
"Ml," "M2," "U"and "T" in the Unified Eden-Yuturi Field] (May 21, 1999) (signed by Occidental
Exploration and Production Company and Petroproducci6n and attached to the Contract).
On January 20, 1999, the day after Petroecuador approved the Contract, the decision to designate
Occidental as operator of the unified fields and the Contract negotiations between Petroecuador and
Occidental were formally denounced to Ecuador's Commission for Civic Control of Corruption.
The complaint challenges the legality of the designation, negotiation, and approval process, and al-
leges that the agreement "will prejudice the State by a magnitude of $500 million" in lost revenues.
Denuncia Perjuicio al Estado en 500 Millones de Dolares por Negociaci6n de Campos Limoncocha
y Eden-Yuturi con Empresa Occidental [Complaint for Damages to the State in the Amount of $500
Million Due to Negotiations with the Company Occidental for the Limoncocha and Eden-Yuturi Oil
Fields] to Doctor Jorge Vivanco Mendieta, President of the Commission for Civic Control of Cor-
ruption, signed by Dr. Kaiser Arevalo B., Diego Cano M., Ricardo Ulcuango, Napolron Saltos G.
and Alberto Acosta (Jan. 20, 1999). The complaint was signed by a member of Ecuador's National
Congress, the Secretary General of a Petroecuador workers' union, CETAPE, the president of the
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ever, the legal authority of the Commission is limited.7"
indigenous organization that represents communities from Ecuador's Andes Mountains region,
ECUARUNARJ, and two respected intellectuals. It alleges that the decision to designate Occiden-
tal-instead of Petroecuador---as the operator of the unified fields reflects an ongoing policy to favor
"foreign private interests" at the expense of national interests. Among other alleged violations of the
law, the complaint challenges the failure to consult with affected indigenous peoples, as required by
the Constitution and ILO Convention 169. See id. In a subsequent publication about the proceed-
ings, one of the petitioners, Napoleon Saltos, elaborates on the charges. Among other irregularities,
Saltos alleges a conflict of interest by a Petroecuador official who participated in the process as a
representative of the state company. According to Saltos, the official, Manuel Echeverria, is a for-
mer President and Manager of Occidental Ecuador, and served as "the Coordinator" for Occidental
during the negotiations. Saltos accuses Echeverria of using his influence in Petroecuador to secure
Occidental's designation as operator of the unified fields with undue haste and without considera-
tion-as required by law--of an internal technical-economic report that favors an alternative ar-
rangement to develop the reserves. NAPOLEON SALTOS GALARZA, ETICA Y CORRUPCION ESTUDIOS
DE CASOS: INFORME FINAL DEL PROYECTO "ETICA Y CORRUPCION" [ETHICS AND CORRUPTION CASE
STUDIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE PROJECT "ETHICS AND CORRUPTION"] 393-415,412 (1999).
78. After preliminary proceedings, the President of the commission sent an official communica-
tion ("Oficio") to the Minister of Energy and Mines. Dated March 31, 1999, the Oficio pre-dates the
final approval of the Contract by CEL, but post-dates approvals by Petroecuador and MEM. It states
that the evidence shows that (1) there is more than one alternative to develop the unified reserves;
and (2) the constitutional right of affected indigenous peoples to be consulted about development
activities had not been taken into account. Commission for Civic Control of Corruption, President,
Oficio CCCC.99.0375, directed to Rene Ortiz, Minister of Energy and Mines, signed by Nicolas
Espinosa, President of the Commission for Civic Control of Corruption (Mar. 30, 1999). The Oficio
requests that the Minister (t) analyze all available alternatives during the process of re-negotiating
Occidental's Contract, in order to protect the interests of the State; (2) carry out the required consul-
tations with affected communities; and (3) inform the commission about the process and final ar-
rangement. Id.
The commission was created by Ecuador's 1998 Constitution, as an autonomous public agency.
The Constitution directs the commission to "act in representation of the citizenry" to promote "the
elimination of corruption," and receive complaints of alleged "illicit acts committed in State institu-
tions, in order to investigate them and solicit their judgment and sanction." CONSTITUTION, supra
note 39, at art. 220. In addition to investigating complaints, the commission is directed by statute to
develop a national plan to prevent corruption. Ley de la Comisidn De Control Civico de la Corrup-
cidn [Law of the Commission for Civic Control of Corruption] [hereinafter Law of the Commission]
(Aug. 12, 1999) (Ecuador), art. 7(a). Although the commission may require state agencies and offi-
cials to provide information, and its findings carry considerable moral weight, the agency does not
have legal authority to sanction corruption or, apparently, to prosecute the offenders.
CONSTITUTION, arts. 220-221; Law of the Commission, art. 7. Notwithstanding the vague but poten-
tially broad Constitutional dictate to "solicit" the "judgment and sanction" of official corruption-
which arguably could be read to grant implied prosecutorial authority to the commission-the Con-
stitution explicitly directs the commission to remit findings of corruption to Ecuador's Constitution-
ally-created Public Minister and Comptroller General of the State, for appropriate legal proceedings.
See CONSTITUTION, arts. 211-213,220-221; Law of the Commission, art. 7(f). The commission may
also "solicit" sanctions by "the competent administrative authorities." Law of the Commission, art.
7(h).
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VI. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
In addition to public corporate statements and periodic accounts in the
press, references to some variation of international standards or practice
can also be found in a number of legal documents, including Ecuadorian
law, Occidental's Contract with Ecuador, and the company's govern-
ment-approved environmental management plan (EMP). Notwithstand-
ing these references, there is considerable confusion in Ecuador about the
content and source of applicable international standards and practices,
and how to implement and monitor them. As a general matter, standards
and standard-setting processes are not clear and transparent, and Occi-
dental's operations and practices are not well understood outside of the
company, even by government officials and local residents. There is no
meaningful independent oversight to confirm the company's compliance
with environmental requirements or assess environmental and social per-
formance and outcomes.
A. Contractual Provisions
The main text of Occidental's Contract with Petroecuador includes
eight references to some variation of international standards or practices,
or to best practice. However, the precise meaning and import of the ref-
erences are unclear, because the terms are not included in the long list of
definitions in the Contract, and no specific norms or practices are identi-
fied. In addition, no sources, or standard-setting authorities, are speci-
fied.
The Contract provides that, for definitions not specified therein, the
parties agree to use the definitions "contemplated" in Ecuador's Law of
Hydrocarbons and regulations, as well as those "generally accepted by
the international petroleum industry. ' 79 The Law of Hydrocarbons in-
cludes a vague reference to international practice; since 1982, companies
have been required to "[c]onduct petroleum operations in accordance
with Laws and Regulations for the protection of the environment and the
security of the country, and with relation to international practice in mat-
ters of preservation of the rich fisheries and farming industry."80 How-
ever, neither the law nor regulations define "international practice" or
explain the meaning of that requirement.
The language used to refer to international standards and practices in
the Contract is also vague and general. Although the precise wording
79. Contract, supra note 29 at para. 3.4.4.
80. Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, at art. 31(t).
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varies somewhat, most relevant provisions refer to standards or practices
that are generally used or accepted by the international petroleum indus-
try. For example, the section on general obligations requires Occidental
"to employ qualified personnel, as well as equipment, machinery, mate-
rials and technology, in accordance with the best norms and practices
generally accepted by the international petroleum industry."8' This pro-
vision is potentially significant because the Contract also provides that,
as the operator of Block 15, Occidental has "technical responsibility" for
oil field operations.82 The obligation to use "the best norms and prac-
tices" means that, at least in theory, the company's discretion is not un-
limited when it selects technology and conducts operations.
The section on environmental protection includes a similarly promis-
ing but vague requirement "[t]o use equipment, machinery, operational
procedures and in general technologies that comply with the standards
for environmental protection and practices used by the international pe-
troleum industry, without prejudice to compliance with the regulations
existing in the country., 83 Another provision requires Occidental "to in-
corporate tecnologia de punta [cutting edge technology], compatible
with Ecuador's Amazon region, for both operations and the studies, re-
ports and application of recommendations, that will be agreed to" by Oc-
cidental and Petroecuador.8 4 The section on insurance obliges Occiden-
tal to obtain insurance for risks of contamination and damage to
ecosystems, "in accordance with international petroleum practice. 8 5
These provisions reflect Ecuador's interest in attracting what the oil
industry calls "world class" modern petroleum operations, instead of
cheap and antiquated, second-rate technology. Although for many gov-
ernment officials, "world class" is more about attracting foreign invest-
ment than protecting the environment, it also reflects a certain level of
official discomfort with the history of oil development in Amazonia, and
the country's international notoriety for shoddy environmental practices
there. Those practices are the result of Ecuador's continuing failure to
implement meaningful environmental regulation and the selection of
standards and technology by Texaco when the oil boom began. As the
81. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.8.
82. The Contract provides that Occidental, as the contractor "shall have technical responsibility
with respect to the operations in the Participation Contract Area, in the terms established in this Par-
ticipation Contract and the pertinent legal norms." Id. at para. 5.1.27.
83. id. at para. 5.1.20.11.
84. Id. at para. 5.5.20.2.
85. Id. at para. 9.2. 10. This is explicitly subject to approval by Petroecuador. See also id. at para.
9.2. Other provisions of the Contract refer to international practices that are used to set reasonable
tariffs for the transportation of crude oil in pipelines. Id. at paras. 7.3 & 7.3.3.
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first company to discover commercial quantities of Amazon crude, Tex-
aco transferred petroleum technology to Ecuador. That technology set
the basic standards for oil field operations, but did not include environ-
mental protection. 86 Texaco's workforce was so unaware of the hazards
of crude oil in the 1970s and i 980s that skilled Ecuadorian workers ap-
plied it to their heads to prevent balding. They then sat in the sun or
covered their hair with a plastic cap overnight; to remove the crude, they
washed their hair with diesel.81
Presumably, the provisions in the Contract requiring Occidental to use
international standards and practices are intended to help close the gap
between oil field technology in Ecuador and the superior technology that
is commonly used in wealthy industrial countries. The provisions also
reflect a vague but widely held belief, encountered in many sectors of
Ecuadorian society, that anything that is "international" is better than
something that is Ecuadorian. Some Ecuadorians refer to this attitude as
a "Third World mentality," and it is especially prevalent in matters of
technology, economics and industrial development. Ecuador was an ag-
ricultural country until the oil boom began.88 In this context, "interna-
tional" is frequently understood to mean "foreign," and especially the
United States.
Despite this apparent intent, the language in the Contract may be too
vague to have any measurable impact on oil field practices. The refer-
ences to international standards and practices do not discriminate be-
tween practices in industrial countries and practices in developing coun-
tries. They also fail to distinguish legal, or governmental, standards and
norms from industry standards and guidelines, or to differentiate between
the law of foreign nations, such as the United States, and international
law. Moreover, standing alone, the provisions in the Contract suggest
that a definitive and credible body of comprehensive international stan-
dards and practices exist. This suggestion is potentially misleading be-
cause there is no international consensus on what "international stan-
86. For a fuller discussion of Texaco and Petroecuador's operations, see generally KIMERLING
1991. supra note 5.
87. Interview with Bertha Margarita Yepez Silva, in Quito, Ecuador (Mar. 3, 1994). Yepez was a
social worker for Texaco Petroleum Company, Texaco's Ecuadorian Subsidiary, from 1973-1989.
88. Unlike many Latin American countries, Ecuador did not participate in the process of
industrialization spurred by import substitution policies in the 1930s. Efforts to move the country
away from the dominant agro-exporting model began in the 1960s, and initially focused on textiles
and food products. MARTZ, supra note 39, at 119-22. Notwithstanding those efforts, Ecuador's eco-
nomic axis remained banana production until the oil boom began. The other principal export prod-
ucts were cocoa and coffee. Id. at 157. The start of the oil boom was rapid in Ecuador, and the oil
industry quickly came to dominate the country's economy. Id. at 157, 370, 376.
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dards" and "best practice" really mean in the environmental arena, and
there is no public international institution with legal authority to regulate
exploration and production activities. Oil field standards and practices
can vary considerably at different locations, even in industrial nations
where regulatory regimes are relatively well established.
In the United States, for example, most oil field regulation varies from
state to state, and standards and practices can also differ at different loca-
tions in the same state.8 9 Interpretations of regulations can vary as well,
and disputes about the meaning and requirements of applicable legal
norms are not uncommon. In addition, environmental regulations in the
United States are constantly evolving. In many jurisdictions, authorities
have been revising oil and gas exploration and production standards, to
require more stringent environmental protection. Even so, critics con-
tinue to attribute pollution and other environmental problems to the in-
dustry at a number of locations in the United States. In countries in the
developing world, oil companies commonly use antiquated standards and
practices similar to the ones that were established in Ecuador by Texaco.
Given the complex, variable and dynamic nature of environmental
norms and practices in oil fields around the world, and the ambiguity of
the language in the Contract, the precise meaning of the international
standards obligations in the Contract is unclear. The provisions requiring
Occidental to use standards and practices that are "used" or "accepted"
by "the international petroleum industry" appear to establish wide-
spread-or even worldwide-use or acceptance by international oil
companies as the key criteria for selecting the applicable standards. This
essentially means that the meaning of "best norms and practices" and"international standards" is what international oil companies, like Occi-
dental, currently do and say. By using language that suggests that gen-
eral use or acceptance is the applicable criteria, rather than "best prac-
tice" or "highest standards," the provisions in the Contract could operate
primarily to help legalize and perpetuate the status quo, and eliminate
89. See infra note I 15 and Pt. IX, secs. B-E; see also AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY,
ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: WASTE MANAGEMENT IN EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION OPERATIONS, API E5 (1997); MICHELLE A. MCFADDIN, OIL AND GAS FIELD WASTE
REGULATIONS HANDBOOK (1996); INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, IOGCC
ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINES FOR STATE OIL & GAS REGULATORY PROGRAMS (1994) [hereinafter
IOGCC Environmental Guidelines]; INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, EPA/IOCC, STUDY
OF STATE REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION WASTE (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Study of State Regulation]; U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY.
Volume 3 EPA/530-SW-86-003-D (draft for public comment) (1987).
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only the most obsolete and indefensible oil field practices. This interpre-
tation would also mean that the international standards that are legally
binding contractual obligations are not the same as the "international
standards" that have been promised by the company in its public rela-
tions. Occidental has pledged to implement a "new model" of hydrocar-
bon operations to protect the fragile rainforest environment, and has as-
sociated this promise with its stature and standards as an international
company. In its Contract, however, the company has not agreed to de-
velop new and innovative practices, or even to necessarily use the best
practices and most protective standards that are currently available, un-
less they are also commonly used by oil companies around the world.
The international standards requirements in the Contract could also fall
short of some of the national standards that have been established on pa-
per in Ecuador's laws and regulations, if they are interpreted to require
nothing more than the "lowest common denominator" among the myriad
standards and practices required by various regulatory authorities around
the world, including developing countries." Provisions that refer to
norms and practices "generally accepted" by the oil industry could be in-
terpreted to represent the "lowest common denominator" among stan-
dards and practices that are not only used, but also favored, by interna-
tional companies. Under that interpretation, standards and practices that
are commonly implemented in industrial countries because of regulatory
requirements might not be required in Block 15, if some companies con-
sider them unnecessary or "over the top." Although a "lowest common
denominator" interpretation of international standards would contradict
the popular and official view in Ecuador, that international standards are
meant to improve environmental practices beyond what is required by
Ecuador's legislation, the language in the Contract allows Occidental and
Petroecuador virtually unlimited discretion in how to select and interpret
applicable international norms. 9'
The provisions in the Contract could also be interpreted as adopting
standards and guidelines that have been published by oil industry trade
groups such as the American Petroleum Institute ("API") and The Oil
Industry International Exploration and Production Forum ("E & P Fo-
rum"). The legal and practical import of that interpretation for opera-
90. Under this interpretation, Occidental would nonetheless be required to comply with Ecuador-
ian law.
91. In the unlikely event that Petroecuador and Occidental reach an impasse over the selection of
applicable international standards, the language in the Contract is so vague that it would be of little
or no use to Ecuador for enforcement purposes, to compel the use of any particular standard or tech-
nology.
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tions in the field would also be limited, because most industry environ-
mental and community relations "standards" are non-binding guidelines.
Although they commonly include some provisions that, if implemented,
could lead to some improvements in oil field operations, most provisions
are too vague and aspirational to offer clear guidance or serve as mean-
ingful legal standards. For example, industry guidelines routinely recog-
nize the need to "minimize pollution," but leave companies considerable
leeway in how to interpret and apply that policy. In addition, they fre-
quently offer a menu of alternative practices, rather than specifying a
precise standard or practice as the most effective environmental protec-
tion measure. When specific practices are flagged as particularly harm-
ful to the environment-such as road building in tropical forests-
companies are advised to try to "avoid" those practices, when practica-
ble, but they are clearly permitted and contemplated under the guidelines,
at the company's discretion.92
Recent nonbinding guidelines prepared by the E & P Forum and
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Industry and Envi-
ronment Center reflect similar deficiencies. The terms "best practice,""good practice" and "responsible standards" are used repeatedly and ap-
parently interchangeably, but their meaning is vague. When specific
standards and practices are catalogued, they do not necessarily follow or
even identify the most environmentally protective standards and prac-
tices that apply in industrial countries.9 For example, as discussed infra,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has gener-
ally prohibited the discharge of exploration and production wastes into
fresh waters since 1979; however, this prohibition is not adopted as a
guideline for "best practice," or even included among the litany of stan-
dards listed in a chart in the document. The guidelines clearly contem-
plate waste discharges into fresh waters, as well as other practices that
are disfavored in the United States-and have been either restricted or
prohibited in various states-such as annular injection. Annular injec-
tion is the injection of wastes into the annulus of a well, without isolating
92. See generally API GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, supra note 87, API ES; E & P FORUM, OIL
INDUSTRY OPERATING GUIDELINES FOR TROPICAL RAINFORESTS, Report No. 2.49/170 (1991).
The soft and generalized nature of oil industry environmental guidelines differs considerably from
the precision and clarity that generally characterize the myriad technical API ttandards for equip-
ment, materials, and installation and engineering practices. The technical standards have been de-
veloped to support the reliable use of interchangeable equipment and materials, reduce customiza-
tion, and facilitate communication between users and suppliers. See generally AMERICAN
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 2000 PUBLICATIONS, PROGRAMS AND SERVICES CATALOG (2000).
93. E & P FORUM-UNEP, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND
PRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW OF ISSUES AND MANAGEMENT APPROACHES (1997).
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contaminants from underground aquifers.94
Although the E & P Forum-UNEP guidelines affirm a number of im-
portant principles, such as the need for detailed planning, corporate
commitment of financial and human resources, compliance monitoring,
and environmental regulation by governments, they leave basic standards
unclear, and suggest an aspirational approach to environmental protec-
tion. The emphasis in the guidelines on continual improvement could
help raise environmental standards; however, in the absence of clear
standards that define a floor, or minimum standards for protection, this
could be interreted and applied to justify low levels of protection. In
addition, the guidelines refer readers to E & P industry guidelines with-
out review or analysis of their content.9 This arbitrarily puts the United
Nations's imprimatur on private norms that have been defined by special
interests, and can contribute to confusion between private and public
standards.
The World Bank has published non-binding internal guidelines for pol-
lution prevention and abatement in projects financed by the World Bank
Group. Those guidelines are intended to provide technical advice and
guidance to staff and consultants who work on "pollution-related pro-
jects," and are comprised of general, pollutant-specific, and industry sec-
tor-specific guidelines. Onshore oil and gas development is one of forty
industry sectors that are included. Significantly, the guidelines do not
purport to embody "best practice" or the "highest" environmental stan-
dards that can be found among the nations of the world. Instead, they
"represent good environmental management practices which can be
achieved and maintained with the levels of skills and resources typically
available in countries in which the World Bank group operates.'96
94. See id; see also infra note 256.
95. See, e.g., E & P Forum-UNEP, supra notes 52-3.
96. The World Bank Group, POLLUTION PREVENTION AND ABATEMENr HANDBOOK, 1998:
TOWARD CLEANER PRODUCTION (1998) at v-vi. thereinafter World Bank 1998]. The guidelines
were developed by a team from the World Bank and International Finance Corporation, in collabora-
tion with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and United Nations Environment
Program. They are envisaged as "living" documents-to be monitored as they are implemented, and
revised as needed, "in the light of the accumulated experience." Id. at vi.
The guidelines for onshore oil and gas development contain some clear norms, including a limited
number of specific parameters and permissible levels for pollutants in wastewater discharges (efflu-
ents) and air emissions. Notably, they prohibit dilution in lieu of treatment, stating that "[dlilution of
air emissions or effluents to achieve these guidelines is unacceptable." Id. at 447. The general
guidelines also prohibit dilution, stating, in bold print, that "dilution of effluents and air emissions
to achieve maximum permitted values is unacceptable." Id. at 387 (boldface in original). How-
ever, the effectiveness of that norm in preventing water pollution from oil and gas operations can be
expected to be limited, because the guidelines do not include chlorides as a parameter in effluents.
Chlorides are typically found in toxic levels in oil field production wastes, and can also be found in
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In the absence of meaningful procedures for government review and
approval of selected international norms and practices to ensure that they
are appropriate and effective, the provisions in the Contract could oper-
ate as a legalized-albeit inexplicit-form of self-regulation, effectively
entrusting the state's authority to set certain standards to the companies
whose conduct needs to be regulated, and allowing Occidental to pick
and choose which of those standards to apply. Occidental and other in-
ternational companies in Ecuador have aggressively promoted industry
standards and guidelines under the general rubric of "international stan-
dards" and "best practice." As a result, private industry positions are
commonly confused with public legal norms, and some industry stan-
dards are acquiring a cloak of public legal authority and legitimacy, that
offers misleading assurances about environmental protection to Ecua-
dorians who do not understand where those standards come from or how
they are developed.
The confusion about the sources of international standards is com-
pounded by widespread ignorance about their content. Many people in
Ecuador believe that a credible but enigmatic body of substantive inter-
national standards exists that can effectively protect the environment.
Occidental and other international oil companies often seem to cultivate
that myth and exploit the ignorance about international standards, in or-
drilling wastes, especially when water-based muds are used. A requirement to measure levels of
chlorides, and the prohibition of dilution, could operate together to compel companies to signifi-
cantly upgrade waste treatment and disposal systems, effectively proscribing the discharge of
wastewater into surface waters in many areas. By not monitoring chlorides or total dissolved solids
(which would include chlorides), oil companies may be able to meet the World Bank discharge stan-
dards by using relatively rudimentary waste management technology and practices that still con-
taminate surface water bodies and impact aquatic life. As discussed infra. in the United States--in
part because of toxic levels of chlorides in wastewaters-EPA regulations have generally prohibited
the discharge of onshore oil field exploration and production wastes into fresh waters since 1979.
See infra note 271 and accompanying text. Thus, the guidelines are significantly less protective than
U.S. standards and regulations that have been in effect for decades.
In addition, The World Bank guidelines for onshore oil and gas development are less protective
than the general environmental guidelines found in the same document. For example, the permissi-
ble level of oil and grease in oil field effluents (20 parts per million, or ppm) is double the amount
that is allowed under the general guidelines (10 ppm); the same disparity is found in the permitted
levels for phenols (1.0 ppm and 0.5 ppm, respectively). World Bank 1998 at 389, 446. Finally,
notwithstanding the provisions discussed above, most of the norms in the oil and gas guidelines are
vague and aspirational. For example, operators are encouraged to "select less toxic biocides, corro-
sion inhibitors, and other chemicals," "minimize gas flaring," "minimize and control leakage from
tanks and pipelines," "practice corrosion prevention," and "reduce the impacts" of wastewater dis-
charges and oil spills. Id. at 446. This language is similar to that commonly used in industry guide-
lines and discussed above in this section. None of the corporate or government officials who were
interviewed for this case study mentioned the World Bank guidelines as a source of international
standards.
2001) International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 327
der to reassure government officials, communities and other stakeholders
about the quality and control of their operations. The growing confusion
between private industry standards and public legal norms-and the arbi-
trary legitimization of industry standards and shadow self-regulation that
it is nurturing-are fundamentally problematic because, despite the
growing corporate discourse about environmental and social responsibil-
ity, oil industry standards and positions are driven first and foremost by
the private needs and interests of oil companies. They do not necessarily
protect the interests of the public. Ironically, it is the failure of self regu-
lation by international oil companies in remote areas and the abysmal
track record of the oil industry generally that has led to growing agree-
ment about the need for international oil field standards. The confusion
between international industry standards and legal norms is reinforced by
both the language in the international standards provisions of Occiden-
tal's Contract, and the general discourse in Ecuador about the company's
operations.
B. ISO 14001
In 1998, Occidental became the first company in Ecuador to obtain
certification under ISO 14001. Currently, both corporate and govern-
ment officials there cite ISO 14001 as the most important international
environmental standard governing operations in Block 15. ISO 14001 is
a private voluntary international standard for environmental management
systems. It is designed to help corporations define and maintain envi-
ronental policies. However, it is not a performance standard and does
not impose any substantive requirements; instead, it requires a series of
procedures that form a management system.97
To be certified under ISO 14001, a company must: (1) establish an en-
vironmental policy that includes a commitment to comply with applica-
ble laws and a commitment to work towards continual improvement and
pollution prevention; and (2) develop an internal process to manage and
97. International Organization for Standardization, ISO 14001. Environmental Management Sys-
rems--Specifications with Guidance for Use (Geneva 1996) (hereinafter ISO 14001 Standard).
ISO 14001 was adopted in 1996 by the International Organization for Standardization ("ISO"), a
nongovernmental organization that promotes international standardization for technologies, in order
to "help rationalize the international trading process." International Organization for Standardization,
Introduction to ISO, at http://www.iso.chlinfoelintro.htm (last modified Jan. 8, 1999). Members of
ISO include private and public national standards bodies. ISO was established in 1947, because of
concern that non-harmonized standards for similar technologies would contribute to "technological
barriers to trade." Id. One example of a commonly-used ISO International Standard defines fea-
tures, such as optimal thickness, for credit cards and phone cards. Adherence to the standard allows
cards to be used worldwide.
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review that policy.98 Each company, however, is expected to set its own
environmental objectives and targets, and a policy to meet applicable na-
tional standards--even in developing countries like Ecuador-would sat-
isfy the ISO standard. Two or more companies carrying out similar ac-
tivities but with differing environmental performance may
simultaneously comply with the standard. In addition, transparency is
not required to meet the standard; however, some procedure for external
and internal communication must exist.99
The certification process is conducted by private companies that are
hired by the company seeking certification. It certifies management sys-
tems, and not outcomes or performance.' °° For example, a certifier
would examine whether a company has a process to identify applicable
legal requirements, but not whether it has complied with those require-
ments. In operations like Occidental's, where certifiers are contracted
from abroad and work in a number of different countries and industries,
the certifier may not be familiar with applicable national laws or have
substantial technical expertise about the operations that are managed un-
der the policy. Moreover, even when certifiers know that an operation is
not infull compliance with applicable standards, certification will gener-
ally not be denied if the certifier believes that the company is making ef-
forts to achieve compliance.
In Occidental's case, there is no systematic government oversight to
review the company's compliance with Ecuadorian law. Notwithstand-
ing this, problems have arisen in Block 15 that clearly demonstrate that
at least some comers are cut, and operations are not in full compliance
with legal requirements. For example, in 1997 a worker was killed on a
barge that was operated for Occidental by a subcontractor to provide
transportation across the Napo River. The barge got caught in a cable
that crossed the river, and when the worker, Dumas Tello, tried to free
the barge from the cable, it snapped and threw him into the river. His
body was never found.'O
Subsequently, the Captain of the Port of Francisco de Orellana (Coca)
determined that a number of laws had been violated: the captain of the
barge was not licensed to operate that type of vessel; the motor was dam-
aged and did not operate in reverse; no life preservers were available on
the barge; and the worker was not otherwise wearing proper attire. In
98. See ISO 14001 Standard, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Armada of Ecuador, Captain of the Port of Fransisco de Orellana (Coca), Oficio No.
CAPORE-AYD-038-O (Feb. 4,1997).
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addition to violations on the vessel, the cable that caused the accident
had been placed across the river illegally, by another subcontractor for
the company. That subcontractor, Seiscom Delta United, was carrying
out seismic studies for Occidental, and did not have a permit from the
marine authorities to suspend its cables across the river and obstruct
navigation.1 °2
When asked about the incident, corporate officials in Quito became
annoyed, and insisted that Occidental had permission for the seismic
line. 103 Although it is true that the company had permission from MEM
to conduct the seismic studies, it did not have permission to obstruct
navigation on the river. After the accident, Seiscom Delta applied for
that permission in order to continue the studies. This cavalier attitude
towards the law illustrates a general attitude commonly found in the oil
patch: once a company has an agreement with Petroecuador and MEM to
conduct certain operations, it can essentially do as it pleases in the re-
mote Amazon oil fields. 1°4 In the interview, Occidental officials denied
any illegalities until asked about the report by the Captain of the Port,
and the subsequent request for a permit. They insisted that the accident
was an isolated incident; however, the blatant disregard of fundamental
safety requirements by both of the subcontractors that 'ere involved
suggests that it reflects more systemic shortcomings.'0 5
102. Id. The incident was allegedly "hushed up," and apparently not many people--even in Ec-
uador's government-know about it. Representatives from Occidental reportedly told Tello's family
that there was no proof that he had died, because they did not have a corpse. Tello's brother, how-
ever, traveled to the region to search for the body and find out what had happened. He appealed to
the Captain of the Port to investigate the death. None of the government officials who were inter-
viewed for this study know about the incident. The author learned about it because she knew the
victim personally, and discussed the incident and response with his brother on several occasions in
1997-1998. She also spoke with a witness from a nearby Quichua community who was working for
Seiscom Delta at the time.
103. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37.
104. In addition to disregarding safety laws and cutting comers in the operations, the barge sub-
contractor also violated Ecuador's labor laws by failing to pay social security taxes for Tello to the
government. See generally Servicios Petroleros (Jaleth, Liquidacidn de Sueldo [Liquidation of Sal-
ary], Dumas Tello (Oct. 20-31, 1996); Servicios Petroleros Galeth, Liquidacidn de Sueldo [Liquida-
tion of Salary], Dumas Tello (Nov. 1-30, 1996); and Servicios Petroleros Galeth, Liquidacidn de
Sueldo [Liquidation of Salary], Dumas Tello (Dec. 1-31, 1996).
105. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37.
In addition to the legal violations, the incident and response raise questions about Occidental Ec-
uador's implementation of the company's internal corporate policies. One of the ten "guiding
Health, Environment and Safety (HES) principles" is to "utilize sound maintenance and work prac-
tices, safety-conscious design, employee training and incident investigations and corrective measures
to prevent health, environment and safety incidents. Should an accident occur, we will be prepared
to respond promptly, appropriately and professionally." A "feature" of the HES policy is to "select
contractors considering their HES performance." HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 24, at 6,
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Another Ecuadorian law that has been violated by Occidental is the
prohibition on dumping materials into waters that threaten navigation by
aquatic life. 0 6 Since 1996, a road built by the company to drill the ex-
ploratory well in El Eden has blocked the migration of fish from a lake
into seasonally flooded forest. In addition to environmental impacts, this
effectively destroyed a local fishery. In response to complaints by the
community, Occidental paid a fine to El Eden, but has not repaired the
damage.107 It is unclear, then, how these and other possible violations of
Ecuadorian law affect Occidental's ISO 14001 certification, or even
whether the certifier knew about them. Occidental refuses to disclose the
certifier's report, or any documents that were generated as part of the
ISO process.'"
For the most part, then, ISO 14001 is a qualitative and subjective stan-
dard that allows companies considerable discretion in how to interpret
and implement it. The greatest value of the standard seems to be an in-
ternal one-it helps companies internalize an environmental culture. 09
In theory, if a company takes ISO 14001 seriously, employees will not
only comply with environmental requirements, but also spend more time
finding and correcting environmental problems. As a result, environ-
mental performance should improve. However, ISO 14001 certification
does not guarantee this result or even disclose whether it occurs, and
does not answer the basic question of what substantive environmental
standards the company applies to its operations. What Occidental's ISO
14001 certification does clearly mean is that the company's environ-
mental paperwork is in order.
Notwithstanding this, environmental officials in Ecuador's government
and other Ecuadorians believe that Occidental's ISO 14001 certification
means that the operations in Block 15 meet some substantive interna-
tional environmental standards, and that the company's compliance has
been independently verified. Although no Ecuadorians interviewed for
this study knew precisely what the standard requires, they all believed
that Occidental's certification confirms that the company has success-
fully raised environmental standards beyond what is required by Ecua-
13.
106. Law of Fishing and Fishing Development, supra note 57, at arts. 47(e) & 80.
107. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001, supra note 27.
108. Most of the documents requested from Occidental for this study were not provided. See in-
fra note 188.
109. Without doubt, the internalization of an environmental culture is an essential component of
corporate responsibility and a needed change in the oil industry. However, reliance on corporate
culture to undertake self-regulation is not sufficient, alone, to guarantee environmental protection.
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dor's national law, and that a credible-but enigmatic-international au-
thority has audited Occidental's environmental performance. For exam-
ple, MEM's Deputy Secretary for Environmental Protection, whose of-
fice, SPA, is formally charged with environmental oversight in Block 15
and other areas where oil development and mining are underway, de-
scribed ISO 14001 as "ideal for the companies and the State.", 1" 0 He ex-
plained that, given the proliferation of oil and mining operations across
huge geographical areas, and the agency's limited environmental staff,
ISO 14001 "gives [them] certainty that the company operates well.""'
The confidence and confusion surrounding Occidental's ISO certifica-
tion are not entirely surprising because Occidental has aggressively pro-
moted the certification in Ecuador as if it were a "Good Housekeeping
Seal." In addition to distributing the "Oxy: ISO 14001 Certified" bro-
chure, the company has placed a large sign on the road to CPF announc-
ing the certification. One prominent environmental official even added
"ISO 14001 Certified" to the Occidental logo on his business card. In
presentations, interviews and conversations, corporate officials regularly
cite ISO 14001 as objective evidence of the company's environmental
excellence." 2  Similarly, officials used the mystique of international
110. Interview with Fausto Coral, Deputy Secretary for Environmental Protection, Ministry of
Energy and Mines, in Quito, Ecuador (Aug. 17, 1999).
Ill. Id. The Deputy Secretary is the highest level environmental official with jurisdiction-and
responsibilities-in the oil fields. His attitude of welcoming international standards and oversight is
also noteworthy because it raises questions about the position that is commonly expressed by devel-
oping nations in international negotiations. Representatives of those governments have vigorously
opposed international environmental regulation of development activities in favor of developing en-
vironmental law at the national level. Experience in Ecuador, however, suggests that at least some
of the officials who bear direct and real-world responsibility for environmental regulation in devel-
oping countries would welcome international initiatives that measure environmental performance at
specific locations, against international standards.
Similarly, Occidental has located production facilities in and near Limoncocha Biological Re-
serve, a protected natural area under Ecuadorian law and a designated Wetland of International Im-
portance under the Convention on Wetlands of international Importance, Especially as Waterfowl
Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, TIAS No. 11,084, 996 UNTS 245 [hereinafter Ramsar Convention). The offi-
cial in Ecuador's Ministry of the Environment ("MMA") Department of Protected Areas who over-
sees the management of the reserve explained that MMA does not monitor the impact of Occiden-
tal's operations on the reserve, or sample water quality in the lake that comprises the centerpiece of
the protected area, Lake Limoncocha. He assumed, however, that Occidental's ISO 14001 certifica-
tion means that the company does monitor water quality and other possible impacts on the reserve,
according to parameters that meet international standards, and that Occidental's environmental per-
formance there meets international standards. Telephone interview with Angel Onofa, Ministry of
the Environment, Dept. of Protected Areas (May 3, 2000). Operations in the reserve are discussed
infra Pt. VIII, sec. B, and Pt. IX, sec. A.
112. For example, during the author's official visit to CPF with three representatives of local
communities, the company's formal presentation about environmental protection began by citing the
certification. The ISO standard was described as a body of international norms, with which ninety-
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standards to dismiss questions about possible contamination by naturally
occurring radioactive material ("NORM"). They admitted that NORM is
present in Block 15, but said that no special environmental measures are
required because it is found at levels that are below "international stan-
dards." When asked, however, officials could not identify the source or
substance of those standards.' 13
Thus, the international standards requirements in Occidental's Con-
tract are not only too vague to impose clear and meaningful new stan-
dards to raise levels of environmental protection in Block 15, but also-
together with the growing official and public discourse about interna-
tional standards-may serve to undermine national efforts to regulate oil
field operations. They offer government officials and other stakeholders
a false sense of security that standards and practices are improving, based
on enigmatic norms that lie beyond the reach of national authorities with
regard to both standard-setting and oversight mechanisms. In addition,
they contribute to the arbitrary legitimization of norms that have been de-
fined by special interests.
With the possible exception of the requirement in the Contract to use
leading edge technology, the implementation of international standards
and practices in Block 15 appears to be strictly a matter of ethics, or cor-
porate responsibility, rather than law. Despite the radical reform of pub-
lic environmental discourse in Ecuador to embrace international stan-
dards, the national laws and standards of Ecuador continue to set the
basic legal standards for Occidental's operations, and at least some of
those laws have been violated by the company with impunity. Moreover,
other provisions in the Contract cede standard-setting authority to Occi-
dental by adopting the company's environmental management plan
nine countries are affiliated, that has certified that Occidental's "Environmental Management Plan
complies with international standards." When asked, "What are the standards?" the acting chief of
field operations responded, "There are many." When asked what some of the standards are, the offi-
cial said that he did not remember all of them; no particular requirements were identified. When
asked to clarify the statement about affiliated countries, officials said they did not know whether that
refers to governments or nongovernmental institutions, like private companies. CPF Visit, supra
note 32. This reflects and reinforces the confusion in Ecuador between public and private norms.
In an interview in Quito, Occidental's chief of field operations admitted that ISO 14001 does not
verify whether the company complies with legal requirements; however, she argued that corporate
culture is more important than government regulation, stating:
You know I could get away with violating the law in the United States if I wanted; I have
worked there for ten years and there are no government inspections. We just fill out forms, so
the corporate culture is more important.
Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37; see also OXY, ISO 14001 Certified, supra note 23.
113. CPF Visit, supra note 32; Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37. NORM is discussed
infra at note 268.
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("EMP") as an environmental standard for Block 15.' t4 The EMP, dis-
cussed infra, authorizes Occidental to set and modify standards, to
achieve "the same level of protection that is required in the United
States," but does not define that level of protection and implies, errone-
ously, that a single "level" of protection is required in the United
States." 5 The EMP and the Contract also fail to provide for government
114. See Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.20.1; see also discussion in Pt. VII.
I 15. As discussed infra Pt. IX, secs. B-E, there are no comprehensive uniform environmental
standards for oil and gas exploration and production in the United States. Although federal law in-
cludes some regulations that apply to oil field activities-such as limits on point source discharges
under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321, and requirements for underground injection wells un-
der the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l -8-most oil field regulation is controlled at the
state level. Among the states, regulatory requirements can vary considerably. Monitoring and en-
forcement are also inconsistent. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission ("IOGCC") has
adopted national environmental guidelines for exploration and production wastes, with funding and
support from EPA. Study of State Regulation, supra note 89; IOGCC Environmental Guidelines,
supra note 89. Founded in 1935, IOGCC now represents thirty-five oil and gas producing states. Id.
at iv. The guidelines-first adopted in 1990 and updated in 1994--evolved from EPA's 1988 de-
termination to exempt most oil field wastes from regulation as hazardous wastes under RCRA Subti-
tle C. See infra notes 272-73. They are intended to help states improve their regulatory programs in
the absence of an overarching federal regulatory program for exploration and production wastes.
A nine-member advisory committee was established in 1989 to work with IOGCC's Council on
Regulatory Needs and EPA to "recommend effective regulations, guidelines, and/or standards for
state-level management of oil and gas production wastes." IOCC Environmental Guidelines, supra
note 89, at 2. Both Chris Shuey and Wilma Subra, cited infra, served on the advisory committee.
Shuey describes the guidelines as "the lowest common denominator from a multi-interest process,"
that included industry and public interest environmental experts, and representatives from EPA and
state regulatory agencies; they do not represent a regulatory determination. Telephone interview
with Chris Shuey, Director, Community Water, Wastes & Toxics Program, Southwest Research and
Information Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Jan. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Shuey Interview I].
The guidelines address administrative and technical issues, but for the most part are very general.
See. e.g.. infra note 268 (NORM guidelines). While some states have used them to improve their
regulatory programs, IOGCC member states are under no legal obligation to adopt the guidelines or
conform their regulations to them. For states that adopt some or all of the guidelines, enforcement
remains a state responsibility and there is no federal oversight of state enforcement or operator com-
pliance with state requirements. Shuey Interview I. According to both Shuey and Subra, the lack of
aggressive oversight and enforcement by federal and state agencies to ensure compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations is a serious problem. In addition, not all standards and technology used in the
United States are superior to standards and practices in developing nations; for example, some com-
panies in some states still use unlined pits for waste disposal, and bury high-toxicity drilling muds
and wastes at drill sites. Id.; telephone interview with Wilma Subra, President, Subra Company,
New Iberia, LA (May 18, 1999) [hereinafter Subra Interview 1]. Another regulatory deficiency,
cited by both Shuey and Subra, is the failure to characterize wells and other oil field facilities-with
multiple waste streams, releases, and sources of contaminants-as an integrated operation, and to
perform cumulative health assessments. See, e.g., infra note 256 (facilities not aggregated to form
"major sources" under the Clean Air Act). Both Shuey and Subra resigned from the advisory com-
mittee in 1999 because of a lack of support from EPA to take needed action to address environ-
mental and health impacts from oil field operations.
The lack of comprehensive national legal standards, consistent oil field practices, or consensus
about what constitutes "best practice" for exploration and production operations makes comparisons
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review and approval, stakeholder consultation, or public disclosure of
company-selected standards." 6
C. Best Practice
In theory, a legal requirement to use "cutting edge" environmental
technology could be one means to help raise environmental protection
standards and close the gap between Ecuador's antiquated oil field tech-
nology and more modem technologies developed for use in wealthy in-
dustrial countries, where environmental protection standards are more
demanding. However, like the other international standards provisions in
the Contract, the import of the technology standard is uncertain because
the language is vague and confusing. ' 7 The term, tecnologia de punta,
is not defined, and its meaning is unclear. Does it require Occidental to
use state-of-the-art technology, the best technology that is generally
available, the best available technology that is economically reasonable,
the best technology that is commonly used by the oil industry worldwide,
or something else?
The phrase, "compatible with Ecuador's Amazon region" could add to
the confusion. Clearly, there will always be a need to ensure that any
technology that is used is capable of operating effectively in the region,
considering both the sub-surface geological conditions and above-ground
environment. The language in the Contract, however, is unclear, and
could arguably be interpreted to limit the introduction of new appropriate
technology in the region, and perpetuate an international double standard
for environmental technology. For example, there are no incinerators or
landfills in Ecuador that use advanced technologies-widely used or le-
gally required in the United States-for the disposal of hazardous and
other solid wastes. Similarly, there are no laboratories with technology
to perform sophisticated chemical analyses on samples of waters or soils.
As a result, Occidental could argue that the Contract does not require use
between U.S. and Ecuadorian standards and practices difficult. A comprehensive review of stan-
dards and practices in the United States is beyond the scope of this article; however, some compari-
sons are offered infra Pt. IX, secs. B-E.
116. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, ESTUDIO DE IMPACTO Y PLAN DE
MANEJO AMBIENTAL, BLOQUE 15, VOL. II, PLAN DE MANEJO AMBIENTAL [ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STUDY AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, BLOCK 15, VOL. 11, ENVIRONMENTAL I PACT STUDY], at
25 (1992) (prepared by AMBIENTEC Ltda.) [hereinafter EMP]. r
117. That provision requires Occidental "to incorporate tecnologia de punta (leading edge tech-
nology) compatible with Ecuador's Amazon region, for both operations and the studies, reports and
application of recommendations, that will be agreed to by the parties" to the Contract, defined as
Occidental and the Ecuadorian State, through Petroecuador. Contract, supra note 29, at para.
5.5.20.2.
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of those technologies in Ecuador, even if they could operate effectively
there, and are commonly used in the industrial world.
Finally, the "agreed to by the parties" clause appears to give Occiden-
tal a veto over the definition of "cutting edge technology" and, conse-
quently, over the applicability and requirements of the standard. Al-
though the language in the Contract is not entirely clear, it implies that
Occidental and Petroecuador must reach an agreement to trigger the pro-
vision and oblige Occidental to use "cutting edge technology." The use
of a negotiated ptandard, rather than one that has been imposed by public
officials, is cordsistent with the general pattern of longstanding relations
between Ecuador and foreign oil field operators. Since the oil boom be-
gan, Ecuador has depended on TNCs to transfer new technology and fi-
nance costly exploration and production activities. This economic and
technological dependency, and the importance of oil revenues and in-
vestment to Ecuador's economy, gives foreign companies enormous lev-
erage in their relations with the government. Despite Ecuador's nominal
authority as a sovereign nation, the actual power that government offi-
cials can-or believe they can--exercise over foreign oil companies ap-
pears to be limited." 8
118. Oil development accentuated Ecuador's dependence on foreign export markets and foreign
investment, technology and expertise. As described by Martz in his study of petroleum policy in
Ecuador through 1984, "leading policymakers often have less independent power than is believed,"
irrespective of who occupies the government and whether it is a civilian or military regime. MARTz,
supra note 39, at 395. Following the discovery of Amazon crude, the oil industry quickly came to
dominate Ecuador's economy, and successive governments have viewed hydrocarbon development
as the cornerstone of national development aspirations. As a result, the health of the oil industry is a
central concern for the State. At the same time, Ecuador is a relatively small producer when com-
pared with other oil exporting nations, so its impact on world markets is negligible. This makes Ec-
uador more vulnerable to international forces and pressures, such as the global economy, interna-
tional oil market, and needs and demands of international oil companies.
Nationalist sentiments were stimulated in petroleum policyakers at the onset of the oil boom,
but were soon "disappointed as international economic realities asserted themselves." Id. at 370.
Traditionalist domestic elites also favored the interests of foreign oil companies. After initial gains
in State control and participation in development activities during the early years of the oil boom, the
balance of power shifted from Ecuador to the international companies. Id. at 376. Martz concludes
that, in Ecuador's relations and negotiations with foreign oil companies, "occasional spurts of more
independent and nationalistic petroleum policy were not sufficient to vitiate the multinationals' supe-
riority." He predicts that:
[S]o long as petroleum is Ecuador's dominant economic force ... basic policy objectives will
favor economic development over national sovereignty whenever the two are in serious con-
flict .... [Barring conditions of economic largesse, the State] will have little choice but to yield
political control in order to maximize earnings and buttress the economy .... Barring the dis-
covery of new major reserves, Ecuador will remain a marginal producer on the international
market.... Whatever the regime, it will be hard-pressed to deal effectively with foreign corpo-
rations. It will be difficult at best to increase bargaining leverage.
Id. at 391-92.
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Instead of assuming an authoritative, command-and-control regulatory
role in environmental affairs when dealing with TNCs that carry out ex-
ploration and production activities, the government has essentially be-
haved like the industry's junior business partner.' 19 In negotiations, gov-
ernment officials have prioritized the need to promote oil production,
locate additional reserves, and maximize the State's share of revenues
and participation in hydrocarbon development, including production and
marketing. They have used the State's leverage primarily to exercise
control over economic aspects of development, including production
rates, State ownership of oil and gas reserves, financial audits of invest-
ments and expenditures, and guarantees to ensure that TNCs finance con-
tinued exploratory activities in the areas licensed to them. 12
0
119. Kimerling 1995, supra note 5.
120. See generally MARTZ, supra note 39; Kimerling 1995, supra note 5. Not surprisingly,
Martz's detailed academic study of petroleum policy through 1984 does not mention environmental
protection or relations with indigenous peoples whose traditional territories contain the oil reserves.
In a recent public forum in Quito about the legacy of Texaco in Ecuador (in which the author also
participated), a key petroleum policymaker from the military government that ruled the nation when
the oil boom began, General Rene Vargas Pazzos, expressed remorse for the State's treatment of
indigenous peoples in Amazonia. With regard to environmental policy, he admitted that the State is
not entirely free from blame, but said that officials were ignorant of the environmental risks and con-
sequences of oil development, and trusted Texaco, as an international company, to use "adequate
technology." Vargas, then an army colonel, served as the second General Manager of Petroecuador
(then CEPE), from October 1973 through November 1975. From January 1976 through February
1977, he was Minister of Natural Resources (currently, the Ministry of Energy and Mines, or MEM).
MARTZ, supra note 39 at 373. As a policymaker, Vargas had a technocratic style and was a strong
advocate of nationalistic petroleum policies. Id. at 109, 160, 183. At the forum, he also expressed
unequivocal support for the right of the "victims" of Texaco's operations to sue Texaco in U.S.
courts, and characterized that company's operations as "criminal," because it "knew about environ-
mental technology but did not apply it." Presentation by General Rene Vargas Pazzos to Forum
Deuda Ecoldgico de Texaco: Impunidad o Restauracion? [Texaco's Environmental Debt: Impunity
or Restoration?] (Jan. 18, 2001) (sponsored by the National Congress of Ecuador Commission for
Official Oversight, Third World Institute for Ecological Studies, and Accidn Ecolgica).
As mentioned infra note 163, a class action lawsuit was filed against Texaco in 1993 in federal
court in New York. The case has generated considerable interest in Ecuador. In 1997, it was dis-
missed by the District Court, in favor of litigation in Ecuador, on the grounds of forum non conven-
iens, international comity, and failure to join Ecuador and Petroecuador as indispensable parties.
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). A postjudgnrent motion by Ecuador
and Petroecuador to intervene was denied. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration. Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). It held that: (I) dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens
and comity was erroneous in the absence of a condition requiring Texaco to submit to jurisdiction in
Ecuador; (2) the lower court's reasoning with regard to plaintiffs' failure to join indispensable par-
ties supports only dismissing claims that seek to enjoin activities currently under Ecuador's control;
and (3) Ecuador's motion to intervene was late and did not include a full waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Id. A ruling on remand by the District Court is expected at any time. For a brief account of
the history of the litigation, see Judith Kimerling, Oil Development in Ecuador and Peru: Law, Poli-
tics and the Environment, in AMAZONIA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE
2001) International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 337
Environmental protection has been neglected by government officials,
despite an abundance of legal requirements on paper, 121 many of which
have been on the books for decades. In theory, the technology standard
in the Contract could provide government officials a vehicle to partici-
pate more actively in environmental decision-making in Block 15.122
However, the provision is written to ensure that the requirements of the
standard will be limited to measures that are agreed to by the company,
not imposed by the government. Moreover, although the provision ap-
pears to contemplate environmental negotiations between Occidental and
Petroecuador, in practice, the environmental unit in Petroecuador is not
involved in the operations of Occidental and other foreign companies. 23
Instead, environmental oversight is the responsibility of MEM, an
agency that, like Petroecuador, has long prioritized the production of oil,
and done little to control its environmental and social consequences.
Because of the lack of experience in Ecuador with "cutting edge tech-
nology" and environmental protection generally, and the lack of official
resources for environmental protection efforts, Occidental can be ex-
pected to have a considerable advantage over government officials in any
negotiations that might develop under the "best practice" provision. As a
general matter, the resources and international experience of TNCs like
Occidental give them a clear advantage when it comes to comprehending
environmental technology and international standards, and, thus, manag-
ing the discourse about them in Ecuador. Occidental and other foreign
companies use this imbalance effectively, illustrating the truth of the
maxim, 'information is power.' The invocation of international stan-
dards has become a tool that companies use to help them maintain their
dominance over environmental decision-making and implementation,
and deflect and discourage meaningful oversight of their operations.
This dynamic helps explain why Occidental has refused to publicly dis-
close the precise standards that govern its operations, and why govern-
ment officials are not fully informed about the company's standards and
practices. Occidental's control of environmental information reflects and
DEVELOPMENT (Tony Hall ed. 2000), at 81-88.
121. This failure to implement meaningful regulation is true of community relations as well, and
continues despite Ecuador's ratification of international law instruments that expand environmental
and indigenous rights and responsibilities; and the incorporation of group rights for indigenous peo-
ples and expanded environmental rights in the Constitution in 1998. See supra notes 45-51 and ac-
companying text.
122. However, environmental standards that are negotiated with special interests behind closed
doors raise serious questions of legitimacy and accountability.
123. Narvaez Interview, supra note 62.
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reinforces its control of environmental standards in Block 15.24
VII.THE PRIVATIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In 1995, the 1992 MEM Environmental Regulations were quietly re-
voked and replaced, following closed door talks with industry.t 2S Many
provisions, including the discharge standards, remain unchanged. One
significant reform, however, appears on its face to grant government of-
ficials considerable latitude to modify environmental impact study (Estu-
dio de Impactos Ambientales, EIA) requirements for foreign companies
like Occidental, and contemplates the negotiation of particularized envi-
ronmental law regimes in contracts with TNCs. 26
MEM regulations require oil companies to prepare EIAs at every stage
of development. In theory, EIAs should include comprehensive baseline
data about environmental and socio-cultural conditions that exist before
operations begin; assess the full range of possible environmental and
socio-cultural impacts that could result from the operations; identify
measures to mitigate adverse impacts; and include a detailed environ-
mental management plan.127 The 1992 regulations included a long list of
information, analyses, and plans that should be included in ETAs. The
1995 reforms expand the list, and provide that, in applying the regulatory
criteria for EIAs, "in cases of contracts for exploration and exploitation
of hydrocarbons, the legal framework for environmental regulation of
124. Corporate officials in Ecuador claim that all environmental information is the "property" of
Occidental and Petroecuador, the parties to the Contract. Interview with Alberto Gomez de la Tone,
Legal Representative-Legal Manager, Occidental Ecuador, in Quito (July 23, 1999) [hereinafter
Gomez Interview]. This contradicts the spirit of international environmental law relating to sustain-
able development and is dubious under Ecuador's constitutional and statutory law. For a discussion
of information and community relations, see Kimerling 2001, supra note 27. For an account of Oc-
cidental's efforts to deflect requests for basic environmental information for this study, see infra note
188.
125. The reforms were published in Ecuador's Official Registry, and have been codified. See su-
pra note 61. However, unlike the 1992 regulations, which were published with great fanfare, the
reforms were not publicized. Many NGOs and other stakeholders do not know that the 1992 regula-
tions have been replaced.
126. Another reform to the regulations was added to a provision that authorizes members of the
public to denounce environmental pollution to SPA. The new language confers a cause of action on
companies, to take legal action against a complainant when the compliant is "not proven or [is) un-
founded." MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at art. 64; cf 1992 MEM Regulations,
supra note 66, at art. 47. According to Quichua in Block 15, Occidental commonly challenges resi-
dents who complain about pollution for technical proof. This practice discourages them from com-
plaining because they do not have access to sampling equipment or environmental information that
is generated and controlled by the company.
127. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at arts. 52-54; cf 1992 MEM Regulations,
supra note 66, at art. 4 1.
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each contract shall be taken into account."' 28 The reforms also refer to
the criteria as "guidelines," while the prior regulations treated them as a
required "methodology." 29
The changes are somewhat confusing because neither the Law of Hy-
drocarbons nor Ecuador's environmental legislation authorize officials in
the executive branch or Petroecuador to negotiate particularized envi-
ronmental regimes with TNCs, either during contract negotiations or the
EIA process. Instead, they appear to set general standards that presuma-
bly should be implemented, applied and enforced in a consistent manner.
In addition, the Law of Hydrocarbons explicitly requires oil companies
to comply with environmental laws and regulations, 30 and the new regu-
lations continue the historical legal trend of reaffirming the State's regu-
latory duties and authority.13'
The modified provisions presumably apply to operations by any com-
pany other than Petroecuador, and imply that TNCs and Petroecuador de-
fine at least some special environmental rules during contract negotia-
tions. Because the legal authority for this is unclear, the practice could
be legally infirm, especially when negotiated provisions could be applied
to contradict the Constitution or generally applicable laws or lawful regu-
lations. Moreover, the procedure-writing environmental rules that can
affect the public behind closed doors in negotiations with special inter-
ests-substitutes stealthy private negotiations for democratic lawmaking
and rational public interest determinations by government agencies, and
raises serious questions of legitimacy and accountability. It is legally
dubious because it disregards the rights of local residents and other
stakeholders to participate in environmental decision-making, and may
also run afoul of separation of powers in Ecuador's government by by-
passing the National Congress.
128. 1992 MEM Regulations, supra note 66, at an. 52. Amendments to article 52 also added a
provision that refers to international standards and modem technology that are "accepted" by the
international oil industry. The provision states:
For the execution of environmental studies, modern technology that is internationally accepted
by the petroleum industry, compatible with the protection of the environment, shall be used,
and it shall be effectuated in conformance with the guidelines that are detailed in the articles
that follow this article.
129. Id. at arts. II, 16, 25, 52.
130. Art. 31 (t) requires companies:
[Tbo conduct operations in accordance with Laws and Regulations for protection of the envi-
ronment and national security, and with relation to international practice in matters of preserva-
tion of the rich fisheries and farming industry. For that end, in the contracts, the respective
guarantees of contracting companies shall be evident.
Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, at art. 31 (t).
131. See. e.g., MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at art. 5.
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The placement of the modified language in provisions governing EIAs
reflects the reality of environmental law in Ecuador-in the absence of
regulation by the State, the preparation of EIAs often serves as the pri-
mary standard-setting process for oil field operations. 3 2 Environmental
management plans are part of EIAs, and generally set forth the most de-
tailed compilation of standards and practices that companies apply to
their activities; and, in theory, the baseline information and impact as-
sessments serve as the "analytical basis"'33 for the selection of standards
and practices. 3 4  In Block 15, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation's
Worldwide Environmental Manager, Clark Hull, described the environ-
mental management plan (EMP) 35 prepared by the company in 1992 as
part of the EIA required prior to beginning production operations (1992
EIA), as "the document which collates all regulatory, mitigation and
standards practices to be employed by the project."' t36
Occidental's new Contract includes a number of provisions that relate
to environmental protection. The segment entitled "Obligations of the
Contractor [Occidental]" includes a relatively long section dedicated to
environmental protection. The opening provision obliges Occidental "to
preserve the existing ecological balance" in the areas where it operates,
"for which its actions shall be governed by the Environmental Manage-
ment Plan and the pertinent regulations that are in effect in the coun-
132. The use of vague language to quietly rewrite regulations, in the absence of corresponding re-
forms to the Law of Hydrocarbons or environmental legislation, may also reflect an effort by MEM
officials to open a legal door to allow TNCs and government officials to negotiate special environ-
mental rules, without attracting public attention. Legislative action on controversial matters is much
more likely to attract public notice and opposition.
133. E-mail from Clark Hull, Worldwide Environmental Manager, Occidental Oil and Gas Corpo-
ration, to Judith Kimerling (Apr. 17,2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hull e-mail].
134. As a result, the potential scope of variances contemplated by the relaxed EIA requirements in
the regulations is not limited to the adequacy of baseline information and impact assessments; it
could also extend to substantive standards and practices. As a general matter, reforming EIA criteria
to allow variances does not necessarily run afoul of the Law of Hydrocarbons or other laws; how-
ever, the absence of limitations or criteria for possible waivers is problematic and, in theory, could
lead to arbitrary agency action and environmental and social consequences. For example, the failure
to prepare an "abandonment plan" or oil spill contingency plan that includes an analysis of the "risks
and behavior" of possible spills, could increase environmental risks. These concerns are theoretical
at this time, because those and other requirements/guidelines have not been effectively enforced. As
a general matter, EIAs by TNCs are seriously flawed by U.S. standards, but are routinely approved
by MEM, without major changes.
135. EMP, supra note 116. The blanket incorporation of 1992 standards and practices into a con-
tract that was negotiated in 1999 is puzzling, and raises questions about what Occidental means
when it says the company is committed to using cutting edge technology.
136. Hull e-mail, supra note 133. As discussed infra, in Pt. VIll, the EMP is troubling in a num-
ber of respects and does not include a complete compilation of applicable Ecuadorian laws and regu-
lations.
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try.""' The definitions in the Contract define "Environmental Manage-
ment Plan" as Occidental's 1992 EMP."3 ' By leading the environmental
protection section with a reference to the company's EMP, and giving a
corporate management plan equal and perhaps greater stature than Ecua-
dorian environmental regulations, the environmental law regime in the
Contract seems designed to perpetuate and even legalize self-regulation
in Block 15. The use of the EMP as a legal standard reflects and rein-
forces efforts to legitimize and legalize oil industry environmental
norms, and is consistent with language in the international standards pro-
visions, discussed supra, that could be interpreted as arbitrarily adopting
oil industry norms wholesale.
Moreover, the reference in the provision to compliance with Ecuador-
ian laws and regulations is confusing because it is written in the present
tense, rather than the subjunctive or future tense. 39 As a result, it could
be interpreted to mean that, throughout the life of the Contract, Occiden-
tal's obligation to "preserve the ecological balance" will be governed by
the 1992 EMP and environmental regulations that were in effect at the
time the Contract was signed. If new and more rigorous environmental
norms are adopted in the future, the company could argue that it is not
required to comply with them.' 40
137. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5. 1.20. 1.
138. Id. at para. 3.3.35.
139. In Spanish, use of the subjunctive tense would most clearly indicate that Occidental should
comply with laws and regulations that are in effect at the time the determination is made.
140. This may sound absurd by U.S. standards, especially if applied to operations and facilities
that are developed in the future. In the United States, environmental and other laws commonly
evolve and change. Retroactive environmental requirements are not unusual because environmental
regulation is often remedial in nature. New requirements may be phased in over time and existing
operations grandfathered, but oil companies are not permitted to contractually freeze the environ-
mental law framework for their activities indefinitely, and obtain blanket exemptions from any and
all laws and regulations that might be enacted in the future.
Ecuador, however, is under tremendous pressure to provide a stable legal environment for foreign
investors; and that interpretation (that Occidental is only required to comply with current regula-
tions) could be supported by another pair of provisions that are also ambiguous with regard to
changes in environmental law. The section on applicable law and jurisdiction begins as follows:
"Applicable legislation: This Contract is governed exclusively by Ecuadorian legislation and it is
understood to incorporate the laws in effect at the time of its celebration." Contract, supra note 29,
at para. 22.1. That is followed by a statement that Occidental "declares, expressly, that is has full
knowledge of the Ecuadorian legislation that is applicable to the Participation Contracts for the Ex-
ploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons." Id. at para. 22. 1. 1.
The environmental protection section includes a second reference to Ecuadorian law and regula-
tions, that requires Occidental to "[c]omply and ensure that subcontractors comply with all laws,
regulations and any other dispositions" that apply to the Contract in Ecuador. Id. at para. 5.1.18. A
pair of subsequent provisions require subcontractors to comply with applicable laws and legal re-
quirements. Id. at paras. 17.4 and 17.5. That language in those provisions does not resolve the am-
biguity because it does not define applicable laws and regulations.
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A review of the 1992 EMP indicates that the environmental law re-
gime in the Contract seeks to not only legalize norms that have been de-
fined by the company in the document, but also cede rule-making author-
ity to Occidental throughout the life of the operations, without
requirements for public disclosure and consultation, or review and ap-
proval by government officials. This amounts to the privatization of en-
vironmental law, and represents a radical new direction for environ-
mental law and policy in Ecuador. Contrary to the regulatory guideline
calling for detailed environmental management plans, Occidental's EMP
is vague in a number of important respects, and does not provide a clear
and complete statement of standards and practices in Block 15. More-
over, it includes provisions that explicitly authorize the company to set
environmental standards in the future. At the same time, it includes
standards that, as a substantive matter, are questionable under Ecuador-
ian law.
In theory, standards set by Occidental should comply with Ecuadorian
law. But environmental law is weak and vague, and the discussion of
Ecuadorian law in the 1992 EIA is superficial and incomplete.' 4' More-
over, the EMP has not been updated to incorporate new developments in
Ecuadorian constitutional and international law, that have entered into
effect since the EMP was written. 42  In addition, Occidental's compli-
141. See generally 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at app. C.
142. The EMP is dated January 1992. Some recent legal developments are discussed supra notes
45-51 and accompanying text. Although the implementation of those rights and duties-including
rights to information and participation in environmental decision-making-is primarily the responsi-
bility ofthe State, Ecuador has effectively ceded both environmental protection and community rela-
tions in Block 15 to Occidental. According to Occidental, the EMP incorporates all applicable legal
requirements. Hull E-mail, supra note 133. Despite this, the EMP ignores the rights of local resi-
dents, and Occidental's practices run roughshod over them. The company makes environmental
decisions behind closed doors, without consultation; conceals important information; and even prof-
fers misleading information. At times, it seems to deliberately cultivate confusion in local communi-
ties about the operations and environmental standards and practices. Kimerling 2001, supra note 27.
Other international law instruments that are relevant to oil field operations include the Convention
on Biological Diversity, supra note 48, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) (entered into effect on Mar. 21, 1994). Both treaties
were ratified by Ecuador on Feb. 23, 1993, and now form part of Ecuadorian national law. The trea-
ties charge national governments with responsibility for implementation; however, Ecuador has not
acted to implement them in the oil fields. Despite this, "corporate responsibility" and voluntary ini-
tiatives to implement "international standards" should include measures to help governments comply
with their general commitments under the treaties. For example, the Framework Convention on
Climate Change requires governments to identify sources and sinks for greenhouse gases, and con-
serve and enhance, as appropriate, sinks and reservoirs for those gases. See id. arts. 4.1 (a), (b), &
(d). To facilitate compliance by Ecuador, Occidental. could provide a clear and complete accounting
of greenhouse gas emissions from its operations, identify natural sinks and reservoirs in Block 15,
and assess how the operations will affect Ecuador's general obligations under the treaty.
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ance record-within the limited parameters of the law in Ecuador-is
flawed. 141
The environmental law regime established by the Contract is vague in
another important respect. The required level of protection is unclear.
The requirement cited above, "to preserve the existing ecological bal-
ance," could be interpreted as establishing a generally applicable per-
formance standard that prohibits the degradation of waters and other
natural resources. In theory, a 'no degradation' standard could require
very high levels of protection, consistent with public promises by Occi-
dental and other TNCs to develop hydrocarbon reserves in the Amazon
Rainforest without harming the environment. It would also be consistent
with language in Ecuadorian laws that prohibit pollution and other harm-
ful impacts. 144 However, the provision in the Contract could be inter-
preted to allow considerable degradation, especially if adverse impacts
appear to be confined to certain localities, and ecosystem-wide impacts
cannot immediately be detected. It could also be interpreted to allow
impacts that are detected but fall short of permanent ecosystem collapse,
across a huge geographical area. In short, it is a standard that could
mean many things to many people, at least until after disastrous-and ir-
reversible-consequences have become indisputable. In practice, it
could operate as a hollow, indeterminate and ultimately meaningless
standard because of the enormous gaps in scientific understanding of
rainforest ecology and, thus, of the meaning of "ecological balance."
Although somewhat murky, the monitoring program in the EMP sug-
gests that the standard may represent an attempt to legalize very low lev-
els of environmental protection. The EMP establishes a single parameter
to monitor the impact of Occidental's operations on flora and fauna: the
Similarly, Occidental could conduct a biodiversity assessment in Block 15 that identifies impor-
tant habitats for threatened and endangered species, and then work with government officials, local
communities and environmentalists to develop measures to protect and monitor those species and
their habitats. One important habitat, and natural carbon reservoir, is Pafiacocha Protected Forest,
discussed infra note 231. The reserve is home to at least twenty threatened or endangered species.
E-mail from Randall Smith to Judith Kimerling, (June 22, 2000). It is especially vulnerable to pollu-
tion because it is a low energy system; in addition, noise from oil field operations can have adverse
impacts on wildlife. As discussed infra notes 145-46 and Pt. VIII, sec. B, biodiversity monitoring
and standards in the EMP are seriously flawed.
143. Seesupra notes 101-07 and accompanying text for examples of legal violations.
144. See. e.g., Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, at art. 31 (t); Law of Waters, supra note 52,
art 22; General Regulations for the Application of the Law of Waters, supra note 52, arts. 89 & 90;
Contamination Prevention Law, supra note 54, art. 3; Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 55,
art. 89. A no degradation standard would also be consistent with constitutional provisions that re-
quire Ecuador to prevent contamination and protect ecological balance. CONSTITUTION, supra note
39, at arts. 23 (6) & 86.
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"lost [biological] diversity."' 45 This could be interpreted to mean that
any impact on flora and fauna that falls short of extinction is acceptable.
Similarly, the EMP standard for monitoring the impact of oil spills on
natural resources does not require assessment or monitoring of possible
chronic impacts on flora and fauna unless a fifty percent biotic mortality
rate is documented in affected ecosystems within six months of the
spill. 14
6
In addition to the EMP, other environmental provisions in the Contract
can be read to permit indeterminate levels of pollution and other impacts.
One provision refers to "an acceptable level of negative impact" from fu-
ture operations. It anticipates that EIAs will be required for new activi-
ties, in accordance with "applicable" MEM regulatory criteria, and states
that they shall include environmental management plans that "avoid ex-
ceeding the maximum tolerable levels and reduce to an acceptable level
the negative impacts" on the environment and local communities. 47 It is
unclear: what the "maximum tolerable levels" are; what constitutes an"acceptable level" of negative impacts; who decides; and how this relates
to provisions in Ecuadorian law that appear to establish a policy of pre-
serving ecosystems and preventing pollution and other adverse impacts.
It may also represent a retreat from the level of protection that was re-
quired-at least on paper-in contracts that were signed with TNCs
around the time that Occidental arrived in Ecuador, in the mid-1980s. 141
145. EMP, supra note 116, at 22. The EMP is unclear about how Occidental should apply the
standard and detect "lost diversity." The "determination" of baseline diversity and the selection of
monitoring techniques and other possible "ecological indicators" are left to the future.
Humid tropical forests are so diverse that the vast majority of species in them have not even been
identified by scientists; as a result, by the time "lost diversity" is detected by Occidental, it could
represent irreparable harm and dramatic changes to the environment. A sounder and more protective
approach would be to select indicator species of flora and fauna before operations begin, and moni-
tor resident and migratoTy populations. Indicator species should include threatened and endangered
species, and species that are important to local populations; in addition, water quality should be
monitored in aquatic habitats that could be affected by the operations. Experience shows that, to
maximize protection of biodiversity, some habitats, such as Paflacocha Protected Forest, should be
off-limits to drilling and construction. The 1992 EIA does not squarely assess the question of
whether oil development is compatible with the preservation of wilderness. To date, experience in
Ecuador's Amazon regions suggests that it is not.
Occidental has not implemented the biodiversity monitoring program and, currently, there is no
monitoring of impacts on flora and fauna, even in Limoncocha Biological Reserve where production
operations are underway. For further discussion of possible impacts on that res rve, and related de-
ficiencies in the EMP, see infra Pt. VIll, sec. B and Pt. IX, sec. A.
146. EMP, supra note 116, at 18, 21-22. Both standards are discussed infra Pt. Vil, sec. B. and
raise questions about EMP compliance with the spirit of Ecuadorian legal provisions.
147. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.20.5.
148. According to a June 1983 presidential decree establishing the legal "bases" for hydrocarbon
contracts, TNCs should be obliged in contracts to:
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The problematic nature of the ambiguity in the management plan stan-
dard, and the width of the door it could open to legalized self-regulation,
is compounded by another provision in the Contract. In the event that
MEM does not approve or reject an EIA (and management plan) within
the time frame designated by MEM regulations, then the agency's si-
lence is deemed to constitute an approval by the agency. 149
A similar provision applies to applications to Petroecuador that are re-
perform all services covered under the Contract, according to the best international techniques
and practices genfrally accepted in the hydrocarbon industry. Said services must be performed
preserving the environment without causing any damage to public or private property. In case
of pollution caused by the Contractor's operations, said Contractor must perform the pertinent
tasks for removal of pollution, notwithstanding its responsibilities to third parties and to the ap-
propriate authorities.
Ministry of Energy and Mines, Law 1775 of 6 June 1983 Containing Contracting Bases for Hydro-
carbon Contracts (Ecuador) at art. 20.4.
Another provision states that contracts should require contractors to "adopt measures necessary
for the protection of plants and wildlife and other natural resources, and, at the same time .. avoid
polluting the air, water, and soil, in conformity with the respective legal provisions and international
agreements." Id. at art. 33. Similarly, Texaco's 1973 production contract with Ecuador-formally
adopted as law-required it "to adopt suitable measures to protect the flora, fauna, and other natural
resources and to prevent contamination of water, air and soil under the control of pertinent organs of
the state." President of the Republic, Decreta Supremo No. 925 [Supreme Decree No. 925], ch. IX,
cl. 46.1 (Ecuador).
The language in Occidental's Contract is similar to vague language found in the "bases" for par-
ticipation contracts, decreed in 1994. Ministry of Energy and Mines, Bases de Contrataci6n de los
Contratos de Participacidn para la Exploracidn y Explotacin de Hidrocarburos [Bases for Con-
tracting Participation Contracts for the Exploration and Exploitation of Hydrocarbons], R.O. No. 364
(Jan. 21, 1994) (Ecuador), at art. 7.2(c) [hereinafter Participation Contract Bases]. See also regula-
tions issued by MEM on the same day that apply to participation contracts. Ministry of Energy and
Mines, Reglamento para la Aplicacidn de la Ley Reformatoria a la Ley de Hidrocarburos [Regula-
tions to Apply Reforms to the Law of Hydrocarbons], R.O. No. 364 (Jan. 21, 1994) (Ecuador), as
amended by R.O. No. 595 (Dec. 22, 1994), at art. 11(3) [hereinafter Hydrocarbon Reform Regula-
tions], at art. II, 25(3). However, the Law of Hydrocarbons and generally applicable environmental
laws and regulations typically use language that requires the prevention of contamination and other
environmental injuries, and do not refer to "acceptable levels" of negative impacts. MEM Environ-
mental Regulations include some effluent standards and vague references to reducing, preventing
and minimizing the occurrence of negative impacts, but they do not define "acceptable levels" of
negative impacts or use that term; moreover, they cite the "special priority" to prevent, control and
avoid contamination and environmental damage, and the obligation to repair any damages and re-
store affected environments. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61.
Although the language in Occidental's Contract may represent more realistic and achievable stan-
dards for oil field operations than the absolutist language found in the earlier provisions (and some
industry public relations statements), it is too vague to compel any particular level of protection.
Most importantly, the determination of what constitutes proper levels of protection is a matter of
public values. As such, it should be made through legislation or a rational and transparent public
interest determination pursuant to statutory standards and authority, rather than delegated to Occi-
dental or decided in private negotiations that exclude all interested private parties except Occidental.
149. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5. 1.20.6. Under the regulations, the review is conducted by
SPA. For production operations, the agency has thirty working days; for exploratory activities, it has
fifteen. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at arts. 26, 10, 15.
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quired or proposed by Occidental under the Contract. If Petroecuador
fails to respond within the time frame specified in the Contract, or within
fifteen working days if no time frame is designated, then "it shall be un-
derstood that Petroecuador has approved the corresponding proposal or
required application."' so This is known as "administrative silence," and
is intended to compel government officials to respond in a timely manner
to applications and other requests from the company.'s1 Notwithstanding
this, the use of administrative silence to approve EIAs is particularly
troubling because management plans define important environmental
standards and practices, including measures that are required to mitigate
adverse impacts.' s2
150. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.2.1.
151. This represents a double standard in Block 15, because a major complaint of Quichua resi-
dents is that Occidental does not respond to their requests and grievances. See generally Kimerling
2001, supra note 27.
152. The most comprehensive legal provisions governing EIAs are found in MEM Environmental
Regulations, and do not include an administrative silence provision. However, MEM quietly
amended the Participation Contract Bases and Hydrocarbon Reform Regulations in December 1994,
to include a sixty day administrative silence provision for EIAs. See Participation Contract Bases,
supra note 148, at art. 7.2, as amended by R.O. No. 595 (Dec. 22, 1994); Hydrocarbon Reform
Regulations, supra note 148, at art. 11(3), as amended by R.O. No. 595 (Dec. 22, 1994).
Ecuador's Law of Modernization includes an administrative silence provision that applies gener-
ally to government agencies. Ley de Modernizaci6n del Estado Privitizaciones y Prestacidn de Ser-
vicios PNblicos por pare de la Iniciativa Privada [Law of Modernization of the State, Privatizations,
and Private Initiative to Render Public Services], art 28, R.O. No. 349 (Dec. 31, 1993) (Ecuador)
[hereinafter Law of Modernization]. Occidental's Contract includes an explicit reference to that law.
However, it does not refer to another provision of the same law that requires agencies to articulate a
reasoned basis for all decisions and determinations, presumably in writing, in order to inform all
interested parties (which should include affected residents), or to an equally pertinent administrative
regulation that requires notice to parties who may be affected by administrative proceedings, and an
opportunity be heard. Law of Modernization, art. 31; Constitutional President of the Republic, Es-
tatuto del Rdgimen Juridico de ia Funcidn Ejecutiva [Standing Rule of the Administrative Law Re-
gime of the Executive Function], arts. 119 & 12, R-O. No. 411 (Mar. 31, 1994) (Ecuador) [hereinaf-
ter Administrative Law Regulations]; see also Constitutional President of the Republic, Reglamento
General de la Ley de Modernizaci6n del Eslado, Privatizaciones y Prestaci6n de Servicios Pitblicos
por Parte de la Iniciativa Privada (General Regulations for the Law of Modernization of the State,
Privatizations, and Private Initiative to Render Public Services], art. 19, R.O. No. 411 (Mar. 31,
1994) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Modernization Regulations].
There is an inherent contradiction between a requirement that agencies provide a reasoned basis
for official decisions-which is also a fundamental tenet of administrative law in the United States,
and is intended to ensure that decisions by government agencies ae not arbituary and capricious-
and the automatic approval of applications when officials do not act within a specified time frame,
irrespective of the substance and import of the application. Ecuador's Constitution also requires
government officials to articulate a reasoned basis for official decisions that can affect persons, and
guarantees affected residents the right to participate in environmental decision-making.
CONSTrTUTION, supra note 39, at arts. 24(13), 88 & 84(5).
As a result, the constitutionality of the Contract and regulatory provisions that permit EIA approv-
als through administrative silence is dubious, and any use of the Law of Modernization to approve
2001] International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 347
A "no degradation" reading of the "ecological balance" standard could
also be contradicted by a third provision in the Contract, defining a
vague standard for environmental remediation. That provision obliges
Occidental to clean up and restore impacted areas to environmental con-
ditions that are "similar" to pre-operation conditions.'" Depending on
how the term "similar" is interpreted and applied, that standard could un-
dermine the spirit of legal provisions in Ecuador, including the rights of
affected residents to seek judicial remedies to repair environmental
threats or injuries. 5 4 It could also run afoul of promises made by Occi-
dental to residents in at least some communities to fully restore affected
areas.
Another variation of a generally applicable standard is found in the
provision in the Contract on environmental oversight. It provides for"periodic" environmental and social audits by MEM and states that the
purpose of audits is "to take precautions, as far as feasible, that . . .op-
erations are carried out respecting human settlements and the environ-
ment."' 55 Although the language is ambiguous, it could be interpreted as
eschewing precise, binding standards altogether-at least for government
oversight purposes-and, instead, obliging Occidental to "do what it
can" to protect the environment and respect local populations.15 6
other environmental applications would also raise serious constitutional questions. By embracing
the administrative silence provision in the Law of Modernization, while disregarding other provi-
sions in that and other laws that are less favorable to the company, including constitutional provi-
sions that appear to prohibit environmental decision-making by administrative silence, the Contract
creates a legal framework that could be used to apply Ecuador's law selectively.' Similarly, the envi-
ronmental provisions echo the constitutional requirement to protect ecological balance, but do not
mention requirements to prevent pollution, preserve ecosystems, or promote access to environmental
information and decision-making.
153. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.20.9.
154. For a discussion of Civil Code remedies that, in theory, could apply, see Kimerling 1995,
supra note 5, at 351-77. Petroecuador and Occidental can contractually agree on how to allocate
liability between them, as joint tortfeasers, but an effort to contractually limit Occidental's liability
to third parties would raise separation of powers questions vis a vis the courts and legislature, as well
as human rights and constitutional questions based on affected residents' rights to judicial remedies.
As discussed above, an effort to contractually write public law relating to required cleanup levels
also raises serious questions of law and legitimacy.
155. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.20.7.
156. This interpretation would fall short of the level of protection required by article 31 (s) of the
Law of Hydrocarbons, which requires companies to present for approval by MEM "plans, programs
and projects and the respective financing so that exploration and exploitation activities do not ad-
versely affect the economic and social organization of the population settled in the areas where the
mentioned activities are undertaken and [do not adversely affect] the local renewable and nonrenew-
able natural resources." See Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, at art. 31(s); see also Hydrocar-
bon Reform Regulations, supra note 148, at arts. 11(4) & 25(4); Participation Contract Bases, supra
note 148. at art. 17.2. For a discussion of some of the impacts of Occidental's operations on local
communities and subsistence natural resources, see infra Pt. IX, sec. A.
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In theory, comprehensive audits serve as the government's primary
mechanism for environmental and social oversight of oil field activities,
especially after EIAs and management plans have been approved for par-
ticular operations.' The use of soft, non-binding language in the only
provision directly linking a substantive environmental standard to gov-
ernment oversight activities'5 8 reinforoes the policy in the Contract to
perpetuate and legalize environmental self-regulation in Block 15, by
adopting oversight criteria that are too vague to enforce. In theory, the
standard could raise a number of legal questions, depending on how it is
interpreted and applied. MEM Environmental Regulations define the ob-
jective of the audits differently. Under those regulations, audits should
be conducted by SPA at least every two years, in order to verify "com-
pliance with Ecuadorian laws and regulations, and with the environ-
mental management plan."'5 9
As a result, the environmental law regime in the Contract could be ap-
plied to weaken substantive oversight standards in Block 15. It could
also be applied to limit the frequency, scope and parameters of oversight
activities. In another deviation from the language in the regulations, the
audit provision in the Contract states that Occidental's EIAs will serve as
the "exclusive base" for "periodic" environmental and social audits by
MEM.IW° Although arguably ambiguous, the provision could be applied
157. In theory, another mechanism for environmental oversight could be the required annual ap-
proval, by MEM, of activities, investments, costs and expenses that are planned by contracted oil
companies for the upcoming fiscal year, which should include environmental activities and expendi-
tures. See Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, art. 31; MEM Environmental Regulations, supra
note 61, art. 5; Contract, supra note 29, at paras. 3.3.33, 3.3.36, 3.3.41 & 5.1.7.
158. Other provisions require Occidental to provide environmental information that is required by
the Law of Hydrocarbons and implementing regulations to MEM and Petroecuador. See Contract,
supra note 29, at paras. 5.1.10 & 5. 1. 11. Other provisions grant Petroecuador the right to verify and
inspect compliance with the Contract and relevant law, according to timetables and procedures that
are agreed to with Occidental. Id. at paras. 5.4.2 & 14.2. Another provision confers environmental
and social oversight responsibility on SPA, but does not articulate a substantive environmental stan-
dard. Id. at para. 14.2. According to Occidental's Clark Hull, the company does not answer to SPA
"on a contractual basis." Hull Interview, supra note 17. For a fuller discussion of the context of
Hull's statement, see infra, at note 188.
159. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at art. 55. The interpretation of the purpose
of the audits is based on the regulatory definition of "environmental audit." Id. at Annex No. 1.
160. Contract, supra note 29, at para. 5.1.20.7. As mentioned above, MEM environmental regula-
tions require audits at least every two years; the failure of the Contract to adopt that requirement
suggests that audits will be less frequent, and may reflect the failure of MEM to implement the audit
requirement to date. In interviews, Occidental officials said there had been two audits, but refused to
disclose the audit reports or any related information. Ecuadorian environmental officials either were
unaware of any audits, or cited one audit, conducted in 1997 of a single seismic line in Pafiacocha
Protected Forest. That "audit" was prompted by a formal complaint to SPA by eco-tourism opera-
tors and environmentalists, and was extremely limited in scope. Under the MEM regulations, it
2001] International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 349
to limit SPA audits in Block 15 to impacts that have been predicted, and
norms that have been defined, in EIAs (and management plans), effec-
tively freezing the scope and parameters of audits and oversight. This
interpretation would increase environmental risks because audits or other
investigations are needed to assess the accuracy of predictions in EJAs,
and the effectiveness of management plans. To enhance environmental
protection, the scope of audits and parameters of government oversight
should be open to new information and developments, including infor-
mation from sources other than Occidental, and changing legal require-
ments. MEM Environmental Regulations contemplate the use of EIAs as
one base for the audits, but do not adopt them as the exclusive base. To
the contrary, the regulations direct SPA to determine the "norms and
scope" of audits.'
6'
Although, in theory, these and any other disparities between contracted
environmental law and public environmental law should be resolved in
favor of the latter, in practice it is likely that MEM and Petroecuador will
defer to language in the Contract. 162 This would not only favor Occiden-
tal's interest in perpetuating environmental self-regulation and limited
government oversight, but also could help protect the company from ac-
countability to third parties for environmental injuries, by limiting infor-
mation that is generated by audits, and creating an exaggerated appear-
ance of government regulation.163
should technically be considered as an "inspection" rather than an "audit." See MEM Environmental
Regulations, supra at note 61, at arts. 58-59.
The inspection found that the line in the reserve had not been authorized, and resulted in a request
by SPA's then-National Director of Environmental Protection, to MEM's National Director of Hy-
drocarbons ("DNH"), to sanction Occidental for working in the reserve without permission. SPA,
Oficio No. 113-SPA-97 (May 27, 1997); Memorando (Memorandum] No. DINAPA-H-97, from
National Director of Environmental Protection, to National Director of Hydrocarbons; Memorando
[Memorandum] No. 739-DINAPA-H-568-96 (Dec. 23, 1996). When interviewed in 1999, the then-
current National Director of Environmental Protection was aware of the request for sanctions, but
did not know whether DNH had followed the recommendation. Interview with Fernando Oliva, Na-
tional Director for Environmental Protection, MEM, in Quito, Ecuador (Aug. 17, 1999). According
to Occidental, DNH did not sanction the company. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37.
MEM regulations require written audit and inspection reports. MEM Environmental Regulations,
supra note 61, at arts. 58-9. A search of MEM environmental archives by archive staff did not lo-
cate any audit or inspection reports for Block 15.
161. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at art. 55.
162. The Contract specifies a legal hierarchy in case of conflicts in legal documents: legislation
prevails, followed by regulations, and then by the provisions of the Contract. Contract, supra note
29, at para. 22.1.4.
163. In 1993, a $1.5 billion class action lawsuit was filed against Texaco in federal court in White
Plains, NY, on behalf of an estimated 30,000 indigenous and settler residents of Ecuador's Amazon
region, who allegedly have been harmed by the company's pollution. One of Texaco's principal
defenses is that the operations were heavily regulated by Ecuador. Among other issues, that allega-
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Other environmental provisions in the Contract that could be used to
help limit Occidental's liability include a certification, discussed infra,
that Occidental has complied with all EIA requirements up until the ef-
fective date of the Contract, and a statement that Occidental shall not be
liable for pre-existing environmental conditions.'" A recent draft
agreement presented by Occidental to Comuna El Eden echoes this pat-
tern, and provides further evidence of a legal strategy by the company to
use negotiations to both (1) limit liability for environmental injuries; and
(2) limit applicable environmental norms to the regime defined by Occi-
dental in its EMP.165
tion is relevant to international comity and forum non conveniens considerations, and whether the
case should proceed in the United States, or be dismissed in favor of litigation in Ecuador. See
Plaintiff's Complaint, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. II, 1994); Brief
for Defendant-Appellee (Texaco), Iota v. Texaco, Inc., Nos. 97-9102(L), 97-9104(CON), 97-
9108(CON), submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Jan. 7, 1998.
See also supra at note 120.
164. See Contract, supra note 29, at paras. 5.1.20.4 & 5.1.20.12. In principle, the latter provision
is a reasonable limitation on liability, consistent with generally applicable principles of civil liability.
However, it requires an adequate record of conditions before and after the operations begin. As dis-
cussed infra notes 167-68, Pt. VIII and Pt. IX, sec. A, the baseline information in the 1992 EIA is
incomplete, includes assertions that are not supported by the evidence, and repeatedly emphasizes
degradation from other sources, including tourism. As a result, Occidental could use the provision in
the Contract, and the record it has constructed in the EIA, to fend offor entangle efforts by the State
to require remedial action in the future. The certification of the record in the EIA could also be used
by Occidental to defend against allegations of injuries by third parties.
In addition, the Contract provides for a final, comprehensive and binding audit, to be concluded
no later than six months before the Contract expires. Id. at para. 5.1.20.8. Other provisions, how-
ever, require Occidental and Petroecuador to maintain the confidentiality of "all technical and eco-
nomic information" for five years after the Contract ends. Id. at para. 5.5.5; see also id. at para.
5.1.13. Occidental interprets the confidentiality provision-which prohibits the disclosure of infor-
mation by one party without the written authorization of the other-to include environmental infor-
mation, and has invoked it to rebuff requests for such basic documents as the 1992 EIA and EMP,
and water sampling results from Lake Limoncocha.
165. The Draft Agreement would apply to new production operations in the Eden-Yuturi oil
fields, expected to occupy roughly two hundred hectares of community lands in El Eden. It provides
for the expropriation of those lands, pursuant to Ecuadorian law, and payments to the comuna that
total more than $600,000 over the twenty-year life of the project. An environmental clause drafted
by the company provides that, in the event of environmental injury, Occidental would either repair
the damage or pay indemnification. This language, and the precedent discussed infra in the text ac-
companying note 238, in which Occidental paid a fine to El Eden but did not repair damages or cor-
rect violations of the law caused by road construction in a wetland, suggests that the company may
seek to limit environmental obligations in favor of less costly payments to local residents. However,
even that commitment may prove illusory because, as drafted by the company, it would be limited to
damages that are (l) caused by failure to comply with Occidental's environmental management plan;
and (2) are "duly demonstrated, confirmed, and sanctioned by the competent environmental authori-
ties." Borrador del Convenio Entre In Comunidad El Edin y OEPC para la Explotacion Petrolera
en Territorio de la Comunidad [Draft Agreement between the Community El Eden and OEPC (Oc-
cidental) for Petroleum Exploitation in Territory of the Community] (Nov. 15, 2000) (unsigned).
There is no provision for damages caused by accidents or intentional actions that lie outside the pre-
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Whatever level of environmental performance is required of Occiden-
tal by the Contract, a comprehensive and credible record of baseline en-
vironmental conditions is needed to interpret and apply the standards in
the Contract in a clear and rational way. The Contract implies that a reli-
able record exists. Although it recognizes that additional EAs may be
required for future operations, the Contract declares that Occidental has
carried out all of the "studies, plans and programs related to the envi-
ronment" that have been required of the company to date; that they have
been presented to the competent authorities and approved by MEM; and
that "it is herein placed on the record" that Occidental has complied with
all EIA requirements up until the effective date of the Contract. 66  By
law, EIAs should include comprehensive baseline information. How-
ever, the record of baseline conditions in Occidental's 1992 EIA is mud-
dled, self-serving and incomplete, and does not support the determina-
scriptions of the management plan. Id. The management plan is not identified; nor was an environ-
mental impact study or management plan presented to El Eden with the draft agreement. As dis-
cussed supra, there is no meaningful oversight of Occidental's operations by the government, and
environmental authorities in MEM may recommend sanctions, but do not have legal authority to
levy them.
Efforts by Occidental to use agreements with local communities to limit environmental obliga-
tions would be legally dubious; however, residents have limited access to legal services and under-
standing of the law, and could be deterred by such provisions from asserting their rights. Already,
there is evidence that Occidental has deflected at least some environmental grievances and inquiries
from affected Quichua by ignoring or challenging people when they complain, and demanding tech-
nical proof when residents raise concerns about pollution. Kimerling 2001, supra note 27. In addi-
tion to the constitutional rights discussed supra, Ecuador's Civil Code includes a number of liability
provisions that could apply to environmental injuries; the company could also conceivably be sub-
ject to U.S. common law obligations for injuries that result from decisions made by corporate offi-
cials in the United States. See Kimerling 1995, supra note 5, at 306-24, 351-57; see also Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527, 1994 WL 142006 at 8-9 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. II, 1994).
The right to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and
remedy, not only is recognized by emerging principles of international environmental law in the
field of sustainable development, but also is (along with the right to equality before the law) a recog-
nized fundamental human right. See, e.g., Rio DECLARATION, supra note 3 at princ. 10; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(II1), U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), arts. 7, 8
and 10; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by Ecua-
dor Mar. 6, 1969), arts. 2, 14, 26; American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S.
Res. XXX. O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965), arts. XVIII, XXIV, II; American Con-
vention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprinted in Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OAS/Ser. LJV/1.4 rev. 7 at 23 (2000)
(entered into force July 18, 1978) (ratified by Ecuador Dec. 28, 1977) at arts. 8, 25, 24. See also
CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at arts. 16-20, 23(l), 23(15), & 23(17). A full discussion of liability
issues is beyond the scope of this article. Expropriation and Occidental's relations with El Eden
prior to the Draft Agreement are discussed infra note 234; for fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001,
supra note 27.
166. Contract, supra note 29, at'para. 5.1.20.4.
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tion. 167  The certification in the Contract, then, arbitrarily legitimizes
baseline determinations that were made by the company, in addition to
contributing to an exaggerated appearance of government regulation in
Block 15.168
VIII.ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN
The most detailed compilation of environmental standards and prac-
tices in Block 15 is found in the EMP,' 69 prepared by Occidental in 1992
as part of the EIA ("1992 EIA") required before beginning production
activities, and featured as a legal standard in the environmental law re-
gime in the Contract.'70 According to Occidental, the EMP "collates all
regulatory, mitigation and standards practices,"' that apply to the opera-
tions. Notwithstanding this, the document does not provide a clear and
complete portrait of Occidental's standards, practices and operations. At
the same time, it includes some troubling details and, when read with the
167. One major shortcoming is the lack of adequate water quality data. In addition, although the
document is not entirely clear or consistent, when read as a whole it implies that there is widespread
degradation in Block 15. This is not true for most of Block 15, and some of the degradation that
does exist can be attributed to pre-production operations by Occidental. Although it includes some
important information, the EIA does not: clearly identify pristine areas; provide clear and adequate
information about baseline conditions in intervened areas (which are not uniform); or distinguish
between degradation that is due to Occidental and degradation from other sources. It also contains
potentially misleading information and assertions that are not supported by the evidence. See, e.g.,
the discussion of sampling data from Lake Limoncocha, Pt. VIII, sec. B.
168. The certification that Occidental has fully complied with EIA requirements is not supported
by an administrative record. Instead, a list of approved "plans, studies and programs" is included in
an annex to the Contract and, for at least some documents, the date and decree number of the official
approval are identified. The absence of an administrative record providing a written memorial of the
official acts and procedures used to conduct the reviews and setting forth the findings and rationale
for the approvals is not surprising. It is unlikely that one exists because such records are typically
not developed when EIAs are reviewed. This continues to be the practice, despite legal reforms that
apply to administrative actions generally, and require public authorities to articulate the legal basis
and rationale for decisions that affect persons. See Law of Modernization, supra note 152, at art. 31
(in effect since 1993); Modemization Regulations, supra note 152, at art. 19; CONSTITUTION, supra
note 39, at art. 24(13) (in effect since 1998).
As a general matter, EIAs by TNCs are routinely approved by SPA without significant modifica-
tion. This reflects and reinforces the general domination by oil companies of environmental deci-
sion-making for oil field operations. Notwithstanding constitutional reforms and international law
principles that recognize broad rights to participate in environmental decision-making, there are no
procedures for public notice, review or comment on draft EIAs. Until recently, EIAs were treated as
confidential documents even after approval. Currently, SPA maintains an archive in Quito where
final EIAs can be reviewed after approval. Occidental, however, apparently does not consider EIAs
to be public documents.
169. EMP, supra note 116.
170. Contract, supra note 29, paras. 5.1.20.1 & 3.3.35.
171. Hull e-mail, supra note 133.
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Contract, indicates that Ecuador has not only failed to implement envi-
ronmental regulation in the oil fields, but also quietly-and arbitrarily-
ceded rule-making authority to a private company to regulate itself.
A. Standards and Practices
The EMP begins with a statement that makes it clear whose document
it is, and who is in control:
Environmental protection is one of the highest priorities that Occidental
Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) has included in the design of
its operations and as such the environmental factor has been considered in
the decision-making in order to reduce the impacts on the environment. 72
The decision-making process and rationale are not explained, and the
document continues with a list of six measures that are "among the deci-
sions made for the design" of production operations. They include: lo-
cating production facilities far from populations; drilling directional
wells; re-injecting formation water; using "impermeable" pits for drilling
muds; burying pipelines, including flow lines that cross rivers; and limit-
ing the width of roads. 73 The plan does not explain why these measures
were selected or how they will be implemented; instead it states that the
EMP has been designed "in order to guarantee the mechanisms that en-
sure that an adequate consideration of environmental factors will be
given during the development of the Project."' 74 This statement is con-
fusing because, presumably, environmental factors have already been
considered during the EIA process, and under Ecuadorian law, environ-
mental management plans should detail the precise measures and prac-
tices that will be used to prevent and mitigate impacts, including moni-
toring. 75 The introduction to Occidental's EMP, however, suggests a
"figure-it-out-as-we-go-along" approach to environmental planning, im-
plementation and oversight.
A review of the document confirms that Occidental is unwilling to
commit to a comprehensive set of clear standards and practices in its
EMP. Instead, it makes a number of general commitments that leave the
company with considerable leeway in how to interpret and implement
them. For example, the initial list of five "design decisions" is followed
by a long table that summarizes potential impacts from the operations
and lists the measures that should be taken to mitigate them. One of the
172. EMP,supra note 116, at 2.
173. Id. at 2-3.
174. Id. at 3.
175. MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, art. 54; see also Contract, supra note 29,
para. 5.1.20.5.
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mitigating measures, to prevent the degradation of surface waters, is that
Occidental "will establish quality standards for all discharges based on
Ecuadorian norms or applicable regulations in the United States." As
discussed above, MEM Environmental Regulations include some dis-
charge standards, most of which are listed in the EMP.' 76 EPA regula-
tions, however, have generally prohibited discharges of onshore explora-
tion and production wastes since 1979; that standard is not mentioned in
the EMP.177 Other important-but equally vague-mitigating measures
include "treatment" of wastes, "control of runoff," and "monitoring and
follow-up of the quality of effluents and receiving waters. ' 178
The table is followed by a summary discussion of four "principle
mechanisms or programs' ' 79 that should be implemented by the company
to execute the EMP. They include a Waste Management Plan, Natural
Resources Recuperation and Protection Plan, Community Assistance
Plan, and a Contingency Plan. Those programs are governed by what is
called the "Comprehensive Program to Guarantee Environmental Qual-
ity' 't 0 and, together, they comprise the remainder of the text of the EMP.
Many of the mitigating measures that are listed in the table, however, are
not discussed in those plans or otherwise integrated into the text of the
EMP, leaving the reader to wonder whether, when, and how they will be
implemented. For some measures, the company's ability to implement
them is dubious, considering the scope of information included in the
EIA.
For example, one measure to protect wildlife is to "locate infrastruc-
176. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 228-30, 252-54 and ac-
companying text.
177. This suggests that the language in the EMP may have been crafted to mislead readers into
believing that Occidental complies with the same standards that would apply to operations if they
were conducted in the United States. By referring to "applicable regulations," a literal reading of the
text means that no United States standards are relevant, because they do not apply to discharges out-
side of the United States.
178. EMP, supra note 116, at 5-7. A separate table of potential impacts and mitigating measures
appears at the end of the impact assessment section of the 1992 EIA. 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at
295-300. The information in the two tables, however, is not organized in the same way, so it is dif-
ficult to work with the tables together. In addition, some measures in the longer table in the assess-
ment section have been omitted without explanation from the table in the EMP. This example illus-
trates a general pattern in the EIA, whereby information is presented in a piecemeal and disjointed
manner, and both the information and analyses are mostly incomplete, frequently superficial, and
sometimes internally inconsistent. This pattern makes the EIA a reader-unfriendly document, and
paints a confused and murky portrait of baseline conditions, operations, and standards in Block 15.
In addition, impact assessments are limited and highly segmented.
179. EMP, supra note 116, at 4.
180. Id. at4, 13-35.
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ture to avoid environmentally sensitive areas."' ' At first glance, this ap-
proach appears promising; however, there is no analysis to indicate that it
was implemented. Moreover, the EIA does not clearly identify the loca-
tion of "environmentally sensitive areas" and important wildlife habitats,
such as sites where endangered species feed, nest, and reproduce. A re-
view of the sites selected by Occidental for its facilities suggests that the
measure is a hollow promise, and that no location is so "environmentally
sensitive" that it is off-limits to the company. For example, Occidental
located production wells and roads in a wetland that comprised part of
the only remaihing undisturbed forest in the Limoncocha Biological Re-
serve.182 At the time, the swampy forest was an important wildlife habi-
tat and hunting area for local residents. Like other swamps, it is particu-
larly vulnerable to spills and other pollution because it is generally a low
energy habitat. It is also located on a flood plain between the Napo
River and Lake Limoncocha. When Occidental drilled its first explora-
tory well in the area, the site became flooded.'83 Drilling operations were
temporarily halted as the company fled the site. Residents who went to
hunt in the flooded forest just after the rains reported seeing drums and
other containers of chemicals that had been washed into the swamp from
the drill site ("Laguna Spill"). Notwithstanding this, the company did
not disclose the spill in the EIA and located production wells, pipelines
and a new road in the area.
Another mitigating measure that has been disregarded was listed to
minimize "conflicts with indigenous cultures, traditions and way of
life."'" It provides that Occidental "will maintain open and cooperative
relations with the [local] communities, including the dissemination of the
EMP among the communities in the area of influence of the Project."' 85
During a visit to Block 15 in 1999, the author was present on three occa-
sions when residents asked company officials for a copy of the environ-
mental management plan that governs operations in their communities.
181.Id. at 5.
182. See 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 92, 179-80, 186-87, 196-204, 248, 260-62; Occidental Ex-
ploration and Production Company, Evaluaci6n del Impacto Ambiental (ElA), Pozo Laguna No. 1,
[Environmental Impact Study, Well Laguna No. I], at 1-12, 16 (Prepared by Ecuambiente S.A., un-
dated); Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Plan de Manejo Ambiental. Pozo Laguna
No. 1, [Environmental Management Plan, Well Laguna No. II, at 1-2 (Prepared by Ecuambiente
S.A., undated); Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Plan de Contengencias, Pozo La-
guna No. I [Contingency Plan, Well Laguna No. I ], at 3 (Prepared by Ecuambiente S.A., undated).
The well was drilled in 1991.
183. See infra note 211.
184. EMP, supra note 116, at 7.
185. Id.
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On each occasion, the company's representatives responded by saying
that they were not authorized to distribute the document. When pressed,
they advised the community to request it, and any other information they
might seek, from the appropriate authorities. On each occasion a differ-
ent appropriate authority was cited. 186  Subsequently, Occidental prof-
fered a document entitled "Constancia," or "Record." Signed in 1992 by
two delegates of the Indigenous Association of Limoncocha, it stated, for
the record, that the delegates had participated in a working group to re-
view Occidental's EMP. 187 The company offered the document as evi-
dence that it does not hide environmental information and that residents
already have a copy of the EMP. At the same time, however, it contin-
ued to refuse to show the EMP to current representatives of local com-
munities. 8 8 This suggests that, to Occidental, community relations is a
186. The authorities included Petroecuador, Occidental Ecuador's General Manager, and a com-
munity relations supervisor. On one occasion the request related to planned operations, but the re-
sponse was similar. The responses reflected two general patterns of practices observed during this
study: (I) in response to requests for information, Occidental neither denied the requests nor pro-
vided the information; instead, people were instructed to request the information again, and the pro-
cedures and authorizations demanded by the company seemed to change arbitrarily; and (2) com-
pany officials deny responsibility for withholding information by attributing decision-making power
to others.
The Contract includes a confidentiality clause that requires the parties to obtain written authoriza-
tion from the other party before disclosing any "technical [or] economic information" to third par-
ties. Contract, supra note 29, at paras. 5.5.5 & 5.4.4. The provision does not mention environmental
information; Occidental says it is included. However, applying the provision to environmental in-
formation would be constitutionally suspect, especially if it is used to withhold information from
affected residents. It would also be questionable under international law and Ecuador's Law of
Modernization. See Law of Modernization, supra note 152, at art. 32 (public access to public docu-
ments unless prohibited by special laws); Modernization Regulations, supra note 152, at art. 20
(public officials must facilitate access to documents); see also supra notes 47-51 and accompanying
text.
187. INDIGENOUS ASSOCIATION OF LIMONCOCHA, CONSTANCIA (Apr. 16, 1992).
188. The author obtained the EMP and 1992 EIA (with some missing pages) from a new archive
maintained by MEM environmental officials. Subsequently, Occidental provided a copy of the same
documents and a recent EIA for exploratory seismic studies. Most of the information requested from
Occidental has not been provided. An initial letter requesting information for academic research
about standards and practices, and follow-up phone calls, were not answered. Subsequently, Occi-
dental sent the following: a copy of OXY: ISO 14001 CERTIFIED, supra note 23; reprints of OIL AND
GAS JOURNAL containing the article discussed supra note 22; a copy of the HESMS GUIDANCE
MANUAL, supra note 24; a copy of the HESMS Guidelines for Community Relations; and a copy of
a company-produced video called "The Human Face of Petroleum."
Subsequently, in response to repeated requests for EIAs, the environmental management plan and
other specific documents, Occidental instructed the author to follow five different procedures. First,
officials promised to provide all of the information upon submission of a written list to the company.
After submitting such a list, the author was given a copy of the Contract and another ISO brochure,
and told to resubmit the request and list in a letter directed to Petroecuador, because Occidental
needs Petroecuador's permission to provide the information.
After re-submitting the request in a letter to Petroecuador, the author was told that the relevant
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checklist, prepared and executed by the company, rather than an ongo-
ing, dynamic process, that needs to be responsive to the concerns, priori-
ties and aspirations of local residents.
A review of the four programs in the EMP shows that-although some
important details are included-the plans are by no means comprehen-
sive, and many important standards and practices are vague and unclear.
For example, there is no clear and complete statement of the quantity,
chemical composition and destiny of the waste streams and emissions
that will be generated by the operations. Similarly, the precise locations
where wastes are buried, and where effluents and emissions are released
into the environment, are not disclosed.8 9
In addition, a number of key assessments and decisions are explicitly
and inexplicably left for the future, including: the location and technical
specifications for one, and possibly two, solid waste landfills to be built
and operated by the company;'90 the location of sites to mine sand and
authority is MEM, and that environmental officials there had instructed Occidental not to provide the
information, because regulations require all such requests to be submitted directly to SPA. After
obtaining an Oficio from the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry, who heads SPA, asking Occidental to
provide the information, and stating that Ecuador's laws do not prohibit Occidental from distributing
environmental and social information to international researchers, the company said the SPA Oficio
is not determinative because Occidental "does not report to SPA on a contractual basis." Instead, it
reports exclusively to Petroecuador. Hull Interview, supra note 17. (This response is curious; in
addition to Occidental's prior referral, both the Contract and Ecuadorian law provide that SPA is
responsible for environmental oversight in Block 15. See Oficio No. 0108-SPA-99, infra note 215.)
The author was told that the request was under consideration at Occidental's U.S. headquarters; and
that the interest shown by local residents in the research, and the formal request by the community
delegation that participated in the author's official visit to CPF-asking Occidental to provide the
author (and the communities) with the requested information-"hurts" the "validity" of the research
and information request. The author was also told that Occidental had developed specific environ-
mental performance standards that post-date the EMP, but that they cannot be disclosed without au-
thorization from the legal department in the United States. The author's request for the standards
would be submitted to the lawyers, but she should not have "much hope" that it would be approved.
The author was advised to "establish a relationship" with the company and "divorce the research"
from any work with indigenous organizations, and given copies of HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL in
English, Spanish and Farsi. Id.
Most recently, the author was told that Occidental's policy is to provide "all documents that are
considered public information and that [Occidental hasI permission, as a contractor to the Ecuador-
ian government, to distribute." She was instructed to submit a revised list of the information re-
quested, for review by Occidental under that policy. Hull e-mail, supra note 133.
189. Effluents refers to liquid wastes that are discharged into the environment, usually into sur-
face waters Emissions are pollutants that are released into the air.
190. EMP, supra note 116, at 46,48. The EMP clearly contemplates construction of a landfill for
"domestic solid wastes," and provides that "industrial" solid wastes may be buried in a "special"
landfill or incinerated. As with the landfills, the location and specifications for the incinerator are
not disclosed. In a troubling disclosure, the EMP states that leachate from the landfill(s) will be col-
lected, passed through an "inspection box," and then discharged into the Napo or Jivino rivers, at an
undisclosed location. Id. at 48. Both rivers are important natural resources for local communities.
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gravel for construction activities;' 9' the "concentration of contaminants
[that will be] liberated into the environment" when effluents, or liquid
wastes are discharged into surface waters; the baseline water quality in
those receiving waters; and the frequency of chemical sampling for
monitoring activities. 92 The information that is needed to make those
determinations is precisely the kind of information that should be gath-
ered, disclosed and assessed in the EIA. Its omission not only raises se-
rious questions about the adequacy of the impact assessment in the 1992
EIA, but also suggests that environmental considerations are more of an
afterthought than an integral part of project planning. If important base-
line data is gathered and standards are set after the EIA and EMP have
been approved, how can the possible environmental impacts of the pro-
ject be assessed in a meaningful way and integrated into the project plan-
ning?
Presumably, these and other important future "determinations', 93 will
be made internally by Occidental, which is assigned "exclusive responsi-
bility" for many of the programs and activities in the EMP, including the
waste management, monitoring, and oversight programs. 194 In addition
to the major gaps in baseline information and applicable standards and
practices, the EMP is written in a way that repeatedly anticipates the re-
adjustment of standards, controls and methodologies.' 95 Although a cer-
tain amount of review and adjustment can be expected for any "new
model" of oil field operations, the EMP appears to allow this far beyond
any reasonable need, and, most importantly, does not provide for disclo-
sure, transparency, or government oversight as standard-setting and other
environmental decision-making by the company proceeds. The result is
a striking lack of clarity about the standards, practices, and oversight of
the company's operations. This murkiness makes it impossible to verify
Occidental's claims of environmental excellence or even to decipher the
level of protection provided by environmental standards in Block 15, and
has created a major source of frustration and anxiety for many residents
in local communities.In effect, then, the EMP creates a framework for self regulation by the
company. In addition to the specific provisions discussed above, two
general provisions are particularly troubling because they appear to give
the company broad authority to set, and modify, the standards for its op-
191. Id. at 64.
192. Id. at 17-18.
193. Id. at 17.
194. Id. at 10.
195. See, e.g., id. at 16.
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erations. The Integral Program to Guarantee Environmental Quality,
which "regulates"' 96 all of the programs and mechanisms in the EMP, in-
cludes a section entitled "Environmental Norms." It provides:
OEPC (Occidental) will adopt the most applicable environmental codes,
norms, and regulations in all phases of the Project. The application of
those norms will be a dynamic process throughout the development of the
Project, in order to comply with the policy of equivalence, which means
that the same level of protection that is required in the United States, should
be given, unless the standards in Ecuador are more strict.' 9
This language reflects Occidental's corporate policy at the time it
wrote the EMP. Initially called "functional equivalence," and subse-
quently re-named "equivalent intent," the policy was one of the first
variations of "international standards" adopted by an oil company in
Amazonia. Although it sounds promising, "equivalent intent" suffers
from the same problems that characterize the more recent international
standards policies in the oil patch. It is vague, and levels of protection
vary considerably at different locations in the United States. As a result,
it allows the company to pick and choose the standards to apply to its op-
erations, without independent oversight. The vagueness of the policy,
and the virtually unlimited discretion that is granted to Occidental under
the EMP, is illustrated by the fact the Occidental has abandoned the pol-
icy of functional equivalence-yet that change apparently did not require
the company to revise the EMP. According to Clark Hull, Occidental's
policy was changed in 1995 to "worldwide standard of care," because
some people in the oil industry, and internal auditors, had interpreted"equivalent intent" to require compliance with United States regulations.
The worldwide standard of care policy allows variable standards around
the world, where environments and exposure pathways are different.
According to Hull, standard-setting under the new policy "lets the com-
pany apply good science and management techniques;" and Occidental
has developed specific performance standards for Block 15 under the
policy, since writing the EMP.'98 Notwithstanding this development, the
company has refused to disclose those standards to the author or local
residents.
The Integral Program to Guarantee Environmental Quality also pro-
vides for annual review of the EMP, "in order to determine the effective-
ness of the application of its programs." Among other items, the review
should include a "re-evaluation" of the environmental impacts of the op-
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id. at 25.
198. Hull Interview, supra note 17.
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erations, and a comparison of those impacts with the impacts that were
predicted in the EIA. Based on the review, the EMP should be "repro-
grammed and adjusted."' 99
Together, these provisions confirm that standards in Block 15 can be
moving targets, and that environmental protection is controlled by Occi-
dental. °° Instead of prescribing a body of clear standards to regulate the
company's operations, justifying the selection of those standards, and es-
tablishing a program to implement, monitor and evaluate them, the EMP
has been crafted to legalize Occidental's internal corporate environ-
mental policy and management program, and authorize the company to
modify standards and practices without public disclosure or government
review and approval.
As a result, the use of the EMP as a legal standard in the new Contract
raises serious legal and ethical questions. Presumably, the company has
made at least some of the decisions and determinations that are called for
in the EMP, yet the document was not updated before it was incorporated
into the Contract. This omission can only mean that Occidental and Ec-
uador are unwilling to commit to clear environmental standards, and that,
for the most part, the State has ceded the authority to set environmental
standards, and evaluate their effectiveness, to the company. This
amounts to the privatization of environmental law. It is legally and ethi-
cally dubious because the State cannot constitutionally shirk its environ-
mental and social duties, and legalize an environmental protection re-
gime that allows private special interests to set legally binding standards
in an arbitrary and capricious manner, behind closed doors. In addition,
Ecuador's government does not have the authority to extinguish or disre-
gard the rights of local residents--under both international law and the
Constitution-to participate in decision-making that can affect the envi-
ronment, or the rights of indigenous residents to be fully informed and
consulted about plans and projects to exploit non-renewable resources in
their territories.2 '
199. EMP, supra note 116, at 34-35. Notwithstanding this provision, the version of the EMP that
was provided by both Occidental and MEM, in 2000 and 1999 respectively, is the same document
that was submitted and approved in 1992, without modifications.
200. Similarly, the section in the Integral Program to Guarantee Environmental Quality that speci-
fies quantitative standards for discharges and emissions begins with the following statement: "OEPC
(Occidental) will adopt the most applicable emission standards for liquid and gaseous residues, and
noise. These standards will be updated as needed." Id. at 27.
201. See. e.g, CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, arts. 23(6), 84 & 86-91; see also supra notes 47-51
and accompanying text.
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B. "The Purloined Data ' 20 2
Two details disclosed in the EMP are particularly troubling. One re-
lates to monitoring activities after an oil or chemical spill. It provides
that within six months of the spill, "the biotic structure" of affected eco-
systems should be evaluated; and in areas where the biotic mortality rate
is found to exceed fifty percent, additional studies should be carried out
to determine whether there are chronic impacts from the spill. 03 This
appears to set a standard that allows Occidental to disregard possible
chronic impacts on flora and fauna from oil and chemical spills, unless a
threshold fifty percent mortality rate can be documented, at an indeter-
minate time within six months of the spill. Although the standard is writ-
ten to sound scientific and authoritative, it is not a scientifically defensi-
ble approach to spill response or natural resources monitoring. The
shortcomings of the approach are compounded by the failure of the EMP
to specify action levels for cleanups.
Those problems are further exacerbated by another detail in the EMP.
The general monitoring program establishes a single parameter to moni-
tor the impact of Occidental's operations on flora and fauna: the "lost
[biological] diversity.' '2 °4  This provision could be interpreted to mean
that any impact on flora and fauna that falls short of "lost diversity" is
acceptable. Tfhat interpretation, however, would be inconsistent with re-
sponsible corporate conduct. 205 It would also be inconsistent with provi-
sions in Ecuador's Law of Hydrocarbons that require oil companies to
protect renewable natural resources and ensure that operations do not ad-
versely affect the local economies of populations who live in the oil
202. The title for this section is taken from a short story by Edgar Allan Poe, "The Purloined Let-
ter." Poe's title refers to a letter that provided crucial evidence to solve a crime. The responsible
party concealed the letter by placing it in the midst of a multitude of irrelevant, unconcealed docu-
ments, instead of attempting to hide it outside of plain view. In the words of Poe:
The minister had deposited the letter immediately beneath the nose of the whole world by way
of best preventing any portion of that world from perceiving it ... (1]o conceal this letter, the
minister had resorted to the comprehensive and sagacious expedient of not attempting to con-
ceal it at all.
EDGAR ALLAN POE, The Purloined Letter,first published in THE GIFr (1845). The use of this title is
not intended to suggest that the data was stolen.
203. EMP, supra note 116, at 18, 21-22.
204. Id. at 22.
205. In addition, Occidental's ability to detect the loss of diversity in time to protect flora and
fauna is questionable. As with all impact monitoring, baseline data is needed before operations be-
gin. The EMP is unclear about how Occidental will apply the standard; the "determination" of base-
line diversity, and selection of monitoring techniques and other possible "ecological indicators" are
left to the future. Not surprisingly, the monitoring program has not been implemented and, currently
there is no monitoring of flora and fauna, even in Limoncocha Biological Reserve.
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patch.0 6
The failure of those standards and the EMP generally to offer mean-
ingful protection to natural resources, and the shortcomings of allowing
Occidental to police itself in environmental and social affairs, is illus-
trated by the Laguna Spill, discussed supra. In a brief discussion of
baseline chemical data, Occidental's 1992 EIA reports that samples at
one location in Lake Limoncocha show the presence of high levels of
heavy metals, far in excess of water quality standards for any designated
use. Occidental implies that the pollution was caused by Metropolitan
Touring, a nature tour operator that used a dock in the lake near the sam-
ple site; and further implies that the contaminants are contained in a
"closed" area of the Lake. 07 This implication is misleading because the
area Occidental refers to is a narrow neck of the lake, that extends from
the main body of the lake, but is not closed off or contained in any way.
In addition, a table of data included in the EIA, but not discussed in de-
tail in the text, reveals that the heavy metals found in the lake-arsenic,
barium, cobalt, copper, lead, nickel, vanadium and zinc-are all con-
taminants that are typically associated with oil drilling activities. The ta-
ble also shows that most of the same metals, as well as cadmium, mer-
cury, silver and beryllium--were found at another site. The results from
that site are not mentioned in the text. Although the location is not dis-
closed with precision, it appears to be somewhere in the swampy forests
of the Limoncocha Biological Reserve, in the vicinity of the Laguna
wells platform.0 8 In addition, high levels of chromium and nickel were
206. The law requires oil companies to present for approval by MEM "plans, programs and pro-
jects and the respective financing so that exploration and exploitation activities do not adversely af-
fect the economic and social organization of the population settled in the areas where the mentioned
activities are undertaken and [do not adversely affect] the local renewable and nonrenewable natural
resources." Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, at art. 31(s).
207. 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 98.
208. In the lake, arsenic was found at 10.4 parts per million (ppm); lead at 45.6 ppm; cobalt at
40.6 ppm; nickel at 33.2 ppm; zinc at 218 ppm; copper at 242 ppm; vanadium at 80 ppm; and barium
at 826 ppm. In the swamp, beryllium was found at 8.2 ppm; cadmium at 24.8 ppm; cobalt at 231
ppm; copper at 158 ppm; lead at 20.3 ppm; mercury at 1.04 ppm; nickel at 145 ppm; silver at 14.1
ppm; zinc at 988 ppm; and barium at 4,310 ppm. Id. at 96-97. For contaminants that are governed
by Ecuador's Water Pollution Regulations, these levels are 43.6 to 98,800 times greater than water
quality standards for human consumption and the protection of flora and fauna.
Ecuador's water quality standards for water that requires "only disinfection" prior to use for hu-
man domestic consumption, expressed in mg/i (ppm), are 0.05 for arsenic; 1.0 for barium; 0.01 for
cadmium; 1.0 for copper; 0.05 for lead; 0.002 for mercury; 0.05 for silver; and 5.0 for zinc. For
flora and fauna, in mg/I (ppm), they are 0.1 for arsenic; 0.1 for barium; 0.1 for beryllium; 0.01 for
cadmium; 0.1 for copper; 0.01 for lead; 0.01 for mercury; 0.01 for nickel; 0.01 for silver; and 0.01
for zinc. Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 55, at arts. 18, 19,25.
In the United States, EPA National Primary Drinking Water Regulations establish maximum con-
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found in two species of plants in the lake.2°9
Lake Limoncocha is an oxbow lake, created when the Napo River
changed course, leaving a body of water.210  The lake is still fed by the
Napo River during periods of very heavy rains. One such rain occurred
while Occidental was drilling the first Laguna exploratory well, at a site
in the reserve. The flooding caused a temporary shutdown of drilling
operations and the Laguna Spill. While the data in the EIA are too lim-
ited to be conclusive, there is no question that they are significant, and
that it is considerably more likely that the pollution in the lake was
caused by the Laguna Spill than by tourism. Nonetheless, the EIA does
taminant levels for drinking water. Those levels, in mg/i (ppm), are: 0.05 for arsenic; 2.0 for barium;
0.004 for beryllium, 0.005 for cadmium; 1.3 for copper; 0.015 for lead (with a goal of 0); 0.002 for
mercury. 40 C.F.R. § 141.23 (2000). In New York, State Public Health Law regulations include
some additional standards, in mg/I (ppm): 0.1 for nickel; 0.1 for silver; and 5.0 for zinc. N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, §5-1.52 (1999).
The text does state, however, that "this [presence of high levels of heavy metals far in excess of
water quality standards] does not occur in the three remaining sampling locations in the lake, where
only the presence of two of those elements was detected at one of the locations, in much lower con-
centrations." 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 100. A review of the data table shows that barium was
found at 64.5 ppm and zinc at 30.7 ppm at another location in the lake; the other metals were not
detected. Id. at 97. Although considerably lower than the levels of barium and zinc found elsewhere
in the lake, these levels nonetheless also greatly exceed water quality standards for human consump-
tion and the protection of flora and fauna, by 6 times to 3,700 times for zinc, and 64.5 to 645 times
for barium.
The variation in the levels of contamination at different locations in the lake could be explained by
the presence of a point source of contamination near the sampling location with the higher levels,
and/or by limited mixing in the lake. The former explanation is most likely, and is consistent with
the author's conclusion that the Laguna Spill is the most likely cause of the contamination. In addi-
tion, notwithstanding the variation, the higher levels of contamination could extend over a very large
area in the lake (and swamp), and be a source of contamination for the lake as a whole. Further
sampling is needed to fully characterize water quality in the lake, and should include sampling of
sediments. Levels of heavy metals could be considerably higher in sediments than water, because
they generally have a greater affinity for soils than water. Contaminated sediments could migrate in
the lake, and be a source of water pollution. Interview with Dr. Mark R. Cullen, Professor of Medi-
cine, Yale University, in New York (May 25, 2000).
209. These contaminants, both carcinogens, are also associated with oil drilling activities. Chro-
mium levels are reported at 0.015% and 0.0003% dry weight; nickel levels are 0.03% and 0.004%.
1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 97.
The text and table also show that oil and grease were found at all four sampling locations in the
lake; however, those results are summarily dismissed-without supporting data or analyses-as"surely of organic origin." Id. at 100. Oil and grease were not detected in the sample from the
swamp. To distinguish hydrocarbons from naturally-occurring oils, samples should be analyzed for
total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH) rather than oil and grease. To better assess the environmental
and human health impacts of hydrocarbon pollution, samples should also be analyzed for specific
compounds such as benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylenes (BTEX) and polynuclear aromatic hy-
drocarbons (PAHs).
210. Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Environmental Impact Study, Well La-
guna No. 1, supra note 182, at 4.
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not disclose the spill."' In addition, even though the levels of contami-
nants in both the lake and the swamp raise serious ecological and health
concerns,212 both sampling sites have apparently been abandoned by Oc-
cidental. Neither site is included in the water monitoring program in the
EMP,213 and there is no sampling of sediments or contaminants in flora
and fauna. Moreover, under the natural resources standards defined in
the EMP (and discussed above), if another similar spill occurred today,
the company's response would still be inadequate.
Local residents say that Occidental studied the lake "by itself" and told
them that water quality is "good." In addition, notwithstanding the evi-
dence of multiple violations of water quality standards, Occidental has
reportedly told Ecuadorian government officials who currently manage
Limoncocha Biological Reserve that-based on the company's sam-
pling-water quality in the lake is "good," and the only contaminants of
concern are coliforms, that come from sewage from a nearby training in-
stitute for bilingual professors.1 4 Occidental reportedly refused an oral
request from the Area Chief of the reserve to review the company's sam-
pling data from the lake, citing a Petroecuador confidentiality policy.215
211. In addition, Occidental officials who were asked about accidental spills for this study did not
disclose the Laguna Spill. The author learned about it because she was working in Ecuador's Ama-
zon region when the spill occurred, and residents who went hunting in the swamp after the rains told
her they saw drums and containers there. The spill occurred in July, 1991. The samples were taken
by an Occidental subcontractor in August, 1991. 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 97.
212. Besides chromium and nickel, other proven or suspected human carcinogens found in the
lake and/or swamp include arsenic, beryllium and cadmium; in addition, lead, cobalt and mercury
are very toxic to humans. See generally CLINICAL OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDICINE (L. Rosenstock & M.R. Cullen eds., 1994) [hereinafter Rosenstock et al.]. The author is
grateful to Dr. Mark R. Cullen, Professor of Medicine, Yale University, for reviewing the data and
sharing his expertise.
213. EMP, supra note 116, at 20. Although it is difficult to identify the precise location of the
second site in the lake where Occidental found high levels of barium and zinc, see supra note 208,
that site also appears to be abandoned by the company in the EMP sampling plan. EMP at 96.
214. The official in Ecuador's Ministry of the Environment, Department of Protected Areas, who
reported this to the author, asked not to be named.
215. The official cited, supra note 214, also reported that Occidental gave the government an ini-
tial payment of US$100,000 to help manage the reserve, and currently provides US$10,000 annu-
ally.
As discussed supra note 188, Occidental has used a similar argument to rebuff efforts by the au-
thor to gain access to sampling data, notwithstanding a contradictory SPA Oficio. In the Oficio,
MEM's Deputy Secretary of Environmental Protection states that Ecuador's laws and policy do not
prohibit Occidental from distributing environmental information to international researchers, and
asks the company to provide the author with sampling data and other requested information. MEM,
Oficio No. 0108-SPA-99, from Fausto Corral Guevara, MEM Deputy Secretary of Environmental
Protection, to Patricio Rivera, Chief of Environmental Control and Industrial Safety, Occidental Ec-
uador (Aug. 20, 1999). See also letter from Judith Kimerling to Fausto Corral Guevara, MEM Dep-
uty Secretary of Environmental Protection (Aug. 19, 1999); letter from Judith Kimerling to Vicki
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It is difficult to interpret Occidental's failure to disclose or consider the
Laguna Spill, and the limited scope of relevant monitoring in the EMP,
as anything other than an attempt to cover up the spill, and quietly create
a record that could be used to blame Metropolitan Touring for pollution
in the lake, should the need arise. This is particularly egregious and irre-
sponsible because the lake is an important fishing area for indigenous
Quichua from a number of local communities, including Limoncocha,
Rio Jivino, Santa Elena, Itaya, and San Antonio. People of all ages fish
day and night. Heavy metals persist in the environment, and many met-
als are known to accumulate in the food chain.216 They could potentially
pose a health risk to local residents who eat fish from the lake, in addi-
tion to threatening wildlife. Both the lake and swamp are located in a na-
tional protected natural area, that was recently designated as a Wetland
of International Importance, under the Convention on Wetlands of Inter-
national Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Conven-
tion).217
In addition to raising serious questions about Occidental's operations,
ethics and compliance with Ecuadorian law, the data suggest that even
when precautions are taken in the oil patch, single incidents can occur-
even during exploratory drilling activities-that can have far-reaching
and longstanding consequences in a rainforest environment and harsh
impacts on local communities. Occidental's failure to disclose, investi-
gate and remedy the Laguna Spill shows how easy it is for oil companies
to hide environmental problems in remote areas, and wrap themselves in
a misleading veneer of corporate responsibility and international stan-
dards.2 18  Neither local residents nor government officials in Ecuador's
Ministry of the Environment, who manage the reserve and worked to
designate it as a Ramsar site, were aware of the data until the author
brought it to their attention.
Hollub, Acting Manager, Mauricio Avila, Acting Environmental Supervisor, Alberto Gomez, Chief
Legal Department, Occidental Exploration and Production Company, Ecuador (July 27, 1999).
216. See generally Rosenstock, et al. supra note 212.
217. Limoncocha Biological Reserve was listed as a Ramsar site in 1998.
218. Of the ten "guiding principles" in Occidental's HESMS Manual, at least two apparently were
not implemented in the wake ofthe Laguna Spill. Principle 7 provides that:
Subsidiaries of Occidental Petroleum Corporation will be responsible whenever remediation is
required for any of our past operating and waste management practices at any active or inactive
facility owned by that subsidiary. We will promptly correct any conditions we have caused in
our operations should they result in significant adverse health, safety or environmental impact.
HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 24, at princ. 7. Principle 8 provides that members of the
"public who may be affected will be informed about relevant health, safety or environmental issues
related to our facilities in a timely manner." Id. at princ. 8.
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IX. IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJOR DESIGN DECISIONS IN THE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN
For routine operations in Block 15, the record is also murky in many
important respects. Nonetheless, a review of the major "design deci-
sions" highlighted by Occidental in the opening pages of the EMP can
shed light on the standards and practices that have been implemented.
A. Site Selection
The first "design decision" listed in the EMP is that "production instal-
lations shall be located far from the populations around the Project."2 19
On its face, this sounds reasonable because proper implementation could
help minimize the intrusion, and reduce environmental and social im-
pacts, on local residents. However, the basic information needed to im-
plement and evaluate the measure is not included in the EMP or any-
where else in the 1992 EIA. 220 The study does not identify significant
environmental and socio-cultural impacts that could result from site se-
lection decisions in Block 15, evaluate alternative locations, or suggest-
beyond this vague statement-that those impacts were factors in deci-
sions about where to locate production facilities. The EIA does not even
disclose precisely where the production facilities are located in relation
to local communities, or include clear and complete information about
where people live, drink, bathe, wash clothes and dishes, garden, attend
school, hunt, fish, and gather important natural resources. As a result,
either Occidental did not implement this measure in a reasoned and seri-
ous way, or the company based implementation on information and rea-
soning that are not disclosed. A visit to Block 15 suggests that the meas-
ure was applied inconsistently and superficially. Many facilities are
located near local populations, and even facilities in more distant lands
can have major adverse impacts on indigenous populations.
The area where production facilities are currently located ("Production
Project Area") is primarily inhabited by indigenous Quichua. Although
219. EMP, supra note 116, at 2.
220. As a general matter, the socio-cultural baseline information in the EIA is incomplete and
Euro-centric. The monitoring program in the EMP reflects and reinforces this superficial approach
to socio-cultural impacts. It designates a single parameter-"the population cpmposition in the
area"--to monitor "socio-economic changes"; and the methodology is to conduc regular censuses.
Although a vague statement is also included, that "[ilf possible, other socio-economic indicators will
be included in this monitoring (health, migration, land tenure, for example)," the EIA does not in-
clude the baseline information that would be needed to do that, such as information about land ten-
ure, local subsistence and cash economies, water sources and quality, health, and nutrition. Id. at 24-
25.
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most communities have central areas where schools, community centers
and a few homes are located, those areas are not major population cen-
ters, and family homes and gardens are dispersed through community
lands. Community lands that do not have homes and gardens are mostly
forests and swamps, and are used by residents for hunting, fishing and
gathering. By Quichua standards, population density in the Production
Project Area is high, and virtually all of the lands are used by people who
live there. However, only one community, Limoncocha, has a central-
ized populatio center. Limoncocha is a former headquarters for the
Summer Institdte of Linguistics ("SIL"), a U.S.-based organization of
evangelical Protestant missionaries, that has worked in Ecuador and
around the world to contact and 'civilize' indigenous peoples, and trans-
late the Bible into native languages. The group was formally expelled
from Ecuador in 1981 and, currently, a training institute for bilingual
professors occupies former SIL facilities.22 1 A small military post is also
located in the community. When Occidental arrived, Limoncocha was a
quiet community, not unlike its neighbors except for periodic visits from
tourists and occasional problems with drunken soldiers. Now it is evolv-
ing into a village.
Occidental located its central processing facility ("CPF") away from
Limoncocha and other homes. This helps reduce contact between oil
workers and residents, which-to its credit-the company has tried to
discourage. However, the wells, roads and discharge site from the sew-
age treatment facility at CPF are located in and around areas with homes,
and they have created a number of problems and concerns that have not
been adequately addressed. For example, at least two families in Limon-
cocha who live in the area traversed by the main road complain that con-
struction of the road has disrupted drainage in their gardens. Because it
221. SIL arrived in Ecuador in 1952. The 1981 Presidential Decree banning SIL activities there
resulted from pressure from indigenous organizations and international criticism of SIL collabora-
tion with governments and TNCs in a number of countries, to "pacify" indigenous peoples and open
their lands to natural resource extraction activities. CORKILL & CuBIrr, supra note 39, at 109-111;
GERALD COLBY & CHARLOTrE DENNETT, THY WILL BE DONE: THE CONQUEST OF THE AMAZON:
NELSON ROCKEFELLER AND EVANGELISM IN THE AGE OF OIL 813 (1995). See also Kimerling, Dis-
location, Evangelization and Contamination supra note 63 (discussing SIL collaboration with Tex-
aco and Ecuador to relocate and pacify indigenous Huaorani).
For accounts of SIL activities in Ecuador from the perspective of the missionaries, see generally
ELISABETH ELLIOT, THROUGH THE GATES OF SPLENDOR (Harper. & Bros. 1957) (Huaorani);
ROSEMARY KINGSLAND, A SAINT AMONG SINNERS (Collins 1980) (Huaorani); ETHEL EMILY
WALLIS, THE DAYUMA STORY: LIFE UNDER AUCA SPEARS (Spire Books 1971) (Huaorani); FRANK
& MARIE DROWN, MISSION TO THE HEADHUNTERS (Harper & Bros. 1961) (Shuar). Notwithstand-
ing the ban on SIL activities, some missionaries who were associated with the group have continued
to work in Ecuador.
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is elevated, the road blocks runoff to adjacent lands; as a result, gardens
alongside the road have flooded after heavy rains, killing crops. Occi-
dental reportedly refused to pay compensation for the losses, and has not
repaired the damage. In Limoncocha, Rio Jivino, and Itaya, Occidental
destroyed crops near homes to build roads and drilling platforms; in
some cases, residents have relocated their homes.
The community of Rio Jivino has been particularly hard hit by Occi-
dental's siting decisions. The forty hectares selected by the company for
the location of CPF was their most important hunting area. It was also a"reserve" that they were protecting for their children. Incredibly, the
1992 EIA does identify the location of CPF. According to residents, the
company knew that the site was a hunting area and community reserve
before it built CPF, because they tried to persuade the company to find
another site.
Residents learned about the site after Occidental approached commu-
nity officials with a proposal to "buy" the land. At the time, the land was
legally titled to Comuna Rio Jivino. Under Ecuadorian law, indigenous
lands that are titled to a comuna are the collective property of all the in-
habitants who comprise the comuna"2 Occidental did not ask residents
for permission to work in Rio Jivino, and people there did not believe
that they could say 'no' to the operations. They did, however, initially,
refuse to sell the land, because of the importance of the area to them.
They asked the company to find another site, but Occidental insisted, and
eventually wore down the resistance to the sale. In the words of local
residents, the company "compro consciencia" (bought conscience), in
exchange for alcohol,fiestas, food and rides in company cars. Occiden-
tal promised residents "todo lo bueno para siempre" (all the best things
forever), including jobs, transportation,fiestas and other benefits. Occi-
dental also promised that it would not operate like Texaco and Petroec-
uador; to prevent pollution, it would use "tecnologia de punta " (cutting
edge technology). For a few years, the company provided assistance to
Rio Jivino; and relations were "good." After the operations were up and
running, however, and had been showcased in press tours and the com-
pany-produced video, "The Human Face of Petroleum," residents say
that Occidental changed. The company gradually withdrew its assis-
tance, and now most people feel "dumped" or "thrown away" by the
company. They say they were "tricked" by Occidental; and currently
222. Ley de Comunas [Law of Comunas], arts. 6 & 7, R.O. No. 186 (Oct. 5, 1976) (Ecuador).
Except for Limoncocha, all of the Quichua communities where Occidental has drilled wells or built
production facilities are legally constituted comunas under Ecuadorian law.
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only a favored few receive any benefits from the operations. 2 3
In addition to feelings of betrayal, residents of Rio Jivino do not have
anywhere to hunt in their own community. Hunting and other subsis-
tence activities not only are fundamental to the health, nutrition and well-
being of indigenous peoples, but also are important factors in the mainte-
nance of their cultures and economic self-reliance.224 As a result of Oc-
223. Among other assistance, Occidental built a school and community center, gave families um-
brellas and tanks to collect rain water, and trained health promoters. It initiated community devel-
opment projects, including a chicken farm for women and a carpentry workshop. See Kimerling
2001, supra note 27. The carpentry "micro-enterprise" was described by OIL AND GAS JOURNAL as
a "sustainable small business" to "boost the local economy." Williams 1997, supra note 22, at 47.
Both the chicken and carpentry projects are highlighted by Occidental in its video, "The Human
Face of Petroleum," as "self-management success stories." But according to local residents, Occi-
dental did not sustain support for the projects, and they had ended. As explained to the author by a
former community official:
With small obras [works], [Occidental] won the friendship of the dirigentes [community offi-
cials], and convinced the people .... Now, it is abandoning the friendship, little by little. Peo-
ple are molestas [upset]. The company has not complied with the agreements. We were like
children with candy. Now the company does not help at all, except it gives a little money to the
dirigenies. The coordination is lost. Community relations do not exist any more .... Now the
company ignores us. Before, it conversed, and had a dialogue with us. If we protest, the com-
pany will call thefuerza publica (Ecuadorian military].
Many residents in neighboring Limoncocha echo those views. An official of the Indigenous Asso-
ciation of Limoncocha explained to the author:
Oxy said it would give us this and this and this, and promised no contamination, everything
clean. We believed the company, and supported it when it entered; we even went to the press,
speaking well of the company, and saying that it helps us .... But after a few years the com-
pany turned against the people. Now it does not favor us.
Most of the community projects in Rio Jivino and Limoncocha that are highlighted in the video and
OIL AND GAS JOURNAL had ended. For a fuller discussion, see generally Kimerling 2001, supra note
27. Notwithstanding those changes, Occidental provided copies of the video and article to the author
in December 1998, in response to a request for information for this study. See supra note 188.
224. The importance of subsistence activities is explicitly recognized in ILO Convefition 169.
Art. 23(l ) provides:
Handicrafts, rural and community-based industries, and subsistence economy and traditional ac-
tivities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering, shall be
recognised as important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their economic self-
reliance and development. Government shall, with the participation of these people and when-
ever appropriate, ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted.
ILO Convention 169, supra note 50, at art. 23(l).
As a result, the culture, health and well being of indigenous peoples are intimately linked to the
preservation of renewable natural resources that support local subsistence economies. In Block 15,
the arrival of "development" in remote areas, with promises of "all the best things forever," invited
indigenous people to move away from traditional subsistence toward a new cash economy. Occi-
dental's operations, however, have failed to meet expectations in providing jobs and services. At the
same time, they have impaired subsistence production. Exploration and production activities have
threatened or harmed renewable natural resources in some locations, diminishing people's ability to
continue a sustainable and self-reliant way of life, and reducing their resource base for sustainable
development. To date, the distribution of environmental impacts and compensatory benefits from
development has not been equitable.
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cidental's site selection decision for CPF, an important element of the lo-
cal subsistence economy has been destroyed and people require more
food "from outside." Among other impacts, this has made them more
dependent on a wage economy in an area where jobs are scarce.225 As a
general matter, many people say they eat less meat. To replace the pro-
tein in their diet they have increased fishing activities, especially in Lake
Limoncocha. In addition to questions raised by "the purloined data" in
the 1992 EIA, this change in subsistence activities may be putting some
stress on fisheries in the lake and, consequently, could create conflict be-
tween the neighboring communities of Rio Jivino and Limoncocha.
Some residents in Rio Jivino have expressed concerned about "talk" in
Limoncocha that the community may try to ban them from fishing in the
lake.
The major fishing area in Rio Jivino is the Jivino River. That river has
been polluted by plantations of African Palm located upriver from the
community, and from oil field operations by Texaco and Petroecuador.
However, it is still an important natural resource for the people who live
there. Residents fish and bathe in the river, and in some areas they also
drink its waters. Occidental discharges effluent from the sewage treat-
ment facilities at CPF directly into the river, at a location in the commu-
nity that is near homes and fishing and bathing areas. Not surprisingly,
many residents-who were not consulted about the location of the dis-
charge or informed about the wastes that are poured into the river-are
concerned that the company may be further degrading the quality of the
water. In another gross omission, Occidental's 1992 EIA does not dis-
close the location of the discharge or the quantity or chemical composi-
tion of the waste stream; nor does it include meaningful baseline water
quality data from the Jivino River or an assessment of the river's assimi-
lation capacity."'
The EMP does include a list of five quantitative chemical standards for
sewage discharges; 227 however, a statement to meet certain concentration
According to interviews with local residents during the summers of 1999 and 2000, the majority
of Quichua who live in the Project Production Area feel that they do not benefit from oil develop-
ment. Increasingly, people are concerned about their health and food supply, and say that Occiden-
tal's development harms their quality of life more than it helps them.
225. Except for temporary work during seismic and construction activities, oil field employment
opportunities for local residents are very limited. The lack of jobs is a major complaint of many
male residents in the Production Project Area, who say they were promised jobs by the company,
before operations began in their conmmunities.
226. Assimilation capacity refers to the amount of pollution that the river can receive, and assimi-
late, without causing the quality of the water to degrade.
227. EMP, supra note 116, at 29.
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standards is not enough to make a good analysis of the consequences of
the discharge for the environment. With one exception, the EMP stan-
dards correspond to standards in MEM Environmental Regulations,
which were first issued soon after the EMP was approved. Unlike MEM
Environmental Regulations, the EMP does not include a standard for re-
sidual chlorine. This is a serious omission because Occidental uses chlo-
rine to disinfect sewage, and the effluent that is discharged into the river
undoubtedly contains chlorine.228 Chlorine can react with oily wastes
and organic material in the environment to create toxic organic halogens,
or trihalomethanes ("THMs"). THMs are possible human carcinogens,
and are known to cause cancer in animals. Despite this, Occidental does
not monitor the Jivino River for organic halogens. 9  In addition, resi-
dents report that the company tells them the discharge has been "cured"
and is safe to drink. The effluent standards in the regulations and EMP,
228. CPF Visit, supra note 32. This also raises questions about compliance with Ecuadorian law.
It is not surprising that both these and the other set of effluent standards in the EMP are almost iden-
tical to the standards in MEM Environmental Regulations, because the regulations, first passed in
1992, were based on closed door negotiations between MEM and industry. See id. at 28; and MEM
Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at tbls. 3, 4. The 1992 MEM Regulations were repealed
by the 1995 regulations; however, the discharge standards were not changed.
229. CPF visit, supra note 32. In addition, Occidental and MEM's discharge standard for total
coliforms (1,000/100 ml) allows for concentrations that are 2.5 times greater than the levels adopted
by Shell for its operations in Camisea, Peru (less than 400/100mI). Shell's standard was based on
the World Bank pollution guidelines, discussed supra note 96 and accompanying text. See World
Bank 1998, supra note 96, at 389. However, Shell had problems with its sewage treatment facilities
and was not able to meet the standard during its operations. Interview and sampling data review
with Gerrit van Eijk, P.T. Supplylink Technical Manager, Shell Prospecting and Development (Peru)
B.V., in Nuevo Mundo Base Camp, Camisea, Peru (July 14, 1998).
MEM Environmental Regulations do not include water quality standards, or monitoring, reporting
or recordkeeping requirements for discharges or water quality in receiving waters. Water quality
standards refer to the maximum levels of contaminants allowed in bodies of water, such as streams
and rivers, and can vary depending on how the water is classified for use. Discharge (effluent) stan-
dards refer to levels that may be discharged into the environment (usually into surface waters).
The Ecuadorian water quality standards mentioned supra at note 208 are found in the Water
Pollution Regulations, issued in 1989 by the Ministry of Public Health. Standards for water that is
used for domestic consumption permit total coliforms levels of one hundred and fecal coliform
levels of twenty, expressed in count per 100 cmi, but require disinfection before use. There are no
standards for THMs. See Water Pollution Regulations, supra note 55.
In the United States, EPA drinking water regulations establish a maximum contaminant level goal
("MCLG") for total coliform bacteria of zero. 40 C.F.R. § 141.52 (2000). Maximum permissible
contaminant levels ("MCL") provide that no more than five percent of water samples may be total
coliform-positive in a month. For water systems that collect fewer than forty samples in a month, no
more than one sample can be total coliform positive. Every sample that has total coliform must be
analyzed for fecal coliform and zero fecal coliform is permitted. 40 C.F.R. § 141.63 (2000). Permit-
ted levels for total THMs were recently re-evaluated, and lowered from 0.1 mg/L to 0.08 mg/L. See
40 C.F.R. § 141.64 (2000).
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however, are not drinking water quality standards.23 °
The 1992 EIA can be read to suggest that impacts on water quality in
the Jivino are not significant because the river is already polluted from
other sources. However, that conclusion would be arbitrary because
baseline water quality, and possible impacts on it, are not assessed.23 '
Moreover, such an approach to environmental protection is not consistent
with responsible environmental practices or Ecuadorian law, and is cal-
lous to the needs and concerns of local residents who depend on the
river. Further degradation could virtually "kill" the river, and seriously
harm the livelihood, health and well-being of the people. It would vio-
late the spirit of a number of provisions in Ecuadorian law, including the
Constitution, that generally prohibit pollution that degrades water qual-
ity, and may also be inconsistent with the standard in the Contract that
requires Occidental "to preserve the existing ecological balance" where it
works.232
In addition to questions and concerns about the ongoing sewage efflu-
ent discharges into the river, residents have reported mysterious itinerant
discharges, that begin "violently." They have also expressed concern
230. Compare MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, at tbl. 3, with Water Pollution
Regulations, supra note 55, at art. 19. For example, effluent standards in the EMP and MEM Envi-
ronmental Regulations allow 1000/100 ml total coliform bacteria, and do not limit fecal coliform as
a separate parameter. Ecuadorian water quality regulations for human and domestic consurription
limit total coliform bacteria to one hundred, and fecal coliform to twenty, and require disinfection
prior to use. Disinfection is not defined but presumably is intended to kill bacteria and viruses. See
supra note 229. As a general matter, effluent standards typically allow higher concentrations of con-
taminants than water quality standards, because they should take into account the assimilation capac-
ity of receiving waters.
231. This reflects a general pattern, in which the 1992 EIA paints a vague and murky picture of
generalized environmental degradation throughout Block 15, identifies multiple sources of pollution,
and seems to imply that areas affected by other activities do not require careful protection. This por-
trait is misleading, because Block 15 includes not only a wealth of renewable natural resources that
provide secure and sustainable sources of food, water, medicines, and shelter for indigenous popula-
tions, but also vast tracts of intact rain forest and wetlands.
For example, the 56,000 hectare, ecologically spectacular Pafiacocha Protected Forest is located in
Block 15. The reserve is a major wetland, with a blackwater river system, lagoons, swamps and
flooded forests. It is home to at least twenty threatened or endangered species of fauna, including
the Amazon River Dolphin, jaguar, puma, Brazilian Tapir, Common Woolly Monkey, Salvin's Cu-
rassow, Blue-throated Piping Guan, and paiche. Fish and bird populations are diverse and abundant,
even for the Amazon Rainforest. E-mail from Randall Smith to Judith Kimerling (June 22, 2000).
The area is particularly vulnerable to pollution because it is a low energy system with little flushing
or wave action to remove contaminants, and like other swampy areas would be especially difficult-
if not impossible-to remedy in the event of a spill; in addition, noise from oil field operations can
have adverse impacts on wildlife. In areas where natural resources have been degraded, such an
approach to environmental protection is not consistent with responsible practice, and is insensitive to
residents who depend on natural resources already under stress.
232. Contract, supra note 29, para. 5.1.20.1.
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about the possible impact of a waste injection well located very close to
the river, and about how they can know that injected wastes are not get-
ting into the river.
Although residents of Rio Jivino thought they were selling their land to
the company, in fact, Occidental had solicited expropriation of the land,
in favor of Petroecuador, so that it could work at the site regardless of the
wishes of the community. The EMP is silent about standards and prac-
tices to gain access to lands that the company wants to use for its opera-
tions. Occidental's Contract, however, provides that Petroecuador must,&solicit and obtain from MEM in a timely manner, upon petition from
[Occidental]. . . the expropriation in favor of Petroecuador, of lands .
* . that may be needed to carry out the obligations" of the company un-
der the Contract.2 3  Occidental's practice of securing the expropriation
of all lands that are used for production facilities was confirmed to the
author in an interview with the company's chief attorney in Quito; how-
ever, residents of Rio Jivino did not learn that their lands had been ex-
propriated until after that interview. 34
233. Id. at para. 5.2.8.
234. Gomez Interview, supra note 124. Similarly, residents of Pompeya, Itaya and Limoncocha
did not know that their lands had been expropriated until after that interview. In Pompeya, where
Occidental built two drilling platforms and access roads, residents believed that the community still
owned the lands. One platform contains production wells; the other is the site of an exploratory well
that, according to Occidental, is "dry." Residents thought Occidental was renting the production site
from the community, and occupying the other without permission. In Itaya, where expropriation
proceedings were conducted in 1997 for a road, and in 199 for a well site and access road, there
was considerable confusion about the negotiations with Occidental and some of the "benefits." No
one, however, knew that land had been expropriated, and there appeared to be a consensus that Oc-
cidental had attempted to buy land, but that the community had not consented to sell it. In Limonco-
cha, residents believed that they had sold land to the company.
The author questioned Occidental about expropriation after attending an assembly in El Eden on
July I, 1999, in which residents learned that community lands had been expropriated without their
knowledge. After drilling the exploratory well Eden-i in 1996, Occidental told the comuna that the
well was dry, but did not restore the site as promised. Residents believed that Occidental was "oc-
cupying" their lands without permission, and sought to negotiate a rental agreement for use of the
land. Occidental refused to negotiate, and insisted on "buying" the land. The comuna refused to sell
the land because it would violate community norms. In the words of one man, "it would be like cut-
ting off an arm of our mother, to sell." In 1998, the comuna wrote to corporate officials in Quito
and, subsequently, to the president of Occidental in the United States, asking the company to meet
with the community to resolve the dispute. Neither letter was answered and, in response to inquiries,
Occidental's Vice President for Executive Services and Public Affairs provided the author with mis-
leading information about the company's land access standards and practices. He said that the letter
was "puzzling and bizarre" because Occidental does not buy land; El Eden is on the "fringe" of
Block 15 and Petroecuador, not Occidental, works there; and, as a worldwide policy, the company
does not work in any indigenous lands without the peoples' permission. He stated that Occidental
supports indigenous land rights and respects the right of indigenous peoples to say "no" to oil devel-
opment. Meriage Interview 1, supra note 20; Interview with Lawrence Meriage, Vice President,
Executive Services and Public Affairs, Occidental Oil and Gas Corporation (Mar. 15, 1999) [herein-
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Occidental's 1992 EIA also fails to mention expropriation or consider
possible socio-cultural impacts of the practice. In addition, although the
EIA includes three global statements about land tenure-which recog-
nize that a considerable, albeit inconsistent, proportion of Block 15 is
comprised of indigenous lands 235 -it does not clearly disclose who owns
the land at the company work sites, or consider how the operations will
impact land tenure or indigenous cultures. At best, this is an egregious
oversight for a company that says it is committed to respecting indige-
nous cultures and land rights. Access to work sites is a major community
relations issue for oil field operators in Amazonia, and it is widely
known that land tenure is critically important to indigenous peoples
throughout the region. A more likely explanation is that Occidental de-
liberately withheld the information, as part of a general policy to conceal
its practice of securing the expropriation of lands that it wants to use for
production operations from both local residents and the public.
More recently, Occidental built a seven-kilometer road through a
swamp in a remote Quichua community, El Eden. The road was used to
transport personnel and equipment to the Eden-1 exploratory well site.
The design did not provide for proper drainage and, instead of protecting
the swamp, the company dumped soils removed from another area in wet
areas as fill. Among other impacts, this caused fishkills in several
streams that traverse the area; and despite complaints by local residents,
the road continues to disrupt drainage in the wetland. It also blocks the
migration of fish from a nearby lake. Previously, fish swam upstream
after heavy rains to feed on fruits in the seasonally-flooded forest, but
after Meriage Interview II].
Nearly a year later, residents of El Eden threatened to tear down an antenna that Occidental had
erected on the occupied lands if the company did not send someone to resolve the dispute. In May
1999, a meeting took place, but residents said the company "made them dizzy" with talk about laws.
They still did not understand why Occidental refused to negotiate a rental agreement and decided to
hold another meeting and invite outsiders who could help them understand what the company said.
At that meeting (which the author attended), Occidental said that the government had expropriated
the land more than a year prior, that the company was not involved in the decision to expropriate;
and that the law requires expropriation, so Occidental cannot legally negotiate a rental agreement or
any alternative arrangement. At the same time, Occidental denied that it had plans to work at the
site. Prior to the meeting, however, the new Contract was signed and reported in the press, The au-
thor and another guest informed the comuna about the press reports, which had mentioned plans to
develop the Eden reserves; at the meeting, however, Occidental refused to confirm or deny that the
Contract had been signed.
235. 1992 EIA, supra note 33. On pages 79-80, the EIA states that sixty-one percent of the lands
in Block 15 are "Indigenous Areas." On pages 271-72, it states that sixty-two percent and eighty-
five percent, respectively, of Block 15 have been legally adjudicated to indigenous Quichua, Siona-
Secoya and Shuar. The numbers seem low because they do not account for indigenous groups who
use and occupy state-owned lands in protected natural areas.
[26:2
2001) International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 375
they have not returned in significant numbers since the road was built.
Residents have lost an important fishery and source of drinking and bath-
ing water.236 These impacts not only illustrate the need for a site selec-
tion standard that is more appropriate to local conditions, but also raises
questions about Occidental's compliance with other applicable standards
and practices. For example, the table in the EMP includes two mitigating
measures that should have been applied to the siting and design decisions
that caused the harmful impacts in El Eden. Both are intended to protect
wildlife, and they include "locating infrastructure to avoid environmen-
tally sensitive areas," discussed supra, and "protection of wetlands and
their drainage. '" 7
Events in El Eden also raise questions about Occidental's compliance
with Ecuadorian law. Although generally vague, some provisions in Ec-
uador's laws and regulations are unambiguous. The Law of Fishing and
Fishing Development prohibits dumping materials that can impede mi-
gration by fish.2 3' Nonetheless, government officials have not acted to
enforce the law. In response to demands by the community to use "better
technology" to improve the road and repair the damage, Occidental
agreed to pay a fine, but reportedly told residents that the work had al-
ready ended.
These problems demonstrate both the importance, to people and the
environment, of standards and practices for selecting exploration and
production sites, and the inescapable reality that, in Amazonia, site selec-
tion standards are intimately related to land access standards. The loca-
tion of a number of facilities in Block 15 suggests that siting decisions
there are based strictly on operational needs and convenience to the
company. The vague but promising dictate in the EMP, to avoid envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas, apparently has not been implemented. 39
The other standard for site selection in the EMP-while superficially ap-
pealing-is also vague. In remote areas, a standard that requires compa-
nies to locate facilities "far from the populations" 240 could be interpreted
to mean "almost anywhere." In Block 15, it has been applied in a way
236. The author first visited the site in 1998, and walked the full length of the road and drilling
platform. She returned to El Eden in 1999 and 2000. In addition to field observations, she partici-
pated in community meetings, interviewed residents, and reviewed documents in the community's
archive relating to Occidental. For a fuller discussion, see Kimerling 2001, supra note 27.
237. EMP, supra note 116, at 5.
238. Law of Fishing and Fishing Development, supra note 57, at arts. 47(e) & 80.
239. Facilities in environmentally and socially sensitive areas include CPF; the wells, roads, and
pipelines in the wetlands and flood plain of the Limoncocha Biological Reserve; and the road in El
Eden.
240. The standard is found in EMP, supra note 116, at 2.
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that is insensitive to indigenous cultures and their concept of territory,
and inappropriate to land use patterns in affected communities.
Although the EMP is silent on land access standards and practices, the
Contract effectively establishes a standard of access by fiat, by compel-
ling the government to expropriate any lands that the company wants to
use. This private-government compact for indigenous territories operates
to eviscerate fundamental rights of indigenous peoples, including their
rights to land, property, and participation in development decisions. It is
also unethical and inconsistent with responsible corporate conduct and
Occidental's own promises to respect indigenous cultures.24'
B. Directional Drilling
The second design decision in the EMP is to drill "directional wells, to
reduce the number of locations, and to use the same location (Drilling
Island) to drill several directional wells." 24 2 This practice is commonly
cited by international companies as an important measure to enhance en-
vironmental protection in tropical forests, because it reduces land take
and clearing of the forest.243  Current technology allows up to ten or
24 1. The expropriation of indigenous lands is so offensive to local residents and the public that
Occidental concealed the practice for years, and denies responsibility now that it has been disclosed.
Kimerling 2001, supra note 27. This vividly demonstrates the limits of voluntary environmental and
human rights standards, and shows how easy it is for TNCs to misrepresent their practices in remote
areas to international audiences, saying 'all the right things' while acting otherwise. According to
government and corporate officials, some other companies use the State's power of expropriation;
others do not. For a fuller discussion, see id.
A statement by a resident at the July 1, 1999 assembly in El Eden, after he realized that commu-
nity lands had been expropriated, shows how deeply disrespectful and unsettling the practice is to
indigenous peoples, and also reflects general frustration with Occidental's community relations:
We do not agree to sell land ... Indigenous peoples have never sold land in the lower Napo
[River area) ... Oxy is an international company-why didn't Oxy inform us, that it is going to
work in this way? ... It seems that Oxy does not respect us, and thinks we are animals, incom-
petents. We are human beings, we are capable. We are not saying no to Oxy or the govern-
ment, but our land is not for sale. We have said this many times; why won't you listen?
The response to the speaker by one of Occidental's representatives, a community relations officer,
suggests that he did not understand the sentiments that were being expressed. He said, "We will
respect you ... you can be sure that if I see you in Limoncocha, I will greet you." The assembly is
discussed supra, note 234.
242. EMP, supra note 116, at 2.
243. See. e.g., E & P FORUM, supra note 92, at 12; E & P FORUM-UNEP, supra note 93, at 10.
Conoco Ecuador Ltd., Conoco Ecuador Ltd. In the Rainforest (undated brochue distributed by the
company, c. 1989-91); letter from Alex B. Chapman, Manager, Environmenti Protection Project,
Conoco Ecuador Ltd., to Jamie Perkins (July 5, 1990) (response to letter expressing concern about
Conoco Ecuador oil development project); Maxus Ecuador, Inc., Maxus (Sept. 1992) (informational
handout distributed by Maxus to people who express concern about operations in Ecuador); letter
from Boris Abad, Chief of Government Affairs and Environment, Maxus Ecuador, Inc., to Ivonne
Ramos, Accion Ecologica (June 15, 1993) (response to request for information from Ecuadofian
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twelve wells to be drilled from a single platform, instead of clearing a
separate platform and access road for each well. There is no question
that this can be a dramatic aesthetic improvement if colonization around
the wells can be controlled, and can significantly reduce other environ-
mental and social impacts-including fragmentation of forest habitat-
depending on the location and design of the facilities.
However, directional drilling may generate larger quantities of drilling
wastes than vertical drilling, depending on the configuration of the
hole(s). In addition, wastes from directional drilling may be more toxic
than wastes frkm vertical drilling, because oil-based drilling muds may
be needed, instead of water-based muds. As a result, the net environ-
mental impact of directional drilling cannot be adequately assessed with-
out considering waste management and disposal practices for drilling op-
erations.244
The waste management plan in the EMP offers some information, but
is vague and incomplete in a number of important respects. Moreover, it
includes two general norms that could conflict with the design decision
to use directional drilling. Those norms include a preference for water-
based drilling muds, because they are less toxic than oil-based muds, and
a commitment to minimize the quantity of wastes generated by the
operations.24s The potential conflict is not recognized or considered in
the 1992 EIA. Instead, a statement is included in the waste management
environmental NGO); Maxus Ecuador, Inc., Plan de Maneo Ambiental Bloque 16 (Block 16 Envi-
ronmental Management Plan) (Sept. 1991), at 13; Shell Prospecting and Development (Peru), The
Carnisea Project, Peru, Briefing Paper 7 (May 13, 1997), at 7; Shell Prospecting and Development
(Peru), The Camisea Project, Pen Stakeholder Consultation Workshop, Fact Sheet (Dec. 1997), at I.
244. Drilling wastes include drilling muds and other chemicals, including industrial solvents, that
are brought to the work site for use during drilling; as well as cuttings, hydrocarbons and formation
water that are removed from the hole during drilling and testing. Drilling muds serve as a lubricant,
coolant and pressurizer during drilling; they also help remove debris from the hole and form a cake-
like lining inside the hole to seal it. The exact chemical composition of drilling muds varies from
hole to hole and even at different depths within the same hole, but they are typically made from
clays, barite and chemical additives, and can be water- or oil-based. Many of the additives are very
toxic, and can include thickeners, biocides, bactericides, corrosion inhibitors, and chemicals to con-
trol the pH.
Drilling mud wastes can also be mixed with hydrocarbons and other substances from the hole, and
typically contain a variety of toxic substances. Waste spoils from the hole can also contain a number
of toxic substances, because they are coated with drilling muds and may come from formations that
contain hydrocarbons, salts and other chemicals. See generally KiMERLING 1991, supra note 5.
More recent advances in directional drilling in the United States may enable up to one-third less
drilling from the surface, using synthetic based fluids such as esters and olefins. These compounds
are less toxic and more biodegradable than traditional oil-based muds. Telephone interview with
Marvin B. Rubin, Engineering Branch Chief, Effluent Limitations Guidelines Program, Office of
Water, U.S. EPA (Mar. 23, 2001).
245. EMP, sura note 116, at 41; see also id. at 42, 49.
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plan that "[i]n case it is necessary to use oil-based muds, they shall be
managed in an environmentally acceptable manner., 246  "Environmen-
tally acceptable" is not defined; but the language allows Occidental con-
siderable discretion, and is not phrased to sound like a particularly rigor-
ous standard. Presumably, it means what Occidental decides it means, at
the time the need-also determined by the company-arises.
Waste handling practices during drilling activities in 1996 in Comuna
El Eden appear to be representative of current practices in Block 15.
Some of the drilling muds were recycled and reused; however, Occiden-
tal has refused to disclose the quantities and chemical composition of the
mud and other wastes. Drilling wastes were dumped in a pair of open
pits. Each pit had a single liner, made of synthetic material. In the pits,
solid materials settled to the bottom. Liquids that floated above the sol-
ids, or supernatant, were siphoned off and discharged into the environ-
ment around the site. This violated Occidental's government-approved
environmental management plan for Eden-i, which states that "waste
waters will not be dumped into streams in the area but rather transported
in pipes to the Napo River., 24 7 The reason for the special provision to
remove wastewaters from the area is that the drilling platform is located
near, and in the watershed of, Lake Yuturicocha. The lake is an impor-
tant fishery for local residents and the site of a popular rainforest eco-
tourism lodge. Like other lagoons, it is particularly vulnerable to pollu-
tion. Residents from the Quichua community of Samona Yuturi, where
the lake is located, complained to Occidental about contamination from
drilling activities; in response, the company reportedly demanded that
they provide chemical analyses of the water, to prove that it was pol-
luted.248
246. Id. at 41, 49 (the same statement appears twice).
247. OCCIDENTAL EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION COMPANY, Es'wro DE IMPA CTO AMBIENTAL
EN EL AREA DE INFLUENCA DEL POZO EDEN, DEL BLOQUE No. 15 - Oxy [ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STUDY IN THE AREA OF INFLUENCE OF WELL EDEN OF BLOCK NO. 151 (Mar. 1996) (prepared by
Corporation CDC-Ecuador), at 114.
248. Because residents do not have access to sampling equipment, they were discouraged from
pursuing their grievance. This incident reflects a general pattern of practices reported by Quichua in
Block 15, in which the company belittles their environmental concerns and complaints, and chal-
lenges them to prove allegations of contamination with "technical data." At the same time, Occiden-
tal refuses to disclose data and other information to verify its performance, or allow residents to par-
ticipate in monitoring activities in a meaningful way. This contradicts Occidental's own corporate
environmental policies, to inform members of the public who "may be affected" about health, safety
and environmental issues, and to "regularly participate in an open dialogue with neighboring com-
munities to share information and respond to the public's input or concerns about safety, health and
the environment." HESMS GUIDANCE MANUAL, supra note 24, at 6-7.
The practice bullies, demeans and discourages people; as one former official of Comuna Rio
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Solid wastes that remained in the pits after the supernatant was re-
moved were covered with dirt and abandoned in place. As with the liq-
uid waste streams, the company has refused to disclose the quantity and
chemical composition of buried wastes; however, drilling wastes typi-
cally contain a number of toxic constituents, including hydrocarbons and
heavy metals. 249 According to residents of El Eden, one of the pits ex-
ploded and spewed oily wastes onto the platform not long after the com-
pany completed drilling activities, closed the pits, and left the site. This
incident suggests that hazardous materials may have been buried in the
pits, with other drilling wastes.
According to the EMP, the supernatant should have been sampled be-
fore discharge. 250 However, this cannot be confirmed because Occiden-
tal has refused to disclose the details of its sampling activities or any
sampling data. Generally, oil companies in Ecuador do not systemati-
cally sample effluents before discharge, despite the fact that MEM Envi-
ronmental Regulations include quantitative chemical standards for those
discharges.2 5' The EMP includes a list of effluent standards, that corre-
spond to the regulations.25 2 When residents of El Eden expressed con-
cern about the discharges during drilling there, Occidental reportedly told
them that the effluent is "cured" prior to discharge, and that it is clean
enough to drink.2 3 This is highly unlikely; even if the effluent complied
with standards in the EMP, it would not be suitable for drinking.25 4
For the most part, these practices do not appear to be significantly dif-
ferent from standards and practices established by Texaco in Ecuador,
Jivino explained to the author: "We have almost no rights because they have machinery, and say we
must have proof to complain. But we do not have an apparatus."
249. KiMERLING 1991, supra note 5, at 59-61.
250. EMP supra note 116, at 49-51.
251. Kimerling 1995, supra note 5, at 338. Similarly, a search of MEM environmental archives
by archive staff for this study did not locate any sampling protocols or data for Block 15. As dis-
cussed supra, the regulations do not include sampling, monitoring, reporting or record-keeping re-
quirements for discharges. See MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61.
252. EMP supra note 116, at 28; MEM Environmental Regulations, supra note 61, tbl. 4.
253. Notwithstanding an agreement with Comuna El Eden not to "impede" environmental moni-
toring by the community during drilling, residents report that Occidental refused to allow the "com-
munity guard" to observe drilling operations. On three occasions, the company reportedly stopped
him from entering the drilling platform, saying it was "too dangerous." See Adca de Mutuo Acuerdo,
Compania Occidenthal [sic] y la Comunidad El Eden Hasta la Termiaci6n de un Pozo por Perforar
[Act of Mutual Agreement, Occidental Company and the Community El Eden, Until the Termina-
tion of One Well to be Drilled] (signed by Occidental and Comuna El Eden) (Nov. 14, 1996).
254. In addition to the deliberate activities in the watershed of Lake Yuturicocha during drilling
operations, residents of El Eden report that a helicopter dropped a load of cargo into the wetlands on
its way to the well site, which has not been located and recovered; and diesel spilled into a stream in
the area when a truck had an accident on the road to the platform. More recently, a number of resi-
dents expressed concern about a series of fishkills after rains, downstream from the platform.
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because all of the pollution that is generated during drilling activities is
released into the environment or buried in a way that presents a threat of
release. The procedures to physically separate the wastes do not consti-
tute "treatment" because they do not reduce the toxicity or mobility of
the contaminants. The continued use of open pits increases the volume
of wastes, as rainwater freely enters the pits and can become contami-
nated therein. What is different from Texaco's practices is that liquid
and solid wastes are separated before they are abandoned in the envi-
ronment, and the release of contaminants may be slower and more dis-
persed; the pH of the effluent may be adjusted before discharge; waste
pits are covered with dirt after drilling, so that they do not overflow or
continue to attract animals; and the liners and de-watering of waste pits
could slow the seepage of contaminants from pits into soils and ground-
waters.
In the United States, the most protective practice, from an environ-
mental point of view, is to use a closed system of tanks, instead of pits, to
handle wastes at the drill site; recycle and reuse drilling muds, as much
as possible; separate small quantity, high toxicity wastes for special han-
dling and disposal as hazardous wastes,2 s and remove other wastes from
the site after drilling ends, for deep injection into a waste injection well,
that does not use annular injection, or, alternatively, for landfarming or
burial at a central waste disposal facility that is licensed to receive the
wastes.256 -In Ecuador, there are no commercial waste disposal facilities
255. in the United States, federal law requires special management and disposal of legally hazard-
ous wastes. Hazardous waste landfills should have double liners, leak detection, and a leachate col-
lection and treatment system; monitoring and record-keeping are also required. See generally Solid
Waste Disposal Act, as amended by Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1997) and implementing regulations. Most, but not all, oil and gas exploration and
production wastes are exempt from RCRA's mandates for hazardous wastes; however, if exempt
waste is mixed with nonexempt waste, then the entire mixture is deemed hazardous. For a discus-
sion of the RCRA exemption for oil and gas exploration and production wastes, see infra note 272
and accompanying text.
256. "Best practices" for oil exploration and production are not codified in the United States, with
the possible exception of technology-based standards for point source discharges under the Clean
Water Act. Discussed infra note 271. they generally ban the discharge of oil and gas exploration and
production wastes into fresh waters. Regulations under the Clean Air Act also include technology-
based standards; however, their applicability in oil and gas fields is very limited, except for gas
plants and flares, because exploration and production facilities are not aggregated to form "major
sources" under the law. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). In addition, hydrogen sulfide (H2S) is not a "hazard-
ous air pollutant" for the purposes of the act. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(4)(A). Finally, the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 exempt oil and gas production wells and associated equipment from being
listed as an "area source," unless they are located in a metropolitan area with a population greater
than one million. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(nX4)(B). Performance standards for flares are found at 40
C.F.R. § 60.18. Flares should only be used for emergency situations. Id.
Although the term "best practice" has become popular in some circles, considerable disagreement
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for drilling wastes or hazardous wastes. This is true at other locations in
Amazonia as well; as a result, the proper disposal of drilling wastes con-
tinues to pose a serious challenge throughout the region.
C. Using "Impermeable" Pits for Drilling Muds
The third design decision highlighted in the EMP is the use of "im-
permeable" pits for drilling muds.2 " This measure is also related to
waste handling and disposal activities at drill sit", ard generally means
that pits are lined with a synthetic membrane. As discussed supra, the
most protective practice from an environmental point of view in the
United States is to use closed tanks instead of waste pits, especially in
areas with shallow groundwater. Moreover, the impermeability of syn-
thetic liners has been questioned by experts in the United States, because
they commonly contain pinholes when they leave the manufacturer, and
can be tom during installation.5 8 Consequently, wastes in the pits can
contaminate groundwater from the beginning of the operations. Over
and controversy remain over its meaning in the oil patch, even among experts in the United States.
As a general matter, it is easier to identify disfavored oil field practices, than favored ones.
Based on a review of federal and some state laws, and interviews with state and federal regulators,
oil industry workers, and experts who work with affected communities, conducted over a number of
years, some practices can be identified that are widely disfavored in the United States, and have been
banned or limited in a number of states, or by federal law. One example is the discharge of wastes
from point sources into fresh waters, mentioned above (and discussed infra). Another is annular
injection (the injection of wastes down the annulus of a well), a practice that has been banned in
some states and requires special permission from landowners in others. Similarly, the use of waste
pits has been increasingly limited, especially in areas with high water tables.
Notwithstanding this, considerable controversy remains about alternative practices, especially for
the disposal of wastes. Deep well injection, burial and land application (including bioremediation)
of wastes are controversial in the United States. Environmentalists and some other non-industry
experts, who acknowledge that those practices are better than others, are by no means confident that
they are environmentally friendly. Oil exploration and production is an industrial activity, and can
have serious adverse environmental impacts even in the United States; in addition, some commercial
waste disposal facilities have poor environmental records. This helps explain why most of the public
debate about oil development in the United States has focused on whether and where exploration and
production activities should go forward, rather than on the details of particular practices or standards
for those operations.
A full discussion of standards and practices in the United States is beyond the scope of this article.
For a fuller discussion, see generally IOGCC Environmental Guidelines, supra note 89; U.S. EPA,
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, MANAGEMENT OF WASTES FROM THE
EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND
GEOTHERMAL ENERGY. supra note 89; MCFADDIN, supra note 89; EPA/IOCC, Study of State Regu-
lation, supra note 89. For the discussion in this article, the author is especially grateful to Marvin B.
Rubin, Chris Shuey, Wilma Subra, and Rick Lowerre for generously sharing their expertise, and to
Paul Kinzie, Karen McDaniel, and Betty Tabor for research assistance.
257. EMP, supra note 116, at 3.
258. Subra Interview I, supra note 115.
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time, liners degrade and within thirty years, they "turn to dust."2 9 The
use of liners in drilling waste pits may slow the pollution of groundwater
while drilling activities are underway. However, to maximize environ-
mental benefits, pits should only be used as a temporary measure, if at
all. After drilling ends, all wastes should be removed from the pit, and
taken off the drill site for proper treatment and disposal at a facility per-
mitted for oil and gas field wastes.260
Occidental's pits, however, are effectively converted into landfills after
drilling ends, as solid wastes from drilling activities are buried and aban-
doned there.26' The explosion of the pit in El Eden suggests that the
company may also use pits to bury other waste materials, in addition to
solids from drilling muds and spoils from the hole. When asked about
the manufacturer's life expectancy for the liners in Occidental's pits, the
acting supervisor at CPF was surprised by the question and answered,
"forever. '2 62  This is implausible. Nonetheless, the EMP does not pro-
vide for maintenance activities or groundwater monitoring around land-
fills at well sites that contain wastes from drilling activities.
D. Reinjection of Formation Water
The fourth measure highlighted in the EMP is the "reinjection of for-
mation water., 263  If properly implemented, re-injection could lead to
considerable improvements in environmental protection in the oil patch.
Injection has long been a common waste disposal practice for produced
water wastes in the United States.2 The most commonly cited best
259. Id.
260. Telephone interview with Marvin B. Rubin, Engineering Branch Chief, Effluent limitations
Guidelines Program, Office of Water, USEPA, Washington, DC (Mar. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Rubin
Interview).
261. See 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 22; EMP, supra note 116, at 50. The burial of wastes in pits
has also been confirmed by a number of local residents.
262. CPF Visit, supra note 32.
263. EMP, supra note 116, at 2. Formation water refers to water in underground geologic forma-
tions; in this case, it refers to water in the hydrocarbon-bearing formations. Formation water is ex-
tracted at producing wells in a mixture with oil and natural gas, and pumped to CPF. At CPF, oil,
gas and water are separated. Some separation may also take place at well sites. In addition to toxic
levels of salts, formation water typically contains hydrocarbons, heavy metals and other chemicals.
The EMP refers to injection of "formation water; this is somewhat confusing because usually the
term "produced water" is used to refer to the aqueous waste stream from the separation process. In
addition to formation water, produced water-also know as oil field brine--can contain chemicals
that have been injected down a well or used in the separation process. Even after separation, pro-
duced water commonly contains high levels of hydrocarbons, metals and other chemical substances,
in addition to toxic levels of salts. In some areas, produced water contains naturally-occurring ra-
dioactive material (NORM).
264. In the United States, the practice was used as early as 1928. Beginning in 1969, reports in
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practice is to reinject wastes into the same geologic formation from
which they were removed; however, that is not always possible, and
wastes may also be injected into another deep formation. The receiving
formation should be located below freshwater aquifers, and geologically
isolated from them.
Experience in the United States, however, shows that injection wells
can become fountains of contamination-both in freshwater aquifers and
above ground in soils and waters-if they are not properly designed, in-
stalled, operated, maintained, and monitored. Serious pollution problems
have been documented in many states in the United States where under-
ground injection is practiced. 65 In addition to known contamination
problems, the critical question of long-term confinement of injected
wastes in injection zones remains unanswered. Not enough is known
about the behavior of injected wastes. Once injected, wastes are re-
moved from control and management, and their subsurface migration to
ground or surface waters cannot be accurately monitored.266
technical journals raised questions and concerns about the environmental impact of unregulated in-
jection of oil field and other wastes. Problems and concerns linked to underground waste injection
included groundwater contamination, well blowouts, and earthquakes. MCFADDIN, supra note 89, at
119.
In 1974, Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act. The law directed the EPA to set standards
for public drinking water supplies and protect underground drinking water sources. See generally 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-25 (2000). Section 300h directed EPA to establish minimum regulatory re-
quirements for State underground injection programs.
Regulations under that provision were first promulgated in 1980. Known as the Underground
Injection Control (UIC) regulations, they establish five classes of underground injection wells. Class
i wells are defined as wells used to inject fluids that are brought to the surface during oil and gas
production, and wells used for enhanced recovery of hydrocarbons and some underground storage of
oil and natural gas. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 144 (2000). Currently, some state authorities have
been delegated the authority, by EPA, to enforce UIC regulations; in other states, that authority has
not been delegated and EPA implements and enforces the UIC regulations.
265. See. e.g.. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, MID-COURSE EVALUATION OF THE
CLASS I1 UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT OF THE MID-COURSE
EVALUATION WORKGROUP (Aug. 22, 1989); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-89-
97, UNDERGROUND WASTE DISPOSAL (1989). The reports reviewed EPA UIC regulations for Class
11 wells for injection of oil and gas wastes, and concluded that the regulations were inadequate to
protect the environment. In 1993, EPA drafted proposed amendments to the regulations. The oil
and gas industry (and API) vigorously opposed EPA's efforts to strengthen the Class II UIC regula-
tory program. MCFADDIN, supra note 89, at 125. The drafted amendments were tabled by high
level EPA officials, and subsequently withdrawn.
Ecuador does not have a regulatory program for underground injection activities. Government
officials who were interviewed for this study did appear to know much about injection operations
and/or oversight, and rely on Occidental and other companies to monitor and oversee their own in-
jection activities. Injection standards set forth in the EMP are vague, and the document does not
contain the information that is needed to compare Occidental's practices with legal requirements that
apply to operations in the United States.
266. Telephone interview with Wilma Subra, President, Subra Company. New Iberia, Louisiana
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In Block 15, Occidental's injection operations have not been inde-
pendently audited, so it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the
practice. One important concern is corrosion--oil field brine corrodes
injection wells and can escape into freshwater aquifers. Activity by sul-
fate-reducing bacteria can also cause corrosion. As a result, companies
must be prepared to spend substantial amounts of money on maintenance
activities-including chemical additives to control corrosion and bacte-
ria-to ensure the continued proper operation of injection wells.267 In
addition, any wastes that contain naturally occurring radioactive material
("NORM") need special handling. The EMP does not include provisions
for detecting and handling NORM. According to the company, NORM
is present in Block 15, but it is "below international standards," so no
special measures are undertaken. Company officials could not, however,
identify the source or substance of the applicable international stan-
dards. 268
(Oct. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Subra Interview II. In addition to releases from improperly constructed
and/or operated injection wells, injected wastes can migrate into fresh water aquifers or to the sur-
face through improperly abandoned well bores, or faults, fractures or geologic changes in overlying
confining zone(s). According to an official in EPA's Office of Water, who asked not to be named,
detailed geological mapping and other measures to prevent releases from injection wells and zones
are key, because "by the time you find it, it's too late ... you cannot remove the wastes or build a
containment [system]." (Interview, Mar. 29, 2001.)
267. Rubin interview, supra note 260.
268. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37; CPF Visit, supra note 32. When present in sub-
surface oil and gas formations, NORM is typically transported to the surface in produced waters.
NORM can deposit in oil field equipment and may be found in scales, sludges, contaminated soils,
and other exploration and production wastes. IOGCC Environmental Guidelines, supra note 89, at
50. NORM is most likely to precipitate out and concentrate at any location where the product stream
is concentrated, slows down or changes direction, such as pit and tank bottoms, valves, and pipeline
(including flow lines) elbows and flanges (where pieces of pipeline are joined). Subra Interview il,
supra note 266; telephone interview with Chris Shuey, Director, Community Water, Wastes &
Toxics Program, Southwest Research and Information Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Mar. 16,
1998) [hereinafter Shuey Interview II].
In the United States, no federal (or international) regulations specifically address NORM-
contaminated waste and materials. Some states have adopted regulations for the management and
disposal of NORM-contaminated materials; other states have been studying the issue. MCFADDIN,
supra note 89, at 2-5. IOGCC Environmental Guidelines recommend that:
States should adopt an oil field NORM regulatory program that addresses identification, use,
possession, transport, storage, transfer, decontamination, and disposal to protect human health
and the environment. States may choose not to adopt such a program if they find, based on
field monitoring data and other scientific information, that significant levels of NORM do not
occur in a state's oil and gas E & P [exploration and production) industry. States that make
such a finding should periodically reevaluate the basis for that determination.
IOGCC Environmental Guidelines, supra note 89, at 50. The guidelines do not define "significant
levels of NORM"; instead, they recommend that states develop a definition for NORM, and establish
numerical action levels above which NORM is regulated, in addition to standards and procedures for
identifying NORM. Id. at 50-51. They further recommend that "landowner notification may be re-
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There is also considerable confusion in Ecuador about the scope of
Occidental's injection practices. Although the EMP only commits to the
injection of formation water, many people confuse this with 'no dis-
charge,' and assume that all wastes generated in Block 15 are injected.
This is not surprising, because corporate officials commonly describe the
operations as "zero discharge., 269  Residents, however, consistently re-
port that supernatant from drilling wastes is discharged into the environ-
ment, and the EMP clearly contemplates that practice, in addition to
some other low volume discharges, and the burial of solid wastes with
270toxic constituents. In a series of interviews, corporate officials in Ec-
uador could not consistently account for all of the waste streams typi-
cally associated with oil field operations. For example, the handling and
destiny of workover and other well stimulation wastes, and of the myriad
low volume, high toxicity wastes that are typically used in the oil patch,
are unclear. In addition, according to one well-informed expert, who re-
quested anonymity, Occidental's injection capacity is not sufficient for
all of its produced water, and the company injects only some seventy
percent of its brine, discharging the rest.
In the United States, EPA regulations under the Clean Water Act have
generally prohibited the discharge of onshore exploration and production
wastes into fresh waters since 1979. The EPA zero discharge standard
applies to all wastes from exploration and production activities, including
produced water and drilling wastes, and is based on a determination by
the agency that "no discharge" represents the (then) "best practicable
control technology currently available ("BPT")." 271 For solid wastes,
quired as a condition of disposal." Id. at 52. Ecuadorian environmental regulations do not address
NORM-contaminated wastes and materials.
269. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37; CPF Visit, supra note 32; Meriage Interview 1,
supra note 20. For example, according to Meriage, the company "injects everything, even runoff;"
however, the CPF visit confirmed that this is not true. According to Hollub, Occidental has dis-
charged all wastes from wells, including drilling wastes, since 1991. However, in 1991, the com-
pany had not yet installed any injection wells. See id.
270. EMP, supra note 116, at 17, 27-28, 42-53; see also 1992 EIA, supra note 33, at 90, 98, 104.
271. 40 C.F.R. § 435.32 (2000). The no discharge standard does not apply to effluents from strip-
per wells, defined as wells that produce less than ten barrels of crude oil per day; or "beneficial use"
discharges, which, in practice, are limited to operations in certain arid and semi-arid areas, where
produced water meets federal effluent limitations and "has a use in agriculture or wildlife propaga-
tion." See 40 C.F.R. § 435.60 & § 435.50 (2001), respectively.
In 1996, EPA adopted a no discharge standard for effluents from coastal shoreline oil and gas fa-
cilities except for Cook Inlet, Alaska. The definition of coastal, in general, means any location in or
on water landward of the shoreline, based on the inner boundary of the territorial seas. This encom-
passes many shoreline areas such as bays, inlets and wetlands, including the North Slope of Alaska.
The standard is based on application of the best available technology standard economically achiev-
able ("BAT') for existing coastal operations. 40 C.F.R. § 435.40 (2001). For new facilities, it is
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many low volume, high toxicity wastes must be managed as hazardous
wastes, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Other low
volume, high toxicity wastes, as well as high volume oil field wastes-
including drilling fluids and spoils, and other wastes uniquely associated
with oil and gas exploration and production activities-are statutorily
exempt from RCRA's hazardous waste requirements, and are regulated
primarily by state laws.272 The exemption is controversial because it is
based on economic concerns rather than the absence of hazardous con-
stituents.273
based on standards of performance for new sources ("NSPS"), based on best demonstrated available
technology ("BDAT"). 40 C.F.R. § 435.47 (2001). See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, DEVELOPMENT DOCUMENT FOR FINAL EFFLUENT LIMITATIONS
GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE COASTAL SUBCATEGORY OF THE OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION
POINT SOURCE CATEGORY, EPA-821 -R-96-023 (Oct. 1996).
Cook Inlet is a deepwater marine environment. However, the exemption from the zero discharge
standard there is based on non-water quality factors: economics and technology. EPA determined
that zero discharge of produced water "is not economically achievable," see id. at XIV-l 8, and that
zero discharge of all drilling wastes is "not technologically available." Id. at XIV-6-12. As a gen-
eral matter, when EPA establishes effluent limitations standards and guidelines, "it does so based on
a determination, supported by analyses contained in the rulemaking record that facilities... [subject
to the limitation) can technologically and economically achieve the requirements of the rule." Id. at
11-3.
The effluent standards are part of EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES"), established pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA"), better
known as the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000). The program governs point source
discharges, and prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source into surface waters of the
United States, without a permit. The definition of "surface waters" can include lands that are adja-
cent to surface waters; however, as a general matter, the program does not apply when wastes are
discharged or applied to soils.
272. See generally RCRA, supra note 255. Subtitle C of RCRA creates a cradle-to-grave regula-
tory program governing the generation, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous
waste, defined as "solid waste" that exhibits a hazardous characteristic or is specifically listed as
hazardous by regulation. For the statutory exemption of oil and gas exploration and production
wastes, see 42 U.S.C. § 6921(2) (1997). EPA regulations defining "hazardous waste" are found at
40 C.F.R. § 261 (2000). For EPA's regulatory determination, which lists many, but not all exempt
and nonexempt oil field wastes, see 53 Fed. Reg. 25,453 (July 6, 1988), clarified at 58 Fed. Reg.
15,284 (Mar. 22, 1993). Produced water is among the exempt wastes, but is regulated under the fed-
eral Clean Water Act as a point source discharge.
Because of the exemption, most solid wastes from exploration and production activities are regu-
lated by state law. See. e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. I8, § 60 (2000) (Solid Waste Management
Regulations); see also IOCC Environmental Guidelines, supra note 89. In addition to state regula-
tion, local laws and agreements with landowners can include environmental provisions that apply to
waste disposal and pit closure and other site reclamation operations at some Ications; many lease
agreements, however, are very general. Telephone interview with Wilma Sulira, President, Subra
Company, New Iberia, Louisiana (Aug. 28, 2000) [hereinafter Subra Interview 111]; IOGCC Envi-
ronmental Guidelines, supra note 89.
273. Congress was concerned about the economic impact of subjecting huge quantities of large
volume exploration and production wastes to the strict requirements of RCRA Subtitle C. In a report
to Congress required under the statute, EPA determined that regulation of oil field wastes under
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As a general matter, most Quichua residents.say that they do not know
how Occidental operates in their communities, because the company has
fenced off its operations and does not let them into the facilities. Despite
this, there are some reports that raise serious concerns. Those reported
activities include spraying produced water or other contaminated water
on roads for dust control purposes;"14 dumping salty wastes near the
Jivino River in Limoncocha; and dumping at night into a stream in
Pompeya.
In addition, there have been reports of nighttime injection into an
abandoned wel) in Pompeya. Local residents noticed a tanker truck on
the road at night. For several nights, it went back and forth, to a "dry"
exploratory well in the community. A group went to investigate, and no-
ticed oil around the wellhead. They confronted Occidental, because they
thought the company had lied when it told them the well was dry; if the
RCRA Subtitle C "would have a substantial impact on the U.S. economy." U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTES, supra note 89, vol. 4, at 45. The agency deter-
mined that full compliance would cost industry as much as $12.125 billion, and cost consumers up to
$6.4 billion annually. It predicted that domestic oil production would decline from four to eighteen
percent by the year 2000. Id. at 25-29 & 45-46. The report also found that:
Documented damages suggest that all major types of [oil field) wastes and waste management
practices have been associated to some degree with endangerment of human health and damage
to the environment. The principal types of wastes responsible for the damage cases include
general reserve pit wastes (primarily drilling fluids and drill cuttings, but also miscellaneous
wastes such as pipe dope, rigwash, diesel fuel, and crude oil); fracturing fluids; production
chemicals; waste crude oil; produced water; and a variety of miscellaneous wastes associated
with exploration, development or production. The principal types of damages sometimes
caused by these wastes include contamination of drinking-water aquifers and foods above levels
considered safe for consumption, chemical contamination of livestock, reduction of property
values, damage to native vegetation, destruction of wetlands, and endangerment of wildlife and
impairment of wildlife habitat.
Id. at 41-42.
The principal constituents of concern identified by EPA in the wastes include arsenic, benzene,
sodium, chloride, boron, cadmium, chromium and mobile salts; however, the agency concluded,
based on limited risk modeling, that "complete adherence to existing State [regulatory) requirements
would preclude most types of damages." Id. at 42-43. At the same time, it determined that
"[djamages may occur in some instances even where wastes are managed in accordance with cur-
rently applicable State and Federal requirements." Id. at 43. The report recommended that Congress
maintain the Subtitle C exemption for most oil field wastes, but noted the desirability of enhancing
the implementation and enforcement of existing state and federal programs to manage oil and gas
wastes, including a review of existing federal and state authorities that could serve as "a means for
implementing any necessary additional controls." Id. at 47-51. As discussed supra note 89, the
IOGCC Environmental Guidelines evolved from the decision to exempt most oil field waste from
RCRA Subtitle C.
For a discussion of the exemption, see Daniel L. McKay, RCRA s Oil Field Wastes Exemption
and CERCLA's Petroleum Exclusion: Are They Justified?, 15 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, &
ENVTL. L. 41 (1995).
274. According to company officials, Occidental uses only clean groundwater for dust control
purposes. CPF Visit, supra note 32; Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
well was producing, they wanted an agreement to rent the land and share
in the benefits of production.2" In response, an official said the company
was "reinjecting" into the well. When they asked why Occidental was
working at night, he said, "because we work better at night." In response
to an inquiry for this study, one company official denied the account and
said that all wastes are injected into the three injection wells. 276 Another
admitted that the company has done some annular injection, but would
not disclose what had been injected or where.277
In the United States, state laws and lease agreements require oil com-
panies to seal abandoned wells with cement plugs to a depth that is be-
low fresh water aquifers, and seal off production formations, in order to
prevent contaminants from migrating through the well to the surface or
into groundwater aquifers.278 Occidental apparently has not sealed the
"dry" well in Pompeya. To convert a dry well into an injection well for
oil production wastes in the United States, or operate an injection well
that has been drilled for that purpose, a permit is required from EPA or a
state that has been authorized by EPA to implement applicable federal
regulations under the Safe Drinking Water Act.279 Among other things,
the regulations require construction of three layers of protection to pre-
vent contamination of underground drinking water aquifers; regular me-
chanical integrity testing of injection wells; and monitoring, recordkeep-
ing and reporting of the nature, source and cumulative volumes of
injected fluids, in addition to injection pressure and flow rates during op-
erations.280 Injection of legally hazardous wastes into wells that are not
permitted to receive them is a federal crime.2s8
275. At the time, residents did not know about the expropriation of their lands.
276. CPF Visit, supra note 32.
277. Hollub and Rivera Interview, supra note 37. It is unclear whether the injection activities in
Pompeya were annular injection. Annular injection is generally out of favor in the United States,
because injected wastes are not isolated from surrounding formations and can contaminate freshwa-
ter aquifers. See supra note 256.
278. Subra Interview Ill, supra note 272.
279. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 144 (2000).
280. Information about the site's geology, hydrology and lithology must be presented with the
permit application, and reviewed by agency staff to ensure that wastes are injected into a geologic
formation that is not interconnected with drinking water supply sources (actual or potential), either
naturally or as a result of fracturing or fissuring from oil field activities. Permit applications must
also include a plugging and abandonment plan, and operators are required to maintain financial as-
surance to ensure that wells will be properly closed, plugged and abandoned. See generally 42
U.S.C. § 300h (2000); 40 C.F.R. § 144 (2000). In some locations, landowner permission is also re-
quired. Subra Interview Ill, supra note 272.
281. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1997).
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E. Burial of Pipelines
The fifth highlighted measure provides for pipelines (including flow
lines) to be buried underground.282 This practice reduces the risk of ac-
cidental spills from vehicles that collide into pipelines from the roads,
and is also an aesthetic improvement. However, it could increase the risk
of spills due to failures in the integrity of the pipeline system, and reduce
the company's ability to detect leaks. Among other stresses, pipelines
are subject to corrosion and abrasion. To prevent spills and leakage, all
aging pipelines need systematic inspection, repair and rehabilitation.
Burying the lines can make this considerably more difficult and expen-
sive. According to one expert, buried pipelines in a rainforest should be
replaced in their entirety after fifteen years; some oil field workers, how-
ever, say that lines could last considerably longer (or for less time), de-
pending on how they are constructed.283
Occidental's assessment in the 1992 EIA of potential impacts from
pipeline failures is incomplete and superficial. The EMP does not pro-
vide for pipeline replacement, or include measures to inspect and assess
the state of the lines or otherwise prevent accidental spills of oil and
other pollutants. According to corporate officials, the company uses ca-
thodic protection and physical pigs to protect against corrosion, and the
life expectancy of the pipelines is the life of the project. Occidental does
not, however, use "smart pigs," because they are too expensive.284 Smart
pigs are generally considered to be much more reliable that physical
pigs; however, even smart pigs may not detect corrosion in some areas of
a pipeline.285  Excavation and manual inspection with gamma radiogra-
282. EMP, supra note 116, at 3.
283. According to foreign oil field workers based in Ecuador, Occidental was the first company
there to use an expensive machine to coat the inside of pipelines during construction. The coating
can provide effective and long-lasting protection against corrosion; however, the application process
had not been perfected, and there are almost certainly pinholes where the coating was not properly
applied. As a result, all of the corrosion can be expected to concentrate at those locations, and with
time, the integrity of the line will fail. Without the internal coating, corrosion would be more dis-
persed, and may not lead as quickly to ruptures in the line. This suggests that new, cutting edge
technology may unexpectedly operate to increase environmental risks, when applications have not
been adequately tested and perfected in the field; and some features of new models for oil field op-
erations can be experimental rather than proven models.
284. CPF Visit, supra note 32.
285. Corrosion may be more systematic in a wet climate. Technically, pigs do not detect corro-
sion. Rather, physical pigs are run through pipelines to clean out scale, sludge and sediment that
accumulate on internal surfaces, thereby enhancing longevity. "Smart" pigs also detect irregularities
in the internal surfaces of pipelines. By detecting thinning in pipeline walls, "smart" pigs can be
used to inspect pipelines for the effects of internal corrosion, allowing assessment of the potential for
leaks, cracks and voids (hollow areas inside a pipeline wall.) Cathodic protection mitigates corro-
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phy and ultrasonic thickness measurements may be also needed to gener-
ate a complete picture of the condition of the line.2 86  Moreover, it is
questionable whether pigs can be used in flow lines, because they are
narrower than secondary and other pipelines. According to a European
study funded by the United Nations Environment Program, corrosion is
already a major problem at CPF.287  According to recent reports from
residents of Limoncocha, there have been five spills from flow lines in
their community in a period of less than one year.288 Without proper in-
spection, repair and rehabilitation, the risk of spills and leakage from
pipelines in Block 15 will increase considerably over time, and can be
expected to present major long term environmental threats, even after
Occidental leaves Block 15.289
F. Limiting the Width of Roads
The final design decision highlighted in the EMP is to limit the width
sion. Shuey Interview I, supra note 115; see also JOHN L. KENNEDY, OIL AND GAS PIPELINE
FUNDAMENTALS (2d ed. 1993); Rules of Flow, Metal Studied in U.K. Corrosion Failures, OIL AND
GAS J. (Aug. 16, 1999).
286. See, eg.. Rules of Flow, supra note 285.
287. Jorg Hettler et. al., Environmental Problems of Petroleum Production in the Amazon Low-
lands of Ecuador, Final report of a study funded by the United Nations Environment Programme,
Berlin, 1996. The study did not systematically review operations or impacts in Block 15, and pri-
marily discusses conditions elsewhere. Among other information, the report includes data showing
groundwater contamination from waste pits built and operated by Texaco and Petroecuador, and
some surface water contamination. Despite the United Nations sponsorship, the significance of the
data for affected communities, and the growing recognition in international environmental law of the
importance of broad public participation and access to information, the study has not been publicly
reported or widely distributed outside of government and industry. The author's work is cited in the
report; but she did not learn about the study until after a copy of the report was leaked to her in 1999,
from an Ecuadorian government agency. The source requested anonymity, because of concern that
oil companies would disapprove, and become less cooperative.
288. The spills occurred between late 1999 and July 2000. According to residents, two were from
flow lines that carry a mixture of oil, brine and gas to CPF; the other'three occurred at the same
place, where a flow line carrying produced water (most likely to an injection well) "exploded" and
spilled wastes into a swamp in the watershed of Lake Limoncocha. Occidental reportedly repaired
the lines quickly, and told residents who complained that the produced water is "not chemicals, it is
salt"; and "it is natural, harmless; you can drink it." This is similar to a general pattern of practice
reported by Quichua in Block 15, in which Occidental assures residents that waste discharges do not
contain contaminants, and are safe to drink.
289. Most likely, Petroecuador will continue to operate facilities in Block 15 after Occidental's
Contract expires. Occidental is legally required to hand over production facilities to Petroecuador at
that time. Law of Hydrocarbons, supra note 57, art. 29; Contract, supra note 29, paras. 5.1.21 &
18.6.
In the United States, spills from flow lines are not uncommon, and the paucity of specific regula-
tory requirements for corrosion inspections and periodic replacement of pipelines (including flow
lines) has been criticized outside of the industry. Shuey Interview I, supra note 115; Subra Interview
i, supra note 266.
[26:2
International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields
of roads.2 90 The rationale for this is unclear, considering the breadth and
nature of damages typically associated with road building in tropical for-
ests. Limiting the width of a road does not appear to be significant, when
compared with environmental and social impacts of road building gener-
ally. In addition to roads for production operations, Occidental-unlike
some other companies-has also built roads for exploratory drilling ac-
tivities.291 Ecuador's new Ministry of the Environment considers roads
in the Amazon region to be a major problem, including roads built in the
last decade, where colonization has so far been limited. A current prior-
ity of the agency is to convince oil companies to accept a moratorium on
new road construction in the region.292 Government officials generally
are excited about new production facilities that were built by another
TNC, ARCO, without a permanent road. A high voltage electric mono-
rail provides transportation along the pipeline. ARCO decided not to
bury the line for environmental reasons. According to Oil and Gas
Journal, project managers sought to "minimize excavation that would
damage mature tree roots and cause corrosion.2 93
A significant change that is not highlighted in the EMP, but has been
implemented by Occidental in Block 15, is the use of water for dust con-
trol on roads, instead of waste oil. If the company consistently uses
clean water-rather than wastewater-then the measure constitutes a ma-
jor improvement over standards and practices established by Texaco.
Corporate officials say they use only clean groundwater on the road;
however, some residents offer conflicting reports, and say that the com-
pany has used contaminated water on at least some occasions. In addi-
tion, the environmental impact of using freshwater resources for road
spraying is not assessed in the 1992 EIA. As a general matter, the EIA
does not include a clear and comprehensive assessment of possible envi-
ronmental and social impacts from road-building activities, and even as-
serts-without supporting evidence or analysis-that road maintenance
activities will be a beneficial impact of Occidental's operations.294 In
addition to potential long-term and regional impacts, a number of local
grievances have been linked to road construction in Block 15, including
290. EMP, supra note 16, at 3.
291. Use of helicopter transport is generally regarded as a better environmental and social prac-
tice.
292. Interview with Jorge Alban, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of the Environment, in Quito, Ecua-
dor (Aug. 19, 1999).
293. Bob Williams, ARCO's Villano Project: Improvised Solutions in Ecuador's Rainforest, OIL
& GAS J. 22 (Aug. 2, 1999). Since building the facilities, ARCO was purchased by British Petro-
leum (BP). BP sold ARCO's interests in Ecuador, and the facilities are now operated by Agip.
294. See 1992 EIA, supra note 33.
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dust pollution, noise, and the destruction of fisheries and crops due to
disruption of natural drainage patterns.95
X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is nothing new about environmental self-regulation by oil com-
panies in Amazonia. The longstanding failure of governments to imple-
ment environmental law has effectively allowed companies to set the
standards for their operations and police themselves. However, the fail-
ure of national governments to act to protect the environment has gener-
ally been regarded as a serious problem. At the Earth Summit, Ecuador
and other governments pledged to change course, and implement na-
tional laws and regulations to protect the environment, and ensure that
development is fair to future generations. Proponents of globalization
argue that free trade helps developing nations do this, by exporting inter-
national standards and strengthening democratic institutions and the rule
of law, including environmental law.
This case study, however, reveals a radical new development in envi-
ronmental law in Ecuador. Occidental has negotiated a legal framework
with the government that, for the most part, seems designed to perpetuate
and even legalize the exclusive reliance on corporate environmental self-
regulation. Whereas self-regulation historically occurred because of in-
action by the State, in Occidental's current Contract with Ecuador, the
government effectively cedes authority to the company to set environ-
mental standards for its operations, without public disclosure and consul-
tation, review and approval by government officials, or other democratic
safeguards.296 In effect, the State is contracting environmental protection
to Occidental, along with oil exploration and production activities; this
represents the privatization of environmental law. As a matter of na-
tional policy, the new legal regime has not been publicly disclosed and
debated in Ecuador.297 This raises serious questions of law, legitimacy
295. See supra Pt. IX, sec. A and accompanying text; Kimerling 2001, supra note 27.
296. As discussed supra, the Contract also includes provisions that seem designed to try to limit
Occidental's liability for environmental injuries. As with self-regulation, environmental account-
ability has traditionally been limited because of State inaction, and in particular, the absence of im-
partial fora for victims of environmental wrongdoing. As the possibility of legal liability-at some
time in the future-increases for injuries caused by the international operations of TNCs, Occidental
and Ecuador appear to have negotiated contractual provisions that can be used to help protect the
company and limit environmental liability. Some of those provisions are highlighted, supra notes
163-65 and accompanying text; however, a full discussion of liability issues is beyond the scope of
this article.
297. Proposals to privatize certain assets and operations, including the generation and distribution
of electricity, telephone and water service, social security, road-building and crude oil transportation,
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and accountability, and could operate to undermine democracy and the
rule of law in Ecuador, in addition to presenting environmental and so-
cial risks.
The privatization of environmental law represents an abdication by the
State of one of its most basic responsibilities to its people. It is legally
dubious in Ecuador because it contradicts the government's constitu-
tional and statutory environmental duties; bypasses the national legisla-
ture; and effectively eviscerates the rights of indigenous peoples in Block
15 and other Ecuadorians to participate in environmental decisions that
can affect them. As a policy matter, it is unwise, because it substitutes
private law for public law without democratic safeguards, and transfers
control over compliance with state objectives to the special interests that
have to meet those objectives. It grants legislative and administrative
powers to a foreign oil company, without clear standards or procedural
safeguards. Occidental, like all private (non-State) companies, is profit-
driven, and answers first and foremost to its stockholders. Environ-
mental protection can be expensive, and conflict with private interests to
reduce costs. Environmental decisions by Occidental must necessarily
reflect the company's private interests. The legal regime defined by the
Contract and EMP, however, does not allow for countervailing forces to
balance those private decisions and protect the interests of the public,
such as public notice, comment and scrutiny; or government approval,
based on a rational determination of the public interest, that is guided by
democratic legislation. The potential for abuse is unlimited. Political
accountability is absent. Inequities in the distribution of political power
in Ecuador are compounded. The privatization of environmental law
sends a chilling message-that governments like Ecuador are not capable
of implementing environmental law to regulate industrial development
by TNCs.
Democracy and the rule of law mean many things to many people, but
surely they do not mean that the power to write environmental law can
be properly delegated to a foreign oil company, based on stealth negotia-
tions between special interests and a small group of officials who belong
to a discredited and distrusted political class. Before Occidental's Con-
have been controversial in Ecuador because of economic and nationalist concerns. As a result, pro-
gress towards privatization has been limited, when compared with other countries in Latin America.
The lack of national consensus on privatization and other neo-liberal economic policies, including
increases in the price of gasoline and natural gas, have contributed to outbreaks of social unrest in
recent years. Notwithstanding the spotlight on privatization in Ecuador, the public debate has not
included proposals for the privatization of environmental law. This is not surprising because such
proposals would likely generate considerable controversy and could contribute to social unrest.
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tract becomes a litmus test for democratic development and the rule of
law in Ecuador, it should itself respect the spirit of democracy and the
law, including laws that favor the interests of local residents and the pub-
lic. The Contract should be publicly disclosed and evaluated in Ecuador.
To inform that discussion, Occidental should fully disclose the standards
it selected, and other environmental information; and a credible, inde-
pendent and transparent audit should be undertaken, to evaluate the com-
pany's environmental standards and performance.298
There is no question that international standards and corporate respon-
sibility offer great promise for needed improvements in oil field opera-
tions in Ecuador and throughout Amazonia. At the same time, however,
they are not without considerable peril. This study shows that "corporate
responsibility" and "international standards" can operate to undermine
the development of national environmental law and capacity, by arbitrar-
ily legitimizing norms that have been defined by special interests, and
reassuring government officials and other stakeholders that practices are
improving, based on enigmatic standards that lie beyond the reach--or
responsibility-of national authorities. For Occidental, the invocation of
international standards is a tool that helps the company maintain domi-
nance over environmental decision-making and implementation, and de-
flect and discourage meaningful oversight. International standards mys-
tify Ecuadorian environmental officials and local residents, and
Occidental exploits their lack of information and experience to cultivate
confusion about the standards and practices for its operations. Occiden-
tal uses the cloak of international standards and corporate responsibility
to wrap its operations in a veneer of environmental excellence and social
responsibility and beef up its public image.
Experience in Ecuador shows that international standards cannot be
divorced from the social, economic, and political context in which they
operate. At the same time, however, a major source of potential abuse
can be linked to the widespread confusion, outside of industry circles,
about the sources and substance of applicable norms. The international
community can act to address that problem by developing transparent
and participatory mechanisms that can be used to independently evaluate
and verify environmental claims by TNCs at specific locations. Those
mechanisms should: (1) clearly identify applicable standards, and their
source; (2) verify compliance with applicable standards; (3) evaluate the
effectiveness of standards by measuring environmental performance in
concrete terms; (4) identify measures and standards that could be used to
298. For a more detailed proposal, see Kimerling 2001, supra note 27, at 244-45.
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raise environmental protection levels and repair damages; (5) develop
transparent and credible monitoring and review protocols that could be
implemented, for the most part, by national residents and officials, in-
cluding local communities, throughout the life of the project; and (6) in-
clude a public outreach and education program that invites government
officials, local residents, environmentalists, and other interested members
of the public to participate in the review, and ensures that the findings
and recommendations can serve as meaningful tools for environmental
education. Two measures will be needed to enhance the credibility of
the reviews: (1) the team conducting the review should include experts
that have been selected by local communities and environmentalists, in
addition to industry and government experts; and (2) and the work of the
group must be transparent, and its findings recorded and justified.
At first blush, TNCs will likely resist this type of participatory audit,
so some form of lawmaking, at the national or international level, may be
needed. However, TNCs that are serious about raising environmental
standards should welcome an opportunity to credibly demonstrate their
progress, and get public recognition for environmental improvements. In
addition, the interests of responsible TNCs will be served by distinguish-
ing their activities from operations by free riders. Free riders are compa-
nies that do not raise standards; they can put other companies at a com-
petitive disadvantage, and injure the public image of an entire industry.
By reviewing operations at specific locations, participatory audits
would promote meaningful international standards by helping to move
the discourse from vague generalities to concrete measures. They would
respond directly to the real world needs of local residents who are con-
cerned about the impact of operations in their communities, but feel
overpowered by TNCs, neglected by their government, and without
anywhere to turn for assistance or relief. Participatory audits could also
help promote the development of national environmental law and democ-
ratic decision-making in countries like Ecuador, by nurturing and inform-
ing a dialogue, in concrete terms, between government officials, local
residents, TNCs and other stakeholders about environmental standards
and oversight. This would further serve to help governments implement
international-and perhaps also national as in Ecuador-law commit-
ments to guarantee the participation of indigenous peoples and affected
residents in environmental decision-making and implementation. Fi-
nally, the audits offer a concrete mechanism to continually improve envi-
ronmental standards and performance at many locations in the develop-
ing world, and would help inform the international trade debate.
Some things are changing in the oil fields in Ecuador. But the compa-
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nies are still firmly in control of operations, including environmental
standards and practices, and in some areas, local residents are frustrated,
and sometimes angry.299 In a few locations, including Block 15, TNCs
may be beginning to raise levels of protection for some activities, at least
in the short term. However, this is not certain, and requires independent
verification and long-term monitoring. One critical question that cannot
be answered from the public record in Block 15 is whether groundwater
aquifers are protected from contamination by injection operations, land-
fills and buried pipelines.3° In addition, there are a number of other un-
answered questions and problems, clear room for improvement, and a
need for transparency, oversight and accountability. Even under a best
case scenario, with high standards and serious efforts at implementation,
problems arise, and enormous risks and uncertainties remain. Corporate
ethics and self-regulation should play a role in raising levels of environ-
mental protection in the oil fields, but they are not a panacea that can re-
place government regulation.
In the Amazon Rainforest, the potential environmental, social and cul-
tural costs of continued experimentation with industrial "sustainable" de-
velopment are high. At best, the jury is still out on whether oil compa-
nies can extract oil and gas from a fragile rainforest environment without
serious injury; the track record of the industry in Ecuador to date sug-
gests that they cannot. Moreover, the cumulative impact of expanding
oil, gas, and international pipeline projects throughout Amazonia has not
been adequately assessed. At least some areas-including protected ar-
eas, swamps and flooded forests-should be off-limits to oil and gas de-
velopment, and local communities that want a different model of devel-
opment should have the right to turn away TNCs.30 1  No new
development should go forward in Amazonia until the oil industry has
credibly demonstrated-by action at existing facilities rather than plans
299. In October 2000, an oil worker was speared and wounded by an indigenous Huaorani, after
his nine-month-old infant died. A Colombian company working in the area, Petrocol, was blamed
for the death, because it had failed to provide medical assistance or transportation. In a communica-
tion to the press, the Huaorani organization, ONHAE, explained the incident as a reflection of "the
extreme conditions in which our people live because of the petroleum companies in the territory,
[prompting] the return of old Huaorani traditions for defense and vengeance." Organization of the
Huaorani Nationality of the Ecuadorian Amazon - ONHAE, Comunicado de Prensa (Press Com-
munication] (Oct. 10, 2000). Five oil "blocks" cover eighty percent of Huaorani territory, and there
is no "serious" prior consultation with the Huaorani or credible environmental and social controls or
monitoring., Id.
300. Injection can increase the risk of groundwater contamination; as a result, it could operate to
lower levels of aquifer protection, and create new problems, especially in deeper strata.
301. This includes uncontacted and isolated groups of indigenous peoples, whose territories
should be off-limits to industry and other development by outsiders.
[26:2
2001] International Standards in Ecuador's Amazon Oil Fields 397
for future ones-that it can honor promises to protect the environment
and respect local cultures.302 As a general matter, for international stan-
dards and corporate responsibility to play a constructive role in trade and
development, reliably raise environmental standards, and help nations
like Ecuador strengthen democratic institutions and develop environ-
mental law, then, at a minimum, the applicable standards must be clear
and transparent, and their effectiveness independently verified, with
community involvement, in the light of the day.
302. The environmental NGOs Oilwatch and Acci6n Ecol6gica have called for a moratorium on
new oil development in Ecuador. See Esperanza Martinez, MORATORIA A LA ACTIVIDAD PETROLERA
[MORATORIUM ON PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES], in EL ECUADOR POST PETROLERO [POST-PETROLEUM
ECUADORI (2000).

